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ABSTRACT
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represents an exciting 
and revolutionary development in the field of international law generally and 
international criminal law specifically. Unfortunately there are many ways in which 
academics, the media and political decision-makers misinterpret its intent and its 
nature. This thesis considers these traps and embarks upon an analysis of 
international criminal law by considering the content o f the Statute and how it 
proceeds to establish an International Criminal Court, capable of bringing those 
most serious perpetrators to account The subject matter of the ICC reveals a 
Court with a very limited jurisdiction, over a very limited category of international 
crimes, in a specific context The backbone of the Court is a novel concept called 
“complementarity.* The concept is worth exploring in detail, for it reveals a Statute 
that introduces a new vocabulary of how an international court is capable of 
functioning, yet at the same time being respectful of the primary right of States to 
prosecute international crimes themselves. Yet the concept is even more 
intriguing, for it establishes the Court as an institution that neither centralizes 
international criminal judicial authority, nor establishes a hierarchy of international 
criminal law. It actually reinforces the decentralized nature of international law. 
The ICC is required to presume that States are acting in full propriety in the 
manner in which they dispose of suspected international criminals, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. Prosecutorial and judicial discretionary power is 
restricted and supervised by the disparate personalities within the international 
legal system. This approach has profound implications for truth and reconciliation 
commissions (TRCs) and amnesties associated with them. The whole notion of 
complementarity rests on a unique view of international law as being decentralized 
and exercised through consensus, negotiation, equality, deliberation and 
communication, rather than through the establishment of hierarchies of law and 
institutions or imposition and command. This is a reflexive vision, supported by 
contemporary international legal practice -  especially the proliferation of 'regional 
arrangements.* It is not a well-recognized system however. Opposition to the 
Rome Statute is mired in the expectation of seeing the familiar patterns of the 
centralized and hierarchical domestic legal systems, projected into the 
international. Both Indian and American arguments reflect a lack of imagination 
and a lack o f vision to break free from the chains of traditional legal thought.
ix
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C h a p t e r  1
Chapter One: The State of the Field 
Introduction
On 22 April 2002 a ceremony took place in the New York headquarters of the 
United Nations.1 Ten States deposited their ratifications to a multilateral treaty 
called the Rome Statute, thereby authorizing the creation of the International 
Criminal Court2 In accordance with the Rome Statute’s requirement of a minimum 
of sixty ratifications, the treaty entered into force on 1 July 2002.3 The treaty 
authorizes the establishment of a permanent global court, to bring to account 
individuals for specific international crimes.4
1 Secretary General of the United Nations, The Secretary General Off the Cuff, ‘Rome, 
Italy, 11 April 2002 - Press conference with President Carlo Ciampi following ratification 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (11 April 2002), online: 
United Nations <http://www0.un.org/News/ossg/sgcuff.htm>(date accessed: 25 April 
2002).
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 
reprinted in William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 167-247Jhereinafter the Rome 
Statute). Other documents associated with the Statute and the ICC include: Report of 
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Finalized 
Draft Text of the Elements o f Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/lNF/3/Add.2, reprinted in 
Schabas, ibid. at 248-292 [hereinafter the Elements of Cranes]; and Report o f the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Finalized Draft 
Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.3, 
reprinted in Schabas, ibid. at 293-382 [hereinafter the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence).
3 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 126. By 1 July 2002, there were 76 States Parties 
to the Rome Statute that had ratified. (Source: ‘Multilateral treaties deposited with the 
Secretary-General- TREATY l-XVIII,* UN Treaty Database Online: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treaty10.as 
p> (date accessed: 5 July 2002).
4 For current information regarding the Advance Team’s efforts in setting up the Court, see 
their web site at < http://www.un.org/law/icc/>. The first meeting of the Assembly of 
States Parties will be held from 3 to 10 September at UN Headquarters. See: PCNICC, 
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, PCNICC 
Doc. No. PCNICC/2002/2 (24 July 2002), online at the ICC web site mentioned in the 
previous sentence.
1
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2
Despite the optimism following ratification, numerous States remain resolute in 
their opposition to the Statute, including: the Peoples’ Republic of China, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan.5 The representatives o f more than two-thirds of 
the global population have not accepted the Statute or the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court The United States reluctantly signed the Rome 
Statute in 2000, but on 6 May 2002, withdrew its signature. It considered the 
Statute seriously flawed. This action paved the way for the final enactment on 3 
August 2002 of the anti-ICC legislation known as American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act o f 2002* This Act actively attempts to undermine the membership 
of those States that have ratified the Rome Statute and prevents any form of 
cooperation by the United States with the Court. The United States is now 
negotiating bilateral treaties in order to provide exemption for “covered allied 
persons” and “covered United States persons” by States Parties to the Rome 
Statute7
5 Supra note 3.
6 American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 2002 H.R. 4775 § 2001-2015 
annexed to Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 2002 H.R. 4775 
[hereinafter ASPA]. The text of ASPA was obtained from the web site of the Washington 
Working Group on the International Criminal Court 
<http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/ASPA-HR4775.html> (date accessed: 18 August
2002). It should also be available at the US Federal Legislative Library web site 
<http://thomas.loc.govA>, although that web site was not non-functional at the time of 
writing. The Act was signed by President Bush on 3 August 2002 (see: “U.S.:'Hague 
Invasion Act1 Becomes Law: White House 'Stops at Nothing’ in Campaign Against War 
Crimes Court” Human Rights Watch (3 August 2002), online: Human Rights Watch 
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/aspa080302.htm> (date accessed: 17 August
2002). The House of Representatives and Senate passed the harmonized Act on 23 and 
24 July, respectively.
7 The terms ‘covered allied persons” and “covered United States persons” are those used 
in ASPA at § 2015. On 12 July 2002, the Security Council agreed to a resolution 
exempting American personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court for one year, which 
ended the American threat to terminate U.N. peacekeeping operations (Edith M. 
Lederer, ‘U.N. Reaches Deal on War Crimes Court” Associated Press (12 July 2002)). 
The text of the relevant Security Council Resolution (Resolution 1422 (2002), SC Res. 
1422 2002, UN Doc S/RES/1422 (12 July 2002), online United Nations web site 
<http://Www.un.org> (date accessed: 18 August 2002)) is contained in Security Council, 
Press Release SC/7450, ‘Security Council Requests International Criminal Court Not to 
Bring Cases Against Peacekeeping Personnel from States not Party to Statute: 
Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1422 (2002); Request is for 12 Months, with Annual
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Despite such hullabaloo, the Rome Statute represents a significant development in 
international criminal law, if not international law generally. Controversy and 
limited participation are not necessarily indicators of certain failure; they are 
however indicators that the Court has a long way to go in order to achieve 
legitimacy in the eyes o f some of the planet's most influential and populous States.
Exploration of a New Legal Field
The International Criminal Court is an entirely new court Its jurisdiction represents 
the frontier of a pioneering field of law - “international criminal law.” A quick survey 
of university legal courses reveals that international criminal law is rapidly 
becoming a widely taught subject at law schools.8 A number of American 
universities maintain regular internships at some of the main international courts 
and tribunals.9 The topic is far-reaching. There are broad implications for human 
rights, extradition law, administrative law, public international law, criminal law and 
the laws of war (“international humanitarian law”). Sometimes the separation 
between law and politics (international relations) is not always clear. One might 
argue that law strives to lim it the exercise of absolute power, whereas politics 
strives to justify the exercise of absolute power.10 At other times the field may
Renewals Intended” (12 July 2002), online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7450.doc.htm>. This negotiated
settlement only amounted to a temporary reprieve. The passage of ASPA has re­
established the American antagonism to the ICC.
8 Including the University of Edinburgh, the University of Glasgow, Rutgers, and McGill. 
The McGill course syllabus is online: McGill Law School <
http://www.law.mcgiH.ca/>(date accessed: 24 April 2002).
9 Including Harvard and Northwestern, from the author’s own experience as an intern at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2000 and 2001) and at The 
International Court of Justice (1999).
10 Consider Anthony Carty, “Why Theory? - The Implications for International Law 
Teaching,” in Philip Allott, Tony Carty, Martti Koskenniemi and Colin Warbrick, eds. 
Theory and International Law: An Introduction (London: The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 1991) at 83. Professor Carty explains why it is that 
international lawyers and international relations academics do not generally get along. 
The roots rest in the disillusionment in the aftermath of World Wlar I. Refer generally to 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989) -  one of the central themes of mis 
book is that legal realists represent apologists, while legal idealists represent Utopians.
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appear to lack coherence. Frequently the quality o f secondary analysis is wanting. 
Such traits should not be surprising in a new area o f law that develops by the day. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the manner in which the International Criminal 
Court is designed to operate, as specified in the Rome Statute. Rather than simply 
re-describing the Rome Statute, a contextual approach w ill be adopted. The 
provisions contained in the Rome Statute w ill be examined within the context of the 
emergent international criminal legal system, drawing heavily upon the two ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals (the ICTY and ICTR). The goal will be to gain a 
greater appreciation for the emergent legal field and present a framework in which 
to understand its complexity.
Sources
Where possible, reliance is made on primary sources including the Rome Statute 
itself, various documents relating to the Statute (such as the travaux preparatoires) 
and related documents concerning the ad hoc tribunals.11 Academic literature on 
international (criminal) law falls largely into the following categories: legal realism 
{l’6tatisme), legal positivism (absolute or universal human rights); universalism; 
and parallelism (sometimes referred to as “dualism”).12 Like any categorization, 
this one probably does not do justice to the variety of outlooks present13 They
Ronald Dworkin describes the approach using human rights as "trumps’” designed to 
counter and limit administrative discretion by recourse to realist ’policies.”  (R. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) at xi as cited in 
Martii Koskenniemi, “The Effects of Rights on Political Culture,’  in Philip Alston et at, 
ed., The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 101.
11 In this respect access to the Internet has been crucial. It has provided a means of 
obtaining recent documents in a timely and cost-effective manner.
12 Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, Juricultural Pluralism vis-d-vis Treaty Law (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) at 72-74.
13 For a comprehensive discussion on the historical development of various perspectives 
in international law (and the sovereignty of States), see: Luzius Wildhaber,
Wechseispiel Zwischen Innen Und Aussen: Schweizer Landesrecht,
Rectsvergieichung, VOIkenecht (Basel un Frankfurt am Main: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 
1996) at 19-49. Note that Martti Koskenniemi reduces these categories even further to 
two -  the legal realist v. the legal idealist (what he calls “apologist v. utopian”).
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may not always be distinct at times. Nevertheless the categorization is convenient 
for the purposes of this thesis.
Conceptual Bases of Existent International Criminal Law Literature
Presuppositions
The conceptual bases of the existing literature need to be considered before 
embarking on any extended analysis. Certain presuppositions tend to colour the 
analysis from the start potentially distorting how one perceives the International 
Criminal Court and international criminal jurisdiction. Bias exists in many forms 
permeating not only thinking but also the use of language and terminology. 
Certain terms used in certain ways, represent indicators of a certain outlook. It 
may be inappropriate to use such terms to describe the International Criminal 
Court The language may restrict our ability to depart from established concepts 
and to examine new innovations in international law. Nowhere is this more 
evident, than in the confusion arising from the use of ambiguous terminology in the 
Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, where one refers to “primacy” and “concurrent 
jurisdiction.” There are four main schools of thought that must be considered. 
Unfortunately each school has deficiencies, which render each an inappropriate 
filter through which to examine the International Criminal Court and its jurisdiction. 
Such deficiencies arise due to inherent bias.
Legal Realism
Traditional international law would normally propose two doctrines that direct the 
behaviour of States in international law: obligation and consent The two
doctrines exist in tension.14 Adherents to classical international law would argue
14 For Koskenniemi, the objective/subjective has to be a false dichotomy. The two have to 
coexist. Like electromagnetic poles in physics, they cannot exist independently for the 
relative relationship to one, defines the other. They have an inherent duality. Left 
without mediation or balance, one will “devour” the other -  hence the need for what he 
calls “mediation.” Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of
International Legal Argument, supra note 10 at 464. To the Taoists, this is the 
embodiment of the ying and the yang; these forces of opposition (lightness and 
darkness; physical reality and spirituality; male and female; and life and death) need to
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that States are the sole holders of legal personality in the international domain. 
Since they are absolutely sovereign, their freedom of action is limitless. Anarchy 
of a sort occurs, as States attempt to optimize their self-interest -  often called 
"legal realism.”15 There is a hint of classical liberalism in this approach and an 
analogue to the self-regulating, firee-market economy. Proponents would include 
Oppenheim and Hedley Bull.16 The State is omnipotent. Its consent is essential to 
the legitimacy of any international legal rule. There is no place for morality. The 
conduct of States is perceived as being entirely objective, amoral and "clinical.”
Legal Positivism
Legal positivists would hold that international law is a set of rules that describe 
what behaviour is and ought to be. Hans Kelsen visualized law as a system of 
hierarchical norms, adhered to, voluntarily and through coercion -  but also through 
the centralization of both enforcement and legislative authority.17 Coercion and 
centralization are crucial elements to positivism. Austin felt that international law 
was not quite law as it lacked the enforcement capability of punishing offending 
States; while, Hart felt that the lack of a central authority did not deprive 
international law of its legal character, although it did make it defective.18 In the
be in balance for a harmonious universe to exist; see Patricia Ebrey, Chinese 
Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 77-79.
15 Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 72-74.
16 See generally: Lassa Oppenheim, A Treatise on International Law (London: Longmans, 
Green & co., 1905-06) and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). In Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: 
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1940-41 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1942) at 56-79, Kelsen suggests that this nihilist argument is the 
weakest counter to the legalistic argument that war is forbidden in principle. 
Oppenheim’s approach denies the legal order in total, as it is incompatible with absolute 
state sovereignty. For Kelsen *a more serious” argument is that war is moraNy forbidden 
and that it is a sanction for wrongful State behaviour. The problem is that the victor is 
not always right and a war of aggression may not necessarily be motivated by wrongful 
behaviour on the part of the victim-State. For Kelsen though, the "most striking 
objection” is to consider war as neither a sanction nor a delict. In that case who decides 
what is a ‘just war?"
17 Hans Kelsen, ibid. at 45-55.
11 Ibid.
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absence o f the utopian dream of centralized legislative authority (a world 
government), Kelsen saw a centralized judiciary as vital: it being capable of 
determining when an individual State committed the ultimate transgression, and 
therefore when use of the ultimate coercive action was appropriate - "the just 
war.”19 Legal positivists emphasize the expression of legal centralism - possibly 
analogizing international law to domestic law.20 Thus for Kelsen, the “just war” was 
the international analogue of the domestic criminal prosecution.
Since positivism not only dictates what law is, but what it ought to be, it is intolerant 
of legal diversity or “juricultural pluralism.*21 There is only one interpretation. Yet 
the intolerance is also directed toward legal discourse, for positivism also denies 
that there is any other theoretical approach to understanding international law:22
That international theory of law of the past hundred years seems 
both curiously repetitive and practically inconsequential follows 
from its dogmatic insistence on the conceptual primacy of 
‘international society1 to international law. For neither ‘rules’ nor 
‘behaviour’ offer a fully transparent wherewithal to reach the 
meaning of social events or actions (law or not-law, sanction or 
violence?). Interpretative assumptions are needed -  assumptions 
which cannot, however, be validated by further reference to 
empirical facts because it is through them that lawyers invest the 
facts of State practice with legal meaning.
"Uncompromising” supporters of absolute inviolate human rights may fit into this 
category too.23 Positivism engenders certainty but also rigidity and inflexibility.
19 Ibid. at 45 and 52.
20 Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 67.
21 Ibid. at 68.
22 Martti Koskenniemi, "Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,* in Philip Allot and others, 
ed., Theory and International Law: An Introduction, supra note 10 at 11.
23 Martti Koskenniemi suggests that "rights” as a concept emerged in support of 
liberalism’s efforts to constrain government and politics against realists bent on applying 
social utility and clinically “objective" policies. Thus "rights” became a "trump” (in Ronald 
Dworkin’s words) to counter and limit administrative policies based in legal realism. See: 
Martii Koskenniemi, “The Effects of Rights on Political Culture, " in Philip Alston and 
others, supra note 10 at 101.
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Yet for a State to impose an obligation upon itself, through consent, is to restrict its 
freedom of action. Obligation is the antithesis of consent How can a folly 
sovereign State bind itself to adhere to an obligation? Malcolm Shaw describes 
this incongruity as the “paradox o f dualism.'24 The international legal system is 
founded upon this contradiction. In public international law, the limits upon what 
powers the State may exercise are defined in the United Nations Charter -  to 
which all member States of the United Nations must comply.25 One might 
compound the paradox by considering customary law. How can a State be bound 
to adhere to international norms or treaties to which it did not freely consent? This 
is not an easy question to answer, but the fact remains that such obligations have 
been deemed to exist by some international criminal legal experts and tribunals.26
Universalism
For the universalist, an emphasis is placed on the obligation of the State to 
international norms, conventional or customary. There is no absolute sovereignty 
of the State. World Federalists represent an extreme position, advocating a global
24 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) at 185.
25 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 at Article 2. 
Substitute State for Members. See also Statute of the International Court o f Justice, 
Annex to Charter of the United Nations, Ibid. <http://www.icj-cij.org/>(date accessed: 16 
March 2002) [hereinafter the ICJ StatuteJ at Article 36. The ICJ Statute requires the 
precondition of State Consent to its jurisdiction over a specific case (or generally).
26 For example in the investigation following the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999, Louise 
Arbour (and her office), the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, concluded that the United States and France were bound by the 
Protocols of the Geneva Conventions even though they had not ratified them. It was felt 
they were so widely applied that they now constitute customary law. Of course this was 
not a judicial decision and therefore its precedential value is not much. Would the ICTY 
judges have decided differently? See, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (The Hague: 13 June 2000), online: <htto:/̂ ww.un.org/»cty/> (date 
accessed: 6 June 2001) and Michael Cottier, “Did NATO Forces Commit War Crimes 
During the Kosovo Conflict? Reflections on the Prosecutor’s Report of 13 June 2000,' in 
Fischer, Horst, KreB, Claus and LOder .Sascha Rolf, ed. International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (Berlin Vertag: 
Amo Spitz, GmbH, 2001).
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court capable of imposing its jurisdiction over the State.27 Advocates of natural 
justice represent a less extreme position, but argue that all secular law is 
subordinate to some higher law -  sometimes divine, sometimes philosophical. 
Examples might include S t Augustine and Grotius; Bentham; or the Islamic 
scholars who explained the Koran -  the Ijma.“  Liberal notions of the right to 
property or economic prosperity may also fall under this category.29
There are two problems with this approach. F irst efforts are made to analogize 
the international legal system (and courts) to their domestic counterparts.30 This is
27 For example one need only visit the web site of the World Federalist Association and 
read John B. Anderson, "...Without Global Law there Can be no Justice" and the WFA 
Statement of Goals and Beliefs (16 November 2001), online: 
<http://www.wfa.org/about/> (date accessed: 10 January 2002). Note the date on this 
document was incorrectly listed as 16 November 2002. Also see: Interview with William 
Pace by Diplomatie judiciaire, “[undated], online: Diplomatic judidaire
<http://www.dipiomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/ICCUK3.htm> (date accessed: 12 July 2002).
28 See generally, Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Being Summa theoiogiae, /-//; 
QQ. 90 through 97] (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). Charles 
Montesqieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, trans. A.Cohler et al. (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Printed for E. Wilson and W. Pickering, 
1823). For a survey of Islamic law, consider. N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978). Also consider the arguments put 
forward for universal legal principles independent of jurisdiction in Konrad zweigert and 
Hein KOtz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). One 
might add to this list the contemporary focus on globalization: see Bonaventura de 
Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the 
Paradigmatic Transition (New York: Routledge, 1995) and William Twining, 
Globalization and Legal Theory (London: Butterwortns, 2000).
29 A variant of natural justice even exists, called the "liberal theory of international law:" 
where the legitimacy of a legal rule or State behaviour rests upon a legitimate 
democratic regime with a free economy -  see William W. Burke-White, "Reframing 
Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty 
Legislation’ (2001) 42 Harv. Int’l L.J. 467 [echoing Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Liberal 
Theory of International Law,” (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int’T L. Proc. 240].
30 Consider for example: Stephen Edwards, ‘Israel Feels Chid from War Court: Standoff 
Looms over Jenin Probe Amid Fear Findings Could be Used Against Israeli Soldiers," 
National Post (27 April 2002), online: National Post Online 
<http://nationalpost.com/>(date accessed: 27 April 2002)[also on cover page of paper]. 
In this article Stephen Edwards described the Court as a "supranational war crimes 
tribunal." While the author was neutral with respect to the Court, his outlook is a popular 
assumption that Court is like a domestic court asserting its primacy of law and 
jurisdiction over all others. The Court might exercise primacy over an individual, but it 
does not exercise primacy over a domestic court system.
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reminiscent o f the positivists. The analogy is only superficial.31 The domestic legal 
system exists within a hierarchical system of government that asserts its dominion 
over its population. The international legal system exists decentralized and within 
a system that lacks a legislature. It merely exercises its authority only when a 
State has deferred a case to it or consented to its jurisdiction. There is no 
international institution with dominion over States, let alone individuals. The 
boundary between the judiciary and the executive (not to mention the legislature) 
is far more indistinct than in the domestic system:32
It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of 
powers which is largely followed in most municipal systems does 
not apply to the international setting...Among the principle organs 
of the United Nations the divisions between judicial, executive and 
legislative functions are not clear cut...There is however, no 
legislature...in the United Nations system and, more generally, no 
Padiament in the world community. That is to say, there exists no 
corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly binding 
on international legal subjects.
Thus the comparison of the two jurisdictions may amount to a denial of the sui 
generis character of international (criminal) law. It is comparing ‘apples to 
oranges.”
31 For example the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals may reflect a 
mixed civil law, common law character but that is where the comparison ends. See 
William Schabas, ‘Common law, «C ivil Law» et droit penal international: Tango (le 
dernier?) e La Haye," 13 R.Q.D.1.1 (2000) at 287-307.
32 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, ICTY, Appeal Chamber, Decision, 5 October 1994, online: 
ICTY web site <http://Www7un.org/icty/tadic/appeaydecision-e/51002> (date accessed 7 
December 2001) at Paragraph 43. [A parallel reference also exists: International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Decision n  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic 
(Establishment of the International Tribunal) [October 2, 1995] 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996)+] 
Contrast the approach taken here in discussing this Decision to that of Christopher 
Greenwood, which almost exclusively focuses on the Decision from the point of view of 
international humanitarian law: Christopher Greenwood, “International Humanitarian 
Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 265. For a discussion of the indistinctiveness 
between judiciary and executive in Canada and the United Kingdom, see B. Archibald, 
"The Politics of Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tensions 
between Punitive and Restorative Paradigms of Justice" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69 
at 73.
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The second criticism with the approach of universalists is that their arguments are 
predicated upon the assumption that there are universal international legal norms. 
By assuming that there exist binding norms, universalists could be regarded as 
being supranationalists, holding that States be bound by these norms. The 
position is in opposition to legal realism, although it may be closely related to 
positivism. Universalists would advance that the International Criminal Court must 
be authoritative, not compromise, and apply the “law.''33 They believe in a universal 
natural justice. Some military manuals of law refer to natural justice.34
Yet can it be said that there really are universal norms or even rules? When one 
refers to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols,35 they are 
considered by some to be universal in scope and application and therefore 
customary law, binding on all nations whether ratified or not.36 Yet the British
33 Louise Arbour, "The Responsibility to Protect: A Step Forward in Human Rights 
Protection: A Discussion of the Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty” (The Dalhousie University Chapter of the Canadian Lawyers’ 
Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR), Kings College, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia: 27 March 2002) [unpublished].
34 For example: Canadian Armed Forces, Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level V. 
20 9/01, CFP B-GG-005-027/AF-011 (Ottawa: Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
2001) [draft], online: DNET/JAG < http://www.dnd.ca/jag/>(date accessed: 15
November 2001) at 1-10. This may be reflective of a higher level of influence from the 
Quebec civil law in Canadian military legal system. This could be the subject of forther 
research.
35 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, (1950) 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, (1950) 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of C'tvtiian Persons in Time of 
War, (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter the Geneva Conventions of 1949]; and 
Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter the First Protocol]; and Protocol Additional II to the 1949 Geneva 
conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- 
International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Second Protocol].
36 Consider. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Office of the 
Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, supra note 27 at 
Paragraph 42. In the Report it was suggested that France and the United States were 
both bound by the Protocols since they were now customary law, even though neither 
had ratified them. Note that this Report is not a judgement from the Tribunal. It could
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government expressed reservations to the First Protocol: to apply exclusively to 
conventional weapons; not to apply where the defence of military necessity is 
advanced; not to include the commission of criminal or terrorist acts; to allow for 
the use of medical aircraft for other purposes that are military in nature; and that 
under certain circumstances, the nature of the offences may deprive the offenders 
of protection under the Protocol -  including a response in kind.37 Similarly the 
French government expressed reservations including its inability to guarantee the 
protection of installations containing dangerous forces and that the gendarmerie 
nationale was an integral part of the French armed forces.38 The existence of 
reservations and the diversity of interpretation vis-d-vis international human rights 
treaties tend to undermine the proposition that there are universal legal norms.39 
In contrast the Rome Statute prohibits reservations.40 By such prohibition, the 
Rome Statute represents an effort by the negotiators to make it into a statement of 
universal norms.
however have a degree of authority in that the Office of the Prosecutor is representative 
of the Secretary-General.
37 Schedule to the Geneva Conventions Act (First Protocol) Order 1998 (U.K.), S.l. 
1998/1754.
38 CICR, “Adhesion de la France au Protocole I du 8 juin 1977,' 842 R.I.C.R. 549, online: 
ICRC < http://Www.iac.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002).
39 Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12. Consider also: Alison Dundes Renteln, 
International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage
Publications, 1990) at 46-87; and Jerome J. Shestack, “The Jurisprudence of Human 
Rights* in Theodor Meron, ed., Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy 
Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 69-105. Shestack, Renteln and Bunn- 
Livingstone argue that there are universal legal norms, but that the way in which they 
are implemented differs due to cultural relativism and pluralism. The norms are not 
absolute but relative. For a discussion of the problem of reservations also consider 
Hugh M. Kindred, ed. International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 6<h 
ed., vol. 1 (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1999) [temporary edition] at 21-22 with specific 
reference to the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case, Adv. Op. [1951] 
I.C.J. Rep. 15 and how the issue appears to be unsettled still.
40 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 120 - although Article 124 allows for a transitional 
provision where the State Party may decline to accept jurisdiction of the Court for seven 
years. The Elements of Crimes also aims to restrict diverse interpretations of the crimes 
described in the Rome Statute.
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Ironically while universalist-proponents of the International Criminal Court see the 
body as a supranational entity, upholding international human rights, it is this same 
vision of the Court that some of its opponents seize upon.41 American opponents 
see the Court as a body that would indict American military personnel serving 
abroad and as a tool for challenging American foreign policy.42 Such an outlook is 
illogical, for an overriding precondition in the Rome Statute to its jurisdiction being 
admissible, is that there must be evidence of an unwillingness or inability to initiate 
domestic legal process or an abuse of process or lack of good faith.43 There are 
numerous other safeguards to avoid the situation of a supranational court 
asserting primacy, as Phillippe Kirsch, one of the key negotiators, observed upon 
publication of the Statute:44
...This Statute contains numerous checks and balances which will 
ensure that the Court operates in a credible and responsible 
manner, consistent with its role in the upholding the rule of law.
This Court is not a threat to any State which is committed to the 
security and well-h{e\ing of individual human beings. The court will 
serve the objectives of such States by contributing to long-term 
stability.
41 Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., “The International Criminal Court vs. The 
American People,* 1249 The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Executive Summary (5 
February 1999) at 2. The Heritage Foundation is very much a voice piece of the Bush 
administration. Other opponents have a position opposite to that of the American 
government in that they feel that it is not supranational enough: see Dilip Lahiri, 
'Explanation of Vote by Mr. Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, On the Adoption of 
the Statute of the International Court” (17 July 1998), online: Web site of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court < http://www.un.org/law/icc/>(date accessed: 
14 May 2002).
42 Madeline Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States,* 
(2001) 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 14, especially at 37-43. Compare Michael Scharf, ‘The 
ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party states: A Critique of the U.S. 
Position,” (2001) 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 67 at 77. Scharf dissects Madeline Moms’ 
article.
43 Thus the context is important. Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17 and especially 
Article 17(2). See chapter three also.
44 Philippe Kirsch, ‘Ceremony for the Opening of Signature on the Treaty on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court ‘II Campidoglio,’ Rome, July 18, 1998’ 
in M. Cherif Bassiouni, compilation, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Documentary History (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at xix.
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These checks and balances are frequently called complementarity,4S It appears as 
though opponents to the Rome Statute do not take into account these safeguards 
or, alternatively, feel that they are inadequate. The supranationalist has much in 
common with the positivist
Parallelist
Parallelists are capable of accommodating the proliferation of international courts 
and tribunals. Different jurisdictions are regarded as operating in parallel to one 
another.46 Parallel lines never intersect There is a hint of federalism in this 
approach. There is no supreme court in the international legal realm that can 
impose its w ill upon all jurisdictions, as there is in a federal domestic legal system. 
Each jurisdiction operates independently of the other, reminiscent of the federal 
division of powers. Intrusions and overlap are unwelcome and regarded as a 
potential excessive exercise of power -  ultra vires. Each jurisdiction is a discrete 
and self-contained unit There is a minimum of interaction, if any at all.
The parallelist outlook holds that State consent takes priority over State obligation 
in certain areas. States remain the sole personalities in the international legal 
system and all international law flows from them. A sort o f anarchy results from 
their interaction, and in the process, order becomes established. The approach is 
embodied by the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ); only States have 
legal personality before it and its jurisdiction is only possible with their consent. 
While each Member State of the United Nations is obliged to comply with a 
decision of this Court, should a State Party fail to comply, the other State may 
defer the matter to the Security Council.47 The Security Council may then make
45 This will be explained in more detail in chapter three.
46 Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations (General 
Assembly, New York, 27 October 1998), online at ICJ web site: < http7Awww.iq-cq.org/ > 
(date accessed: 20 January 2002). Malcolm Shaw would call this dualism, however 
parallelism is preferred since it implies more than two entities involved in the relationship 
(i.e. multiple jurisdictions).
47 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94.
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recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the judgement.48 The 
Security Council in turn is composed of fifteen States with five States having 
permanent seats (with vetoes). These five represent the hegemonic order of the 
victorious States of World War II (1945).49 Thus the deferral contingency is a 
bulwark to maintaining State sovereignty and consent as primary ingredients in the 
formulation of international legal rules. It is at this point that concurrent jurisdiction 
of the Security Council and the International Criminal Court exists in matters 
concerning crimes of aggression that are also acts of aggression. For a parallelist 
the Charter specifically authorizes the Security Council to have the primary 
exercise of jurisdiction in such matters;50 for the universalist the reverse holds true. 
In reality neither holds true, exactly.
Yet there is interaction between international courts and tribunals. Parallelism is 
not entirely appropriate as different international legal jurisdictions cross one 
another in terms of their scope. Parallelists deny any workable form of 
complementary relationship between the international and domestic jurisdictions. 
They see each court as supreme, in its respective domain. There exists 
disjunction.
Reflexive Law
There may be a means of transcending some of the difficulties posed by the 
limitations of the dominant schools of thought Gunter Teubner describes a
4S Ibid. at Article 94(2).
49 Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996. Third 
Edition. Volume I: The Court and the United Nations (Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) at 19 to 25. Rosen ne is critical of this structure as it is not reflective 
of the current power structure of States. Most notably the United Kingdom is a shadow 
of what it was in 1945. It would seem logical for India to have a permanent seat given its 
position as a nuclear power, a major regional entity and the feet that it contains nearly 
one quarter of the world's population, mis may be a source of some of Mr. Lahiri’s 
vocal opposition to the role of the Security Council and certain members being allowed 
to participate in referrals to the Court, who might not necessarily be States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, (supra note 42)
30 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 26 at Chapter VII.
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concept which he calls “reflexive law.” 51 He considers there to be three stages in 
legal evolution:52
1) A formal law stage, where the focus is “on establishing basic rules by which 
private parties orient their affairs and resolve disputes;”
2) A substantive law stage, where “purposive, goal-oriented intervention” 
results in the emergence of a regulatory regime; and
3) A reflexive law, where other institutions are involved and the goal is to 
influence behaviour by means other than regulation.
With the increasing complexity of interactions within societies, it has been argued 
that substantive law is inadequate for it is: uneconomical; forever expanding, 
creating the danger of unharmonized legislation; allowing an unwieldy 
administrative bureaucracy to emerge; and making law generally inaccessible to 
all but the “experts,” or in the words of noted legal historian S.F.C. Milsom:53
...So long as the legislature casts those entitlements /to allocation] 
in terms of definite rules and rights, o f course, there is no problem 
about judicial control. But one of the pressures behind the whole 
shift is that which has pushed law itself off principles and into 
details. Complexity defies specification. There are too many
For a discussion of reflexive law see: Gunther Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive 
Elements in Modem Law,” (1983) 17 Law & Socy Rev. 239; and Eric. W. Orts, 
“Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227 at 1255.
52 Teubner, ibid. S.F.C. Milsom probably subscribes to Teubner’s reflexive law approach. 
He believes that through globalization the relationship in modem society has changed 
from man and man as equals, to manager and managed. This vertical relation is 
reminiscent of the western medieval world in that there are those with ‘power to allocate 
and those with some entitlement to allocation.” While this may be similar to the 
“dependent structures of which the feudal unit was a simple model” his extension to 
include the role of discretionary power of administrators is intriguing (if not Weberian). 
Milsom has probably identified the second, substantive law stage (or the regulatory 
State). Whether this is an indication of “history running backwards, remains to be seen. 
Given that the ICC is in many respects a court of high office (or chivalry), one cannot 
wonder if there is something in this. See: S.F.C. Milsom, Studies in the History of the 
Common Law (London: The Hambledon Press 1985) at 221.
53 S.F.C. Milsom, ibid.
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details, too many possible factors; and in the end you have to leave 
H to somebody’s discretion...Perhaps even in so central a citadel it 
would be wiser and more just to accept guidelines for a discretion 
rather than a capricious multitude of rules, and to concentrate the 
law upon ensuring that the discretion is property exercised.
Moving beyond Milsom, reflexive law promotes decentralization and voluntary 
compliance by those interested groups.54
Advocates of reflexive law typically envision the municipal model o f a legal system 
where there is a form of domestic monism -  a centralization of judicial authority, 
law making and enforcement in the apparatus of the State. In international law 
generally and international criminal law specifically, there is a decentralization of 
judicial authority, law making and enforcement Therefore from the outset one 
must exercise a certain degree of caution in applying reflexive law to the 
international legal system, since it has largely been theorized in the domestic legal 
environment.
Legal theorists who propose the idea of reflexive law tend to associate the concept 
with the Hegelian idea of an evolutionary process.55 Thinkers such as Nonet and 
Selznick would present a three-stage model of legal development: repressive, 
autonomous and responsive law.56 For Habermas stages would include 
“rationality structures," preconventional, conventional and post-conventional.57
To some degree this may be the system envisioned in the Rome Statute, where there is 
not only the authority invested in officials of the Court but also various participative roles 
enshrined for States, the Security Council and NGOs, not to mention checks on the 
exercise of discretionary powers by Court officials. This was discussed at an interview 
between Professors B. Archibald and H. Kindred (17 August 2002). This will be the 
subject of chapters three and four with a practical case study in chapter five.
55 For example consider Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick (USA); and JQrgen 
Habermas, Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner (Germany). These are mentioned in 
Gunther Teubner, supra note 52 at 242: Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and 
Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New York: Hamer, 1978); Jurgen 
Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der GesseKschalt Oder Sozialtechnologie -  
Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).
56 Teubner, ibid. at 243.
57 Ibid. at 244 citing Habermas generally.
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Gunter Teubner would identify these stages as formal law, substantive or 
regulatory law and finally reflexive law.58
There is difficulty with an evolutionary model when applied to international 
(criminal) law. Can it be said that it has evolved and if so, from what? Is it still 
evolving? Is it really “primitive?* These are very difficult questions that are well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The concept of a Hegelian continuum is 
debatable, in that the Rome Statute may amount to an increasing degree of 
regulation (and therefore an increase in “substantive* legal character), but as w ill 
be shown, it does not amount to “so central a citadel’ of legal or judicial authority. 
The Rome Statute is designed to operate in a complementary relationship with the 
domestic courts, the traditional approach to prosecuting international crimes.
Input Output Input Output
Unidirectional Reflexive/Recursive
Figure 1 -  Block Diagrams of “Two* Cases of Legal Systems 
Approaches: Unidirectional (Formal or Substantive) and Reflexive
If one sets aside the evolutionary questions concerning international law, there are 
two systems approaches possible for the realization of legal norms. Figure 1 
captures the essence of Teubner’s arguments about domestic law, when applied 
to international law. In the left-hand diagram, a stimulus or challenge confronts the 
legal system, labelled as an input. The legal system reacts and responds in some 
form, for instance the creation of legislation. The output is a function of the input 
but the input is independent of the output. The relation between input and output
58 Teubner, supra note 56 and Orts, supra note 52.
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is one-sided or unidirectional. It is disjunctive. For Teubner this is typical of both 
formal and substantive law.59
In the reflexive system (the right-hand diagram), the output is a function of the 
input but the input is also a function of the output The relation is bi-directional and 
folly conjunctive. Output and input are mutually dependent upon one another. A 
feedback loop exists. The feedback is accomplished by emphasizing procedure 
over purpose and deliberative communication from multiple sources constantly 
monitoring the output. The regulative, imperial and monist approach gives way to 
law by deliberation and consensus.
There are some weaknesses to the outline above. Some critics of this post­
modern approach have questioned whether formal law has ever existed.60 Surely 
all law is reflexive to some degree. Statutes and legislation are amended and 
revised. International conventions are negotiated along with additional protocols. 
Even demagogues “fine tune” their legal rules in order to meet challenges to their 
despotic regime. Rather than considering two independent forms, perhaps the 
unidirectional case is simply a specific and extreme case of reflexive law where the 
level of feedback is negligible or inadequate. Thus the reflexive model is a general 
model. Different approaches to stimuli, within a legal system, can be differentiated 
by the degree of reflexivity, where the variable is the amount of feedback.
A problem arises with respect to the inherent stability of a feedback system. In any 
system incorporating a feedback loop, it is possible that feedback is continually 
returned to the input An ever-increasing accumulation of feedback, augmented 
every time a feedback loop may occur. The magnitude of the feedback becomes 
so great that the system eventually becomes so unstable that it fails. This is what
59 Teubner, ibid. at 240 using example of excessive welfare regulation which tends to stifle 
individual initiative and ingenuity, exacerbating the underlying social problems that the 
regulation was intended to address in the first place.
60 Teubner, ibid. citing Duncan Kennedy, ‘Legal Formality” (1973) 2 J.L.S. 351.
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happens when a microphone is placed next to the amplified speaker and a 
horrible, deafening tone results (damaging the speakers).
Teubner rightly points out the problem in the reflexive legal model. There exists a 
presumption that all monitoring is provided at an equal level. It does not take into 
account those that do not participate or those who participate more actively than 
others. There is a danger that certain interest groups may co-opt the apparatus to 
portray a false image of reality and thereby distort the system inputs to promote 
outputs in their favour.61 He calls this ‘asymmetric” feedback. Teubner suggests 
the creation of autonomous organizations, which attenuate and filter input and 
restore symmetry before the feedback is returned to the decision-makers.62 By so 
doing stability is achieved. Though this approach achieves stability, by its very 
nature, the filtering process is, regulatory and relatively non-reflexive. Thus a 
necessary tension exists between regulation and reflexivity in order to ensure 
system stability63
Plan of the Thesis
The four schools of thought do not entirely capture the reality of the international 
criminal legal jurisdiction or the Rome Statute. They do however represent 
predominant academic opinions, which have a very significant influence on
61 One might consider the co-opting of the World Conference Against Racism in 
September 2001 by anti-American and anti-Israeli interests (including a long list of 
NGOs) as a situation in which the UN reflexive system became unstable. Despite 
attempts to calm the conference down and moderate its tone, it vociferously attacked 
both the United States and Israel over the Palestinian issue. The European Union and 
the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (Mary Robinson) also voiced similar 
concerns. In the end, the United States and Israel withdrew from the Conference. See: 
‘S. Africa Trying to Revive U.N. Racism Meeting” CNN (4 September 2001), online: 
CNN <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africaa)9/03/racism.conference/ > (date 
accessed: 23 August 2002); and World Conference Against Racism 
<http://www.un.org/WCAfR/pr.htm> (date accessed: 23 August 2002).
62 Teubner, supra note 52 at 276 suggests independent citizen action committees in the 
realm of consumer protection (such as the German Verbraucherzentrale and StUtung- 
Warentest) as models of such autonomous bodies providing such filtration and 
correcting of the feedback so that it does not result in a runaway loop.
63 This should evoke memories of Koskenniemi’s false dichotomy and duality concept 
(Koskenniemi, supra note 10 at 464).
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decision-makers. While this thesis will not reject these opinions outright, it w ill 
reconsider them to assess some of the contradictions evident in the literature and 
in statements o f policy from decision-makers. Reflexive law provides an additional 
means of understanding how law operates, although it must be considered with 
extreme caution since it is rooted in a conceptualization of domestic law. It is not a 
dominant school of thought, but it does provide an extra “tool” for analytical 
reasoning.
Through an awareness of these outlooks, analytical “traps'' may be avoided. The 
approach adopted is contextual and rooted in practical experience -  perhaps even 
“empirical.” It represents another manner of perceiving the complexity of the 
international criminal legal system. The aim is to employ mediating strategies to 
view opposing schools of thought concurrently, through: “mediating definition, 
recourse to procedure; and contextualization.”64 Attention to the precise use of 
language, focus on the procedures of the various courts, and the contextual 
relationships between the courts (domestic and international), represent the 
underlying approach to the thesis. In this manner a new appreciation for the 
Rome Statute, the ICC and the international criminal legal system may be 
achieved.
There are six chapters in total. In chapter two, the first substantive chapter, the 
traditional relationship between States, in their joint efforts to deal with international 
crimes, is examined. An exploration of the nature of international and 
transnational organized crime reveals that the traditional approach sometimes 
fails, especially where the apparatus of the State becomes co-opted for criminal 
activity. It is here that the subject matter of the International Criminal Court 
becomes evident -  high crimes of public office. The Court's jurisdiction is actually 
quite narrow and incomplete. The core crimes are specific and uncommon crimes,
64 Martti Koskenniemi, “Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,’ in Philip Allot and others, 
supra note 10 at 47.
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committed in a certain context Though its jurisdiction may be narrow, chapter two 
reveals why the Court is necessary.
Complementarity, the cornerstone of the Rome Statute, is considered in chapter 
three. It defines the relationship between the Court and domestic courts. It is an 
important concept but is poorly understood as an abstraction. The dimensions of 
complementarity reveal the concept as a function of conjunctivity -  the degree of 
cooperation and mutual recognition between international and domestic courts. 
There is a vocabulary that has been developed in the Rome Statute to describe 
the approach and attention is paid to it. The Court does not assert its jurisdiction 
over “subject” States. Instead there exists a deferential system, with numerous 
safeguards to ensure that complementarity is achieved. A secondary system of 
safeguards can be identified in the regulation of judicial and prosecutorial 
discretionary powers. Chapter four examines such regulation, revealing insight 
into the nature of the international legal system and comparing how the regulation 
works in the ICC in comparison to the ICTY and ICJ.
In chapter five, truth and reconciliation commissions with limited amnesties are 
examined in the framework of the Rome Statute. Using the ICTY as a comparator, 
one can see just how the entire system of complementarity, through the 
consideration of issues of admissibility, operates in the ICC. The result is that not 
only are amnesties more tolerated within the framework of the ICC, so are quasi­
judicial TRCs. The approach is far less supranational than the manner in which 
the ICTY treats them.
In chapter six, this difference between the ICC and ICTY approaches is pursued in 
slightly more detail. The nature of the Rome Statute's approach, to the 
prosecution of international crimes where States are unwilling or unable, is quite 
different to that of the ICTY; the ICC's jurisdiction is “asserted" in a highly reflexive 
in manner. It has to be in order to respect its overriding doctrine of 
complementarity which in turn reinforces the decentralized and disparate nature of
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the international legal system. This is an approach that is not particularly unique 
within contemporary international law -  for instance, it exists through the 
proliferation of international organizations; especially what are called “regional 
arrangements.” Opposition to the Rome Statute centres on a rejection of this view 
of contemporary international law. It is not because it is ineffective, but because 
legal and political thinkers expect to see the structures of their domestic legal 
system mirrored in the international. Thus they expect to see some form of 
centralization and hierarchy -  whether an ICC asserting its primary jurisdiction 
over individuals or a Security Council overseeing and checking an ICC subordinate 
to it.
Ultimately the real test for the future of the ICC is two-fold: to either encourage 
States to bring individuals accused of international crimes to account or in very 
unusual instances to assist the State by acting where it and its judicial system 
have gone awry; and to prove that complementarity can work -  namely that the 
ICC can function within a decentralized international legal system without the 
recourse to judicial centralization or supranationalism in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.
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C h a p t e r  2
Chapter Two: Subject Matter of the ICC 
Introduction
It is quite common for an analysis of the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal 
Court to involve a discussion of the subject matter o f the Court.65 Invariably such 
analysis becomes very doctrinaire, simply ending up in the reading of those 
relevant provisions of the Statute and the Elements o f Crimes that describe the so- 
called “core crimes.’’66 Such an approach lacks context One cannot abstract the 
crimes from their context otherwise one falls into the trap of seeing their 
prohibition as absolute, transcendent legal obligations that bind the State. The 
difficulty is that at times, the State is either unwilling or incapable of prosecuting 
international crimes, particularly when its apparatus has been co-opted by criminal 
elements. The role of the individual, capable of orchestrating the core crimes in 
the context specified by the Rome Statute, is the critical element in understanding 
the subject matter of the Court and its purpose.
The goal o f this chapter is to examine the subject matter o f the International 
Criminal Court Rather than simply examining the crimes as specified in the Rome 
Statute, this chapter will consider their contextual relationship to the State. 
Transnational crimes and international crimes will be explored in some detail. The 
traditional, inter-State approach to combating such crimes w ill be investigated.
65 For example see William Schabas, supra note 2 at 21-53; Herman von Hebei and Darryl 
Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court" in Roy S. Lee, ed. The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 41-78; or Leila Nadya Sadat, 
The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for 
the New MMIennium (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002) at 129- 
259
66 Elements o f Crimes, supra note 2.
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Ultimately the traditional approach must be inadequate somehow, to give rise to 
the need for the International Criminal Court
The traditional approach is premised upon a State that functions responsibly and in 
conformity with the international legal norms to which it has consented to adhere. 
It is when the State acts irresponsibly that international crimes may be committed 
with impunity by public or private individuals. The reasons why a State might go 
“awry” include the corruption of public officials or the lack of control by the State 
over “criminal activity" in its jurisdiction. There are many threats to the State in this 
regard: transnational corporations; covert intelligence activities; aggression by 
another State; terrorism; mercenarism; the existence of the extra-juridical State 
("the shadow state"); rogue State governments; the presence of rebel forces; and 
even rogue non-governmental organizations (including corporations). The threats 
have become even greater in an era of government deregulation, privatization, 
globalization and the "black" economy. The Rome Statute does not even pretend 
to address all of these threats -  but it addresses a few. Its jurisdiction is actually 
quite narrow. What it does, is try to bring to account those individuals, alleged to 
have committed the core crimes described, when the State is unwilling or 
incapable of so doing. The persons who are "capable” of committing these core 
crimes, in the context described in the Statute, are necessarily public officials (de 
facto or de jure). Persons on the "margin” of the de jure State would still fell under 
this ambit, since they have links to the State and are public officials in a cte facto 
sense. The International Criminal Court is therefore a court that brings those to 
account who commit the core crimes, under the banner of the State or an entity 
that is state-like.
Transnational Organized Crimes
"Transnational" is simply an adjective describing something that ‘extends beyond 
national bounds or frontiers."67 All transnational crime is organized in some
67 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "transnational."
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manner; its capability to operate across State boundaries, in multiple jurisdictions, 
necessarily implies a highly organized, concerted and well-planned activity. It is 
hardly spontaneous. The perpetrators of transnational organized crime are very 
adept at employing the latest in technological innovation -  including computers, 
telecommunications, accounting processes, the media and transportation.68 It is 
the epitome in "free enterprise,” driven entirely by the motive o f profit, regardless of 
how it is obtained.
A multilateral approach has been adopted to tackle this category of crime. The 
United Nations for instance, has introduced the Palermo Convention and its 
Protocols as one means of facilitating multilateral cooperation by States and their 
law enforcement agencies.69 The titles of the four documents associated with the 
Convention reveal some (but not all) of the issues associated with transnational 
organized crime:70
• United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12 
December 2000)-,
68 United Nations Office for Drug Prevention and Crime Control, “Summary of the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and Protocols Thereto” (undated), 
online UNDCP web site <http7/Www.undcp.org/palermo/convmain.html>(date accessed: 
30 April 2002) at Paragraph 2.
69 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, 
Annex I. 55 U N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) 
[hereinafter The Palermo Convention). For the draft Convention and Protocols see: Ad 
hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime on the work of Hs First to Eleventh Sessions, UN GAOR, 55*1 Sess., Annexes, 
Agenda Item 105, UN Doc. A/55/383 (2000), at 25 [hereinafter The Palermo 
Convention]. The Convention includes: United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 335 (Annex 1); Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40
I.L.M. 353 (Annex 2); Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 377 (Annex 3); and 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of an Trafficking in Firearms and their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 384 (Annex 4).
70 The Palermo Convention, Ibid. at Annexes 1,2, 3 and 4.
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• Protocol against the Smuggling o f Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (12 December 2000);
• Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing Protocol against the Smuggling o f 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12 December 2000); 
and
• Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing o f and Trafficking in Firearms and 
their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12 December 
2000).
The Convention requires States Parties to criminalize the laundering of proceeds 
from a crime, and to criminalize the corruption of public officials.71
This last obligation demonstrates an important characteristic of transnational 
organized crime; it tends to co-opt the apparatus of the State through the 
corruption o f public officials. When public officials are corrupted, they no longer 
work in the interests of the State and therefore compromise its integrity. When the 
integrity of a State to function as a rational entity is compromised; adherence to 
international norms and legal obligations is no longer certain. The State can 
become capable of violating those obligations and thus capable of committing 
international crimes. Thus not only is transnational organized crime a threat to the 
State but it may be a threat to all States and their coexistence.72 It is a threat to 
the international legal order.
71 Palermo Convention, ibid. at Article 6. Ibid. at Article 8.
72 See: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Transnational Criminal Activity (1998) 10 
Backgrounder Series (Ottawa: CSIS, 1998). The Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service has defined transnational crime as being a product exclusively of organized 
criminal syndicates (at 1). It lists 18 groups of this nature operating in Canada ranging 
from the Sun Yee On triad to Russian vory v zakone. The Russian Interior Ministry 
(MVD) estimates that such criminal organizations control 25 to 40 per cent of Russia’s 
gross national product (GNP) and 50 to 80 per cent of Russian banks (at 4). CSIS 
identifies four foundation activities: narcotics trafficking, illegal arms dealing, money 
laundering and the export of Russian natural resources (at 4). CSIS is therefore of the 
opinion that transnational crime is a cause of the destabilization of states through the
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While the example the spousal murderer who is fleeing a national jurisdiction may 
represent a transnational crime, it is of a wholly different class to the type 
discussed above; it may be better termed a domestic crime, which has developed 
extra-territorial aspects, due to the flight of the suspect from the jurisdiction where 
the act occurred.
International Crime
Unfortunately there are divergent views on what makes a transnational crime differ 
from an international crime. In R. v. Finta, it was argued that the international 
crime must have a greater egregious character than a domestic crime.73 Professor 
Bassiouni suggests that international crimes must be: “a threat to the peace and 
security of mankind’ or involve a ’significant international interest;’ and be 
‘shocking” or ‘egregious’ conduct by the standards of ‘commonly shared values of 
the world community.”74 Professor Bassiouni suggests a list of 22 categories of 
criminal activity that could be considered as international crimes, including the core 
crimes of the Rome Statute, but also: mercenarism, drug offences, trafficking in 
obscene publications, theft of national treasures, bribery of public officials and
corruption of public officials and threats to the economic security of the nation. Thus 
rather than attack transnational crime, the Rome Statute aims to attack those who have 
been likely corrupted by elements of transnational crime in order to commit international 
criminal acts. Not only is this a ‘catch-up game,’ but the Rome Statute only addresses 
symptoms of an overall underlying problem confronting States. This CSIS paper is 
based upon Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems, UN Doc. A.CONF. 169/15/Add. 1 (4 April 1995) cited in Gerhard O.W. 
Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts,” in Phil Williams and Dimitri 
Vlassis, eds., Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses 
(London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2001) at 14. One might also consider 
Letizi Paoli, ‘Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Enterprises,” ibid. at 88-108 -  this is the 
origin of my use of the term "the ultimate in free enterprise.”
73 Jordan Paust, M.Cherif Bassiouni, Sharon A.Williams, Michael Scharf, Jimmy Gurufe 
and Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Durham, North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1996) at 19, referring to R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 
701, online: ICRC CD-ROM: Droit international humanitaire-lntemational Humanitarian 
Law, 30 December 1998, Version 5, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross. 1998).
74 Paust, ibid., citing M.C. Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Tribunal 36,45 (1987).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
counterfeiting.75 Some critics suggest that the list is far too encompassing.76 
Paust and Bassiouni rightly point out that there are difficulties with this list; 
foremost is the difference in nature of the criminal act carried out by an individual 
and that which is carried out by an individual in her capacity, as an agent of the 
State.77 Crimes that require ‘state action’ are deeply political in nature and have 
the fewest penal characteristics. Crimes which have the least political content 
such as drug trafficking, have a greater penal and enforcement character.78
While this may be true, it still does not answer the question of what exactly is an 
international crime. Some of the acts on Professor Bassiouni’s list, in a certain 
context, have the capability of undermining the integrity of the State -  for example 
an organized, wide-ranging effort to destabilize the State’s monetary policy through 
the wide-scale counterfeiting of its currency. Yet if it is an isolated act of one 
person photocopying several thousands of dollars in an ad hoc manner, the 
character of the crime is quite different. It is therefore submitted that Professor 
Bassiouni’s list is encompasses too much, as it does not take into account the 
context of the crime and its impact upon the integrity o f the State to function within 
the international community. Perhaps the term ‘ international crime” would be 
better described as a ‘contextual international crime’ or ‘a crime directed at 
undermining the integrity of the State.” But are all such contextual crimes 
international crimes? No.
73 Ibid. at 11 citing Bassiouni, Iinternational Crimes: Digest/Index o f International
Instalments 1815-1985 (New York: Oceana, 1986).
76 Kristin Henrard, “The Viability of National Amnesties in View of Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law (1999) 8 MSU-DCL J. Int’l L. 595
at 608.
77 Paust et at, supra note 74 at 12.
78 Ibid.
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There is a second element necessary in defining an international crime. The 
prohibited act also must be recognized at international law (conventional or 
customary) as an international crime:79
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a 
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach 
is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes 
an international crime.
Thus, egregiousness (or gravity), the degree of organization and the requirement 
that the act be prohibited by international law -  these are the elements that 
establish whether an act achieves the status of an international crime. But there 
still remains one element to consider -  the type o f individual involved.
Individual Accountability v. State Accountability
It is at this point that individual accountability and State accountability may be 
separated. The matter of States carrying out international crimes or delicts against 
other States is well within the realm of public international law. It could amount to 
aggression. Traditionally such acts are remedied by: bringing the matter to the 
attention of the Security Council (Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter)-, 
submitting the issue to international arbitration or adjudication; or acting in self­
ILC, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth 
Session, 6 May -  26 July 1996, UNGAOR, 51** Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10 
(1996) at Article 19(2). International delicts were also defined at Article 19(4) as any 
other internationally wrongful act which did not meet the definition at Article 19(2). ft 
should be noted that James Crawford concluded that Article 19 did not reflect current 
international law, in that the Article 19 provisions were for too general and for too 
encompassing. Instead, the International Law Commission opted for specific crimes as 
representing international crimes: genocide, aggression, apartheid, forcible denial of 
self-determination and other wrongs which "shock the conscience of mankind.” See: 
James Crawford, ILC, Fourth Report on State Responsibly, UNGAOR, 53rt Sess., UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/517 (31 March 2000) at Paragraph 46 and 47. Thus an international crime 
is one of those specified, or some other serious breach of international rules. It should 
be noted however that in the context of international crimes, one now refers to crimes 
committed by individuals rather than by a State.
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defence.80 Approaches to conflict resolution rely upon the assumption that the 
States are willing to resolve conflict States gone awry may not be interested in 
resolving conflict but rather in promoting it
International criminal law operates to bind States to norms through the liability of 
those individuals who represent the State in an official capacity (cfe jure or de 
facto):81
International law is assumed to be a system of binding norms, 
regulating the mutual behaviour of states, that is, of the individuals 
who represent states, then the state cannot be assumed to be 
sovereign.
The traditional approach to holding such individuals accountable has been through 
domestic State law.82 For Kelsen, international law regulated the relations 
between States, whereas domestic municipal law regulated relations between 
individuals.83 International law specified a “material element” while domestic law 
not only specified material elements but addressed the personal element too.84 
For Kelsen, international law required domestic law for its implementation and 
ultimately directed the development of domestic law. While this may have had an 
impact on sovereignty, the effect was not direct. Although Kelsen described the 
relationship between the two as “supplemental,”85 ”[o]nly in conjunction with the 
national legal orders does international law form a significant whole.”86
80 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Chapter VI (“Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes”), Articles 33-38; and at Chapter VII (“Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”), Articles 39-51.
81 Hans Kelsen, supra note 16 at 79.
82 Ibid. at 80.
83 Ibid. at 82.
84 Ibid. at 84.
83 Ibid. at 84-88. Hence what he means by “states cannot be assumed to be sovereign,” 
for they are obligated to comply with international norms as are their agents within the 
State itself. Thus international law has an impact on the citizen within the State. The 
term “direct effect” has been imported from European Union law. Unlike international 
law, European Union law does have primacy over the Member States of the European 
Union. The European Union legal order is enmeshed within the legal orders of each
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Where the organs of a State have been co-opted by criminal influence -  namely 
through the subversion of public officials, the individual is liable through the 
‘principle o f responsibility based on fault” for her failure to uphold her duty to the 
State to adhere to its international legal obligations.87 Certain indicators are 
suggestive of the commission of an international crime in this context -  ‘for private 
or personal use;”88 ‘not justified by military necessity;”89 ‘not in the furtherance of a 
political objective;”90 the euphemism for negligence of ‘ being in a position that he 
should have known;”91 and ‘superior responsibility.”92 Liability flows from 
international law, through the executive (and all organs of State) to the individual:93
Member State. See: Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law (Brussels: 
Director-General for Education and Culture, European Commission, 2000) at 95-99. 
Also see Luzius Wildhaber, supra note 13 at 50-59 and especially his remarks 
concerning the European Court of Human Rights and how States are bound by 
conventional law to apply the principles found in the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 
223, Eur. T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention on Human RightsJ, online: OSCE < 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Htm1/005.htm>(date accessed: 20 Februrary 
2002), even if the Treaty has not been ratified (he draws upon the United Kingdom in 
particular, but before the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 
42 [hereinafter the UK Human Rights Act] which was the ratifying Act that has been in 
effect since 2 October 2000).
86 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 89. Could Kelsen have identified complementarity back in 
1942, though not necessarily by the label we attach to it today? Some authors would 
disagree with this outlook as being that of Kelsen, for they tend to focus on his outlooks 
on the domestic legal scene and apply them to the international rather than his outlooks 
on the international: see Fernando R. Tes6n, A Philosophy of International Law 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) at 5.
87 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 102.
88 Elements of Crimes, supra note 2 at Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) footnote 47 when referring to 
pillage.
89 Ibid. at Article 8(2)(b)(a)(iv) referring to the war crime of destruction and appropriation of 
property.
90 Promotion of National Unity and Recondiiation Act, 1995 (South Africa), Act 95-34 (26 
July 1995) at Article 20.
91 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 33
92 Ibid.
93 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 99. This has probably been true for some time in international 
law -a t least since Kelsen was writing in 1942.
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An international delict can be committed only by those individuals 
whose duty it is to fulfill the international obligations of a state; 
these are certain organs of the state, ordinarily the executive.
Thus the corruption of public officials may be a serious problem caused by 
transnational crime, but it is the breach of public duty by officials, which leads to 
the commission of international crimes or crimes against the community of States. 
Organs of the State need not always belong to the executive. Again it must be 
noted that such crimes represent a subset of all possible international crimes -  for 
example environmental pollution might not necessarily fit into the subset94
Traditional Approach -  Inter-State Cooperation
Traditionally there are a number o f principles upon which States rely in order to 
assert their extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction over individuals. These include:95
1. Territorial Principle -  where the offence was committed within the State’s 
jurisdiction (and typically the offender has fled the jurisdiction);
2. Nationality Principle -  where the accused is a national of the State (akin to 
“flag state jurisdiction");
3. Protective Principle -  where the State asserts its jurisdiction over individuals 
involved in activities beyond its borders affecting its physical security, 
currency and official marks;
4. Representational Principle (or Agreement Principle) -  where the State acts 
on behalf of another State as is required by international legal instruments
94 ILC, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth 
Session, 6 May -  26 July 1996, supra note 80 at Article 19(3)(d). This does not mean 
that it is not a crime. It is just not of the class of crimes being discussed.
95 Maurice Fkxy, in Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory, eds., Terrorism and International 
Law (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) at 31. This text is dated, describing the 
state of the law only to 1992. Nevertheless it is still useful. Note that the ICC will rely 
primarily upon the Territorial Principle and the Nationality Principle (Rome Statute, supra 
note 2 at Article 12).
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(such as the requirement that the United Kingdom extradite Augusto 
Pinochet to Spain or NATO Status of Forces Agreements);96
5. Universality Principle -  where certain grave acts in of themselves warrant 
the exercise of jurisdiction (such as piracy, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity);97 and
6. Passive Personality Principle -  where a State asserts its jurisdiction on the 
basis of the nationality of the victim.
A number of these bases of extra-territorial jurisdiction are controversial and not 
well accepted internationally. Rosalyn Higgins suggests that the Passive
96 Sometimes this may be known as the ‘Agreement Principle;" see; Hugh M. Kindred, ed. 
supra note 40 at 14.
97 Some States have implemented universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes 
simply by their nature rather than any connection to those States. Consider Belgium's 
indictment of 18 June 2001 of Ariel Sharon for war crimes, crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, allegedly committed during Israeli incursions into Lebanon in 
1982. This is in accordance with the Loi relative d la repression des infractions graves 
aux conventions intemationales de Gendve du 12 aout 1949 et aux pmtocoles I et II du 
8 juin 1977, additionnels d ces conventions, 16 June 1993, online: Diplomatie judidaire 
< http://www.dipk>matiejudiciaire.com>(date accessed; 26 May 2002)[hereinafter the 
1993 to/]. See; Stephanie Maupas, “La campagne beige d’Ariel Sharon’ (Brussels: 
Diplomatie judidaire, 31 January 2002) and Stephanie Maupas, "Les revers de la 
competence universelle" (Brussels: Diplomatie judidaire, 8 July 2001) online:
Diplomatie judidaire < http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com>(date accessed: 2 February 
2002). The implications of such acts are felt well beyond the Belgian borders. 
Reciprocal extradition treaties exist that bind other States indirectly to the 1993 tor. A 
decision on 26 June 2002 bv the Belgian oourd’appel undermined the applicability of the 
1993 tor and argued that Sharon could not be indicted. Israel has suggested that it 
should not apply in any event as Sharon was investigated by an Israel Parliamentary 
Inquiry and dismissed as defence minister. The 26 June decision is being appealed, as 
the present decision undermines the tor. See: Ian Black, ‘Judges Decide Belgian War 
Crimes Law Cannot be Used to Try Sharon,’  The Guardian (27 June 2002), online: The 
Guardian Unlimited < http://www.guardian.co.Uk/israel/Story/0,2763,744717,00.html> 
(date accessed: 27 June 2002). There is no indication that the Inquiry was in bad faith. 
Thus, as we shall see, the Belgian cour d'appel probably decided correctly, for if the 
decision had been otherwise it would have violated the principle of complementarity on a 
state-to-state basis. Lousie Arbour supports this approach over the system of 
complementarity in Rome Statute (see supra note 34). It may not be entirely compatible 
with the concept of complementarity and therefore it is submitted that the resulting 
harmonization of domestic laws to implement the Rome Statute will bring this whole 
issue of extradition and extra-territorial prosecution of universal crimes under control. It 
is also submitted that the era of universal jurisdiction has passed and is no longer 
necessary in light of the presence of the International Criminal Court.
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Personality Principle can be ambiguous and uncertain, despite it first being 
described in the Lotus case.98 Universality is limited to a specific set of offences 
erga omnes (to all) including slavery, piracy, some war crimes but not terrorism.99 
Ultimately the main means of asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction is through 
international cooperation of the judiciary and police enforcement agencies; and the 
harmonization of extradition and deportation regulations.100 The State may either 
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicaire).
Yet such tactics do not always work. In the case of terrorism for example, the Irish 
government refused to extradite suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists. 
There was a high probability that the United Kingdom would violate their human 
rights by sending them to face certain torture at the notorious Maze Prison in 
Belfast101 In other cases extradition is often precluded for reason of the “political 
offence” bar -  where the crime the individual is alleged to have committed -  was 
political in nature and not criminal.102 Who determines what constitutes a political 
bar and for what reason (or motivation)? Such a question is vital, for it is at the 
root of why the traditional inter-State mechanisms of combating international and 
transnational crime are inadequate. How can the nationality principle apply when 
the nationality of an individual is in question (for instance refugees or sans 
papiers)? Assertion of the protective principle can easily involve the violation of
99 Higgins, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 24 citing The Lotus Case PCIJ Reports 
1927, Series A, No. 10; 4 ILR 5 & 153.
99 Ibid. Kristina Miskowiak describes universalism by means of the misleading label of 
“inherent jurisdiction” of the ICC. See Kristina Miskowiak, The International Criminal 
Court: Consent, Complementarity and Cooperation (Copenhagen: DJ0F Publishing, 
2000) at 20.
100 Consider David Schiff, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 125 and 185-200 (for the 
Schengen system of cooperation in the European Union) and Paust et al., supra note 74 
at 497-706.
101 Leonard Leigh, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 176. The European Court of 
Human Rights had apparently recognized the danger of torture and the Irish government 
was simply echoing their concerns. Consider the Irish cases Leigh mentions: Finucane 
v. MacMahon et al.; Clarke v. McMahon [1990] 1 I.R. 228; and Carson v. McMahon 
[1990] 1 I.R. 239.
102 Maurice Flory, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 30.
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another State’s sovereignty.103 In the case of universal crimes, do all States 
accept such acts as being truly universal?104 The traditional approach to extra­
territorial jurisdiction relies upon the integrity of the State and its public officials in 
the exercise of their discretionary powers. Discretionary power could be exercised 
as a shield to avoid prosecution (domestic and inter-State) and to perpetuate 
impunity. It is when officials and the apparatus of the State have been co-opted by 
criminal elements that this system falters. Therefore there exists a constraint on 
the subject matter falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
The State, Gone Awry
Conniption o f Public Officials
The corruption of public officials undoubtedly compromises their independence in 
the performance of their duties of State, in favour of their benefactor. Their 
benefactor could be: any of a variety of domestic groups, transnational organized 
criminal elements, the intelligence services of foreign powers or transnational 
corporations. Inducements might include gifts, money or even political support. 
The international community has tried to legislate guidelines for States to 
cooperate and stop the corruption of public officials, including: the European
103 For example, consider State sponsored assassinations (such as the purported 
MOSSAD killing of Canadian engineer Gerald Bull for his work on the Iraqi Super Gun in 
1990 in Brussels); and the violation of the territorial integrity of other States to abduct 
sought-after individuals (such as MOSSAD’s abduction of Adolf Eichmann from 
Argentina or Mordechi Vannunu from Italy). See John Pike, ‘Mossad: The Institute for 
Intelligence and Special Tasks” (9 May 2002), online: Federation of American Scientists 
< http://www.fas.org/irp/worid/israel/mossad/>(date accessed: 18 May 2002). Consider 
also the diverse involvement of several States in the abduction of Abdullah Oca Ian by 
Greek intelligence agents from Kenya on behalf of Turkey in 1999 (see: Abdullan 
Ocalan, “Statement by Abdullah Ocalan (PKK) on his Abduction from Kenya” (26 
November 1999), online: Arm the Spirit <http:/Awww.hartford- 
hwp.com/archives/51/162.html>(date accessed: 26 May 2002). States involved included 
Israel, Turkey, Greece, Kenya and the United States.
104 Consider the arguments presented in chapter one regarding the question of whether 
there really are universal or absolute international norms. Consider the arguments 
regarding diversity of interpretation and reservations to some of the ”key” international 
human rights instruments; in Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12. Also one 
might wonder about Belgium asserting the extra-territorial scope of its laws to its former 
colonies, such as Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo -  is this not a return 
to some sort of imperialism? Interview with K. Knop and Ian Rennie (10 May 2002).
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Union;105 the Organization of American States;106 the Organization for Economic 
and Cooperative Development (OECD);107 the United States;108 and Canada.100 
Yet such legislation is directed only at "legitimate business’ and not at activities 
carried out by illegitimate businesses or intelligence organizations. How can one 
regulate criminal activity, which by definition operates outside of the law? In theory 
intelligence activities are supervised by various systems of government, but there 
is always the potential for abuse under the guise of national security. There are 
also great lacunae within the domestic implementing legislation (where applicable), 
including: the "unexplored" issues of foreign investment; State responsibility; the 
threat of destroying the reputation of public officials by claiming that they are 
corrupt in order to hinder anti-corruption initiatives; relationships between money 
laundering and political parties; the issue of payments to family, friends and front- 
companies of political officials; and hidden transactions, bank accounts and 
numbered companies.110
The Rogue State
An extreme situation may arise where a regime in control of a State is corrupt from 
the outset of assuming the reins of power (either lawfully or not). Such regimes 
often make no effort to hide their corruption. Examples might include Pinochet in 
Chile, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noriega in Panama or Suharto in Indonesia. Not
,os Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union 
on the Tight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials 
of Member States o f the European Union, Official Journal C 195 , 25 June 1997, 0002 -  
001at Articles 2(1) and 3(1) respectively, online: Eur-Lex < http://europa.eu.int >(date 
accessed: 6 May 2002).
106 Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 29 
March 1996,351.L.M. 724.
107 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Done at Paris, Dec. 18, 1997,18 December 1997,371.L.M. 1.
108 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, (United States) Pub. L. No. 
105-366,112 Stat. 3302.
109 Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998, S.C. 1998, c. 34.
110 Alejandro Posadas, "Combating Corruption under International Law” (2000) 10 Duke J. 
Comp. & Inti L. 345 at 413.
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only is the apparatus of State co-opted for a dictator’s own personal gain but its 
apparatus is used to maintain her hold on power -  including the commission of 
international crimes.111 Ultimately this represents an extreme condition of the 
corruption of public officials.
The Shadow State
Corruption of public officials knows no borders and occurs equally in the developed 
world as it does in the lesser-developed one.112 It has been suggested that in 
certain countries, there exists a fagade of State legitimacy behind of which, exists 
an extra-juridical or “shadow State,” founded upon: corruption, bribery, influence 
peddling, violence and a culture of “kleptocracy.”113 Such a proposition raises 
questions: if the de jure  State is not actually the de facto State, how can the State 
operate in a responsible manner in conformity with its international commitments? 
If it does not, who is held individually accountable? The State? The legal realists’ 
argument that the “shadow State” engenders more stability than the legitimate 
State, poses a problem of whether it is “just” to attack the apparatus of illegitimacy
Consider for example the case of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein used chemical 
weapons in his war with Iran during the 1980s. The use of chemical weapons is 
contrary to international law (the Hague Rules, infra note 153). See Patrick E. Taylor, 
“Officer Says U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas” The New York Times (18 
August 2002), online: The New York Times <http://Www.nytimes.com/> (date accessed: 
18 August 2002). Kelsen, supra note 16 at 4, was of the opinion that if we limit our 
definition of a lawful regime to one which is a liberal democracy, excluding totalitarian or 
autocratic regimes such as in the Soviet Union (in 1942), then we would be making a 
political judgement of a system of social organization. Such judgements are not 
scientific. Kelsen’s approach has dominated traditional inter-State relations, largely 
because the nature of such autocratic regimes did not threaten international peace and 
security. Only in the 1990s have such regimes, especially through international and 
transnational criminal activity, threatened international peace and security. Therefore 
the international community is not condemning the regime per se, but its carrying out of 
international criminal activity.
112 Posadas, supra note 111. hie provides several historical examples including that of the 
Prince Consort of the Netherlands and the Prime Minister of Japan who were found in 
the 1970s to have been taking bribes from Lockheed Martin. Other examples might 
include those allegations surrounding the German businessman Karlheinz Schreiber 
and allegations of corruption of politicians in Germany and Canada; see: John Hooper, 
“Schreiber The Man Who Would Topple Kings,” The Guardian (14 January 2000), 
online: The Guardian <http://Www.guardian.co.uk/ >(date accessed: 20 May 2002).
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at the cost of destabilization.114 Yet is not the apparatus of illegitimacy already a 
form o f destabilization?
What happens when corporations back up such illic it or legitimate regimes, in 
return for business concessions? The problem has arisen in a number of African 
States (the Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone).115 In the 
case of Sierra Leone, one need only consider the support of a number of 
Canadian mining corporations in providing the government with weapons and the 
employment of Private Military Companies to help bolster the teetering-
113 William Reno, “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa,* (2000) J.I.A. 
53:2 at 433.
114 Ibid. It would be a myth to suggest that all “shadow States" exist uniquely in the lesser- 
developed world. In the United States an extra-executive exists beyond the normal 
controls imposed upon government in the form of “think-tanks,” advisory groups or even 
consultancy and press relations firms. Consider the RAND corporation 
(http://www.rand.org/nsrd/cmepp/about.html is the URL to their web site) or the “Carlyle 
Group.” (see: Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, “The ex-presidents' dub’ The 
Guardian (31 October 2001), online: News from Reality
<http://www.hereinreality.com/ca rtyle.html>(date accessed: 11 July 2002). While the 
United States is probably far from being a “shadow State,” there may be some potential. 
Consider the American Defense Department’s Office of Strategic Influence which was 
set up in November 2001 to chum out propaganda to influence dedsion-makers 
(primarily allied) and sway public opinion in support of American policy. See: Gerry J. 
Gilmore, “Strategic Influence Office ‘Closed Down,’ says Rumsfeld” American Forces 
Information Service News Articles (26 February 2002), online: 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202263.html> (date
accessed: 15 May 2002). Consider Jessica Hodgson, “Pentagon Steps Up 
Propaganda Efforts,” The Guardian (19 February 2002), online: 
<http://media.guardian.co.Uk/attack/story/0,1301,652789,00. html>(date accessed: 15
May 2002). Symptomatic is the emergence of shadowy figures such as Otto Reich 
(John Patrick Leary, “Public Diplomacy? Contra Warrior Otto Reich Returns to the State 
Department,” Counterpunch (12 March 2002), online: Counterpunch <
http://www.counterpunch.org/ottoreich1 html>(date accessed: 16 May 2002)) and
stresses on international relations with Cuba (Countil on Hemispheric Affairs, Press 
Release, ‘Cuban Bio-Terror Fact or State Department Fabrication?’ (9 May 2002), 
online: Countil on Hemispheric Affairs <http7/www.coha.org/>(date accessed: 14 May 
2002) [authored by Winter Casey, Alex Volberding and Larry Bims]) or and possible 
complicity in an aggression on Venezuela (Ed Vulfiamy, “Venezuela coup Linked to 
Bush Team,” The Observer (21 April 2002), online: The Observer
<http://www.observer.co.uk/>(date accessed: 21 April 2002); and Duncan Campbell, 
“American Navy 'Helped Venezuelan Coup,”  The Guardian (5 May 2002), online: The 
Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002)).
115 Reno, supra note 114. One could add to this list the rebels of Afghanistan who were 
supported by both Pakistan and the United States against the Soviet Union. These 
same rebels would eventually form the nucleus of the Taliban and Al Quaeda.
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government’s hold on power.116 If a government is unwilling and incapable of 
prosecuting offences against the State or other States because it is simply a front 
of legitimacy for a wholly corrupt shadow State, the entire traditional system of 
individual criminal accountability enforced by States falters.117
Ultimately the individuals running the de facto government are individually 
responsible for their acts. In order to avoid the widespread disruption of a society, 
a reconciliation policy is usually necessary to gradually reform such regimes. It 
probably has to be carried out in concert with re-education, the introduction of 
widespread judicial reform, the enmeshment of the society into international legal 
expectations, the use of limited amnesties and the re-establishment of a 
centralized State.118
116 Three small "junior” mining firms approached the Sierra Leonean government to obtain 
mining concessions: Rex Diamond (headquartered in Toronto); AmCAM Minerals
(headquartered in Toronto); and Diamond Works (based in London but also Canadian). 
These companies were not just involved in mining but also supplied arms to the 
government in an effort to bolster it and protect their mining interests. Rex Diamond 
purchased $US 3.8 million worth of military helicopter parts from Russia (that proved 
defective). AmCAM owns a South African security firm, ArmSec International (SL). 
Diamond Works is reputed to have links and possibly have been a customer of the 
South African "private military company,” Executive Outcomes. In 1995 the Sierra 
Leonean government granted Diamond Works a 25-year mining concession in the Kono 
district -  it is widely believed that Diamond Works in return contracted Executive 
Outcomes to intervene against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Backed by 
mercenaries from Executive Outcomes, Nigerian and Guinean military forces, the 
government eventually managed to wrestle control from the Liberian backed RUF of the 
lucrative diamond producing areas. ‘Mercenaries grab gems” Weekly Matt and 
Guardian (9 May 1997), online: < http://sn.apc.org/wmail/issues> (date accessed 27 
October 2001). Executive Outcomes has a very dose relationship with Sand lines, 
which in turn has very strong ties to elements of the British Ministry of Defence. INS 
Resource Information Center, ‘Questions and Answers Series: Siena Leone -  Political, 
Military and Human Rights Chronology 1991-1997” Doc No. QA/SLE/98.001 
(Washington: United States Department of Justice, April 1998).
117 There exists an argument that to assert the impropriety of such shadow States or hold 
countries to the same standards as western States amounts to a form of moral 
imperialism. While the argument may be appealing from the point of view of the entire 
structure of the international legal system (and States in particular) being eurocentric, 
the logical culmination of such an argument is to deny the entire structure of the 
international legal system. It is an argument of an extreme legal realist. It is therefore 
rejected.
1,8 Consider Philip C. Aka, ‘Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Recondliation in the New Century” (2000) 14 Temple Intl. & Comp. L.J. 327 at 328.
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Rebels -  Pretenders to the Organs o f State
While the “shadow State* problem raises serious issues, so does the status of 
rebel forces. Rebels, like those in control of the ‘shadow State,” are not public 
officials. Nevertheless they are in a position to commit international crimes. For 
example an enemy commander in an international armed conflict might order her 
troops to employ the use of hoilow-point bullets against other forces, as an explicit 
plan to terrorize them -  a war crime.119 The rebel commander may have sufficient 
resources at her disposal to carry out such crimes in their appropriate context. 
The commander could be considered to be a de facto public official, claiming to 
occupy the office of an organ of State. Therefore, she too is individually 
accountable, like those running the ‘shadow State.”120
Terrorism
A serious difficulty arises with the terrorist No international definition of terrorism 
has been successfully concluded in international law. The legal approach is 
complex and requires coordination and harmonization of approaches in multiple 
jurisdictions.121 Most States prefer to deal with terrorists on an individual case by
Enmeshment into the international judicial system of legal expectation is probably the 
most important aspect, however the threat of an international criminal court becoming 
involved could also act as deterrence. In the case of Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell is the 
company that influences the government and opponents of the government have 
targeted its infrastructure. Re-education may sound rather Maoist. It is advanced 
however since attitudes cannot be changed overnight. To think that they can is to adopt 
the stance of a revolutionary. Re-education is ultimately a part of reconciliation. See 
chapter five.
119 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(2Xxix).
120 Convention (III) Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra 
note 36 at Article 4. Note that treatment in accordance with the Convention does not 
necessarily mean the recognition of the legitimacy of their claim to the State.
121 This is the approach adopted by the United Nations in a series of treaties aimed at 
suppressing terrorist activity. See <http://untreaty.un.org/EnglishAersumen.htm#4>. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973; 
International Convention against the Taking o f Hostages, New York, 17 December 1979; 
International Convention tor the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York, 15 
December 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999; Convention on Offences and Certain Other
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case basis, partly for fear of provoking reprisals, and partly because there may be 
some sense of sympathy with their cause, although not always their m eans.122 
Thus in the European context there exists a two-pronged approach, dealing with 
terrorism as both a criminal and political phenomenon.123 Few are willing to 
elevate a terrorist act to the peacetime analogue of a war crime (such as an 
indiscriminate attack).124
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 September 1963; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 December 1970, 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Montreal, 23 September 197V, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, Vienna, 3 March 1980, Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Montreal, 24 February 1980, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1980, Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 
Rome, 10 March 1980, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
of Detection, Montreal, 1 March 1991. Although dated, for an overview, see: Paust et 
al., supra note 74 at 1175-1224. Article 2(1) of the last Convention listed does contain a 
definition, but it is not explicitly for terrorists but for bombers:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person 
unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive 
or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government 
facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, 
where such destruction results in oris likely to result in major economic loss.
122 Flory, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 34.
123 Ibid. This is different to the legal realist approach of denying all but the criminal aspect 
-  "we will not deal with terrorists” -  an approach often flouted during the Regan and 
Thatcher years. It is an approach making some resurgence. For example see: United 
States Department of State Counterterrorism Office Web Site 
<http://www.state.goWs/ct/> (date accessed: 25 August 2002). On that site, official 
policy regarding terrorists represents a return to the 1980s:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals;
Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes;
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force 
them to change their behavior and
Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work 
with the U.S. and require assistance.
124 The comparison is attributed to A.P. Schmidt, proposed to the United Nations Crime 
Branch in 1992 in an internal report. Report alluded to in: United Nations Office for
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The desire of the State to retain some discretionary power over terrorist offences is 
well established. To suggest that it be part of the subject matter of the ICC is 
controversial. Not surprisingly the offence does not appear in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court125 Y et its omission represents a certain 
consistency in the subject matter felling within the Court’s jurisdiction. The terrorist 
offence has the dual character of a criminal act but also of a political one. Thus 
the nature of the terrorist offence exceeds the narrow ambit of criminal jurisdiction 
allocated in the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court
Mercenarism
Mercenaries similarly pose difficulties to the allocation of individual criminal 
responsibility in public office for the commission of international crimes. 
Mercenaries owe allegiance to their employer, which is not necessarily the State. 
They are members of a private army.126 Other employers could include private 
companies, the ‘shadow State" or even organized transnational criminal groups.127
Drug Control and Crime Prevention Web Site <http:/AMWW.undcp.org/> (date accessed: 
20 May 2002) [report unavailable and possibly classified].
123 See comments by William Schabas, supra note 2 at 28.
126 In this sense they are no different from the medieval armies raised by feudal lords. 
There is however the missing link of fealty that a soldier owes to his lord and the lord to
the King. Instead loyalty goes to the highest bidder. For an interesting account, 
focusing on the international legal history and view of mercenarism, particularly in the 
wake of their definition in the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
see: Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, ‘Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflicts," in Antonio 
Cassese, ed. The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Napoli, Italy: Editorials 
Sdentifica, s.r.l., 1979) at 113. GeneraNy a combatant must have an alien character and 
be paid an unusually large amount of money in comparison to domestic armed forces for
the definition to apply. Foreigners fighting for ideological reasons are excluded (see 
115). Members of Al Quaeda therefore cannot be described as mercenaries in the legal 
sense.
127 Consider the employment of Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Sierra Leone. 
Sandline, ‘Company Profile,” online: Sandline International Homepage < 
http://www.sandline.com/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002). While Sandlines, a Private 
Military Company, may be the archetype of a mercenary company, it is not alone. 
Bounty hunters have been active in the Balkans and the American practice of placing 
cash rewards for the apprehension of individuals such as Milosevic or Osama Bin Laden 
encourages the practice. Some analysis have even advocated the use of bounty 
hunters including an American Judge Advocate General Officer (using his rank, an 
indication of authority): Major Christopher M. Supemor, ‘ International Bounty Hunters 
for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice" (2001) 50 A.F.L. Rev. 215.
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Mercenaries are well known to have destabilized (or propped up) States in Africa, 
South America and possibly the Balkans.128 The link between the individual and 
the State can be tenuous.129 It is for this reason that the Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions do not accord the same privileges to captured mercenaries as they 
do to combatants.130 Furthermore there exists the International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training o f Mercenaries o f 1989, which 
criminalizes mercenarism and any form of support to the "industry.''131 It does not 
represent a particularly universal statement of norms, demonstrated by the fact 
that only 23 States have ratified it.132 Leading Private Military Companies such as 
Sandline International claim only to be employed by: internationally recognized 
States; the United Nations; "genuine, internationally recognized and supported 
liberation movements;" and to adhere to international humanitarian law.133 
Sandline adheres to strict confidentiality rules -  which Sandline describes as 
"absolute.”134 Lack of transparency is a characteristic element of the covert and
Also consider ‘U.S. Will Hunt Masterminds of Rwanda Genocide,” Reuters (12 June 
2002), online: Yahoo <http://story.news.yahoo.com/>(date accessed 12 June 2002). 
According to this Reuters report, 15 suspects will be targeted. Already previous rewards 
have netted the arrest of 22 suspects to date. The bounties are intended to result in the 
capture of those individuals who have fled Rwanda and are harboured in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.
128 Sandline International for instance has been active in Angola, Papua-New Guinea, and 
Sierra Leone. For more information, review their press releases, online: Sandline 
International Homepage < http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html>(date accessed: 5 
May 2002).
129 Often such links are hidden or obfuscated. There is a lack of transparency.
130 See also ICRC, Commentaries (Geneva: ICRC, 1998), ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74 
at Article 47 of Protocol I. This commentary provides a history of the criminalization of 
mercenarism and explains how the provisions denying status of combatant are "timid” 
against the harsh censure of the ‘profession’ by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council in the late 1960s.
131 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, GAOR U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 online UNTS Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/44/49), 
p. 306< http://www.un.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002)
132 "Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General" (2 May 2002), online: 
<http7/untreaty.un.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002).
133 Sandline, ‘Company Profile,” supra note 117.
134 Ibid.
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murky world of transnational organized crime, the corruption of public officials, 
arms sales, drug trafficking, money laundering and even the undermining of 
legitimate State government Despite the image of respectability and even 
acceptance by some western governments of groups such as Sandline, 
mercenarism generally remains at the boundary of transnational organized 
crime.135 One could possibly add to this the role of covert intelligence 
operations.136 Thus like terrorism, the dual categorization of mercenarism as both 
a transnational and international crime and yet sometimes politically tolerated, has 
resulted in its exclusion from the Rome Statute and its continuation as a matter of 
purely domestic concern. The executive reserves the right to exercise its 
prerogative.
While transnational organized crime, corporations, mercenaries and possibly 
unchecked covert intelligence, tend to undermine the strength of the legitimate
135 Consider “UN Interview with UK Shadow Defence Secretary” (9 October 2000) 
reproduced in ‘Comment by Sandline International,’ ibid. The interviewee was Ian 
Duncan-Smith, now the leader of the British Conservative Party, who was in favour of 
the employment of mercenaries. It is interesting to note an apparent divergence of 
opinion between the UK Ministry of Defence and tne Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
with regard to the legitimacy of the employment of mercenaries. This may reflect an 
institutional divergence within the UK government between the legal realist and the 
international legalist. Also see: Chris Talbot, ”Carve-up of Diamond and Mineral Rights 
Exposed, as Britain Continues Recolonisation of Sierra Leone” World Socialist Web Site 
(26 June 2000), online: < http://www.wsws.org/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002) which 
contains a detailed outline of the ‘Arms for Diamonds” scandal where the British 
government broke an arms embargo and participated with Sandline in an intervention in 
Sierra Leone to prop up a faltering government. For a more detailed examination of the 
inter-relationship between other mercenary groups (that are more transparent than 
Sandline) and organized crime; consider the following article which describes activities in 
Balkans involving Albania “freedom fighters,” the multi-billion dollar drug trade and 
organized criminal elements: Michel Chossudovsky, ‘Kosovo ‘Freedom Fighters’
Financed by Organized Crime” World Socialist Web Site (10 April 1999). online: < 
http://www.wsws.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002). The use of mercenaries was also 
being entertained by the academic community, particularly in the International Politics 
Department at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (from the author’s own experience 
in 2000-2001).
136 The role of the CIA or KGB in destabilization of regimes and the promotion of such 
activities is well documented. Consider the American support for the Nicaragua contras 
and the circumstances that led not only to the ICJ case but to the prosecution of 
individuals such as Oliver North and Elliot Abrams. This area represents where the law 
and public accountability hits the barrier of national security and state secrecy -  the 
traditional reserve of the political realist.
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State, in being willing and capable of prosecuting those accused of international 
crimes, there are other influences that weaken the resolve of the State. One is the 
prevalent trend toward deregulation of government. Advocates of reflexive law 
may argue that government is too regulating and hindering free enterprise. 
Habermas might describe a loosening, of the tight grip of the State, as a 
"deliberative democracy.”137 Yet deregulation may actually facilitate criminal 
activity; crime is after all, the ultimate in free enterprise -  what one author 
describes as "criminogenic asymmetries.”138
A picture now emerges of a situation where transnational organized crime tends to 
undermine the ability of the State to function properly by co-opting its apparatus for 
criminal enterprise. In the process the ability of public officials to steer the State 
into compliance with its international legal obligations may be compromised. If 
certain internationally prohibited acts are committed, the acts are sufficiently 
egregious, they are organized and deliberate and the complicity of officials of 
States (de jure  or de facto) is involved, an international crime occurs. Traditionally 
the bases of extra-territorial jurisdiction were applied to deal with such influences 
causing the State to go awry. That system falters in the face of the corruption of
137 One might consider the views of JQrgen Habermas to be consistent with Teubner. 
Habermas believes that the Nation-State has come to an end due to the influence of, 
multinational corporations, multicultural fragmentation and differentiation, globalization 
and the extemalization of State sovereignty. (See: "The European Nation-State: On 
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” in JQrgen Habermas, The Inclusion 
of the Other, ed. By Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greiff (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1996) at 105-127. Habermas sees the communication between the 
different groups of society as a means of validating different views on what should be 
law. Thoughtful and rational actions are the cornerstones of his "deliberative 
democracy” rather than a mechanistic approach. (William Rehg, "Preface” in JQrgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Law 
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) at ix. and xvii.
138 Nikos Passas, "Globalization and Transnational Crime: Effects of Criminogenic
Asymmetries,” in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, eds., supra note 73 at 22-56. 
Contrast with R. Randal Rainey and William Rehg, "The Marketplace of Ideas, the 
Public Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: lmplications, of
Habermas’ Theory of Democracy” (1996) 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1923. Rainey and Rehg 
suggest that reflexive law may help to augment a democracy by achieving a truly 
Habermasian "deliberative democracy."
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public officials, the rise of the "shadow State," activities carried out by rebels, 
security services (a form o f aggression), terrorists and mercenaries. Since the 
nature of international crime may ultimately lead to the destruction of States, the 
effect is parasitic.
Subject Matter of the ICC
Overview
By looking at the subject matter of the International Criminal Court, it becomes 
evident that its focus is the weakest link in the sequence of events that lead to the 
State going awry and the commission of serious international crimes. The 
weakest link is the public official (de facto or de jure). According to the Rome 
Statute, generally persons can only be held criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment if they committed the material elements of the crime with intent and 
knowledge (actus reus and subjective mens rea).139 Persons may have intent 
where, in relation to their conduct they mean to engage in that conduct; or in 
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it w ill be arrived at in the ordinary course of events following the act140 
Wilful ignorance is no excuse: “knowledge” is taken to mean awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events 
following the a c t141 Individuals may be held accountable for crimes if committed 
as an individual, jointly or with another person (even if the others were 
acquitted).142 They may be held accountable if they gave orders, solicited or 
induced the commission of crimes (realized or attempted).143 Assisting (aiding and 
abetting) in the commission of the crime and contributing to the commission in any
139 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 30(1).
130 Ibid. at Article 30(2).
141 Ibid. at Article 30(3).
142 Ibid. at Article 25(3)(a).
143 Ibid. at Article 25(3)(b).
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other way are also grounds for individual criminal accountability.144 In the case of 
genocide, incitement is also a criminal a c t145 Persons under eighteen are 
excluded on the grounds that they are children.146 Official capacity, immunities and 
special procedural rules have no relevance in the jurisdiction of the Court147
Superior Responsibility
Military commanders (or their non-military equivalent) are criminally liable for their 
failure to exercise proper control over their forces where they knew or should have 
known that their forces were about to commit any of the core crimes of the Statute 
and failed to take measures to prevent the crimes or submit the matter to 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. In any other 
superior/subordinate relationship, the superior is criminally liable if they failed to 
exercise proper control over their subordinates where the superior knew or was 
wilfully ignorant that their subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; the crimes concerned activities that were within the responsibility and 
control of the superior; or that the superior failed to take all necessary measures 
within their power to prevent, repress or submit the matter to competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution.148
Core Crimes
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the four most serious types of 
international crimes committed by individuals: the crime of genocide; crimes 
against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression.149 There are other 
crimes over which it has jurisdiction but these are not considered to be within the
144 Ibid. at Article 25(3Xc) and (d).
145 Ibid. at Article 25(3)(e).
146 Ibid. at Article 26.
147 Ibid. at Article 27.
141 Ibid. at Article 28.
149 Ibid. at Article 5.
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core of its subject matter.150 The Court will not exercise its jurisdiction with respect 
to the crime of aggression until the Statute is amended seven years from its entry 
into force (1 July 2009) at the first Review Conference -  and then only in 
accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations'5'
Genocide
Article 6 of the Rome Statute contains a description of the crime of genocide, 
supplemented by Article 6 of the Elements o f Crimes. The crime of genocide 
includes acts that are intended to destroy, in whole or in part: national, ethnical, 
racial and religious groups.152 This may include the prevention of births within the 
group and the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.153 "Public’' 
officials (de jure or de facto) are the only persons with organizational capability to 
realize such crimes.
Crimes Against Humanity
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity. The Article 
contains a list of various acts, which on their own would be heinous crimes.154 
However the context o f each act is important to pass the threshold into an 
international criminal act The act must have been "committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
lso William Schabas, ibid. at 52. He notes these as "offences against the administration of 
justice,’ citing Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 70 and the ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, ibid., at Rules 162-169 and 172. These would indude such crimes as 
perjury, bearing false witness, forgery, influenting witnesses, contempt of court, and 
activities related to bribery.
ISI Rome Statute supra note 2 at Article 5(2), 121 and 123. Also Charter o f the United 
Nations, supra note 26. The core crime of aggression is not actually defined yet; 
therefore it is not further discussed here. It w il be discussed at length in chapter six 
however.
112 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 6.
153 Ibid. at Article 6(d) and (e).
154 Ibid. at Article 7(1). Acts might include: murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of fundamental 
liberties, torture, rape, sexual slavery, force pregnancy/sterilization, persecution, 
enforced disappearances, apartheid, and other inhumane acts that intentionally cause 
great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health.
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knowledge of the attack.”155 The categories are not necessarily distinct; for 
example, crimes of genocide could also be crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.
Attacks directed against any civilian population, involve the carrying out of these 
enumerated crimes ‘pursuant to or in the furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attacks.*158 Like the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity are not average "spontaneous” crimes -  but crimes carried out on a wide 
scale and that are invariably well planned and systematic.157 The only person(s) 
capable of such crimes are those in public office (de jure or de facto).
War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Statute sets forth the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes. 
Like the other two core crimes already mentioned, war crimes are of concern 
“when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission 
of such crimes.”158 While there is a lengthy list of offences applicable, they can be 
summarized as offences occurring in certain types of conflict. In times of armed 
conflict of an international character159, the offences relate to serious 
contraventions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols,'60 the Hague Rules,'6'
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid. at Article 7(2)(a).
157 If one can ever call a crime “average.” See Elements of Crimes, supra note 2 at Article 
7(2).
158 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(1).
159 Ibid. at Article 8(2Xa) and (b).
160 All four Geneva Conventions, supra note 36.
161 The Hague Rules refer to a series of conventions and declarations made initially in 
1907 and updated since regarding how warfare is conducted (Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, 
hereinafter the Hague Rules] online: ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74. The Hague Rules 
rave been added to since 1907 and contain a large number of additional and related 
reaties concerning the limits on the use of force in armed conflict. See also: Adam 
Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of Wars, 3d. ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) or for a history, see: Frangoise Bugnion, 'Droit de Gertove et
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and the Hague Convention for the Protection o f Cultural Property.'62 In times of 
armed conflict not of an international character, Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949 would apply and any offence directed to 
non-combatants or those members of the armed forces that are hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds or detention, would be prohibited.163 In instances of “internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence” 
none of these offences would apply, since there is no war.164 There may still be a 
crime, but not necessarily a war crime -  perhaps a crime under national military or 
domestic law.
A Narrow Jurisdiction -  Targeting High “Public” Officials
The “egregious” character o f an international crime is similar to the Rome Statute’s 
requirements o f “committed with intent to destroy,”165 “committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack,’ 166 or “committed as part of a plan or policy or as
droit de La Haye’  (2001) 844 I.R.R.C. 901, online: ICRC <http:/Avww.icrc.org/>(date 
accessed: 30 May 2002). The principle behind the Hague Rules is that the exercise of 
warfare is not without its limitations. Everything from the use of the white flag of truce, to 
the prohibition of dum-dum bullets and chemical weapons is considered in these rules. 
Also: “Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
the Regulations Annexed Thereto of 18 October 1907,” in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1915) at 100.
162 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The 
Hague, 14 May 1954, online: ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74. [Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 
240]
163 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(2)(c). Offences include: violence to life and 
person; outrages committed upon personal dignity; hostage taking; summary 
executions; indiscriminate attacks; serious violations of the Geneva Conventions; 
perfidy; intentional targeting of cultural and religious monuments; pillage; rape; sexual 
slavery; conscription of children under fifteen; and declaring no quarter. See also Article 
8(2He).
164 Rome Statute, ibid. indicates that Article 8(2)(c) does not apply in cases of internal 
disturbances or tensions (indicated at Article 8(2Kd)) but also that Article 8(2)(e), 
comprising an assortment of crimes such as attacks directed at UN personnel, would not 
apply in cases of internal disturbances or tensions (indicated at Article 8(2)(f)).
163 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 6 in reference to Genocide as an international crime.
166 Ibid. at Article 7(1) in reference to Crimes Against Humanity as an international crime.
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part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.''167 All instances of war crimes 
are not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the Court, for they may not have 
sufficient “egregious” character to merit classification as international crimes under 
the Rome Statute. Crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity however may 
be sufficiently egregious in their own right to merit classification as international 
crimes, without qualification (other than definition). This is reflected in Article 1 of 
the Statute: “...[the Court] shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes o f international concern, referred to in this 
Statute.”166 Those committing such egregious acts require significant 
organizational and institutional resources. Such resources generally exist only in 
the organs of State (or bodies capable of usurping the State).169 The individual 
accountability of those capable o f mustering such resources to perpetrate 
international crime becomes the issue.
The label o f “international crime” is uncertain or unclear. It does not necessarily 
include transnational organized crime or terrorist acts -  although it may under 
certain circumstances. While international crimes are generally defined by 
conventional and customary international law, the compliance by a State is 
dependent upon the role of those individuals who occupy public office (or claim to). 
Their public duty is derived from their association with the organs of State, which in 
turn has agreed to comply with the relevant international laws. It is when this office
167 Ibid. at Article 8(1) in reference to War Crimes as an international crime.
,6S Ibid. at Article 1 [emphasis added].
169 The Al Quaeda terrorist network probably fits into this statement. What is significant 
about such groups is that they do have sufficient influence, power and wealth to co-opt 
an entire State such as Afghanistan or Yemen to participate in their enterprises. They 
also have sufficient resources to carry out significant atrocities such as the indiscriminate 
attack on the World Trade Center or the destruction of cultural property and systematic 
abuse of human rights (war crimes and crimes against humanity). There are 
suggestions that Al Quaeda may even have the ability to precipitate a thermonuclear 
war (“U.S. Breaks Taboo with South Asian Peace Mission,” Reuters (12 June 2002), 
online: Yahoo News < http://in.news.yahoo.com/>(date accessed 12 June 2002)). In a 
sense this is a manifestation of the ‘shadow State” problem. Thus transnational 
organized crime and international crime may not always be distinct from one another 
(CSIS, supra note 73).
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is compromised, that the State begins to fail in compliance. Failure could be 
motivated by blissful ignorance, blatant negligence or corruption. The agents of 
the State could be senior officials, supervisors, members of the executive, or 
superior commanders in the field. One need only examine the indictments made 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to realize that the occupations o f those indicted for 
international crimes included medical doctors, clerics, teachers, military personnel, 
police officials, and local politicians -  those individuals in privileged positions of 
responsibility within the State. The core crimes of the International Criminal Court 
are defined: crimes of genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes -  but in 
the context the co-opting of the apparatus of State to achieve a threshold level of 
egregiousness by the individual agent of the State. Thus the core crimes are 
offences carried out under the banner of the State. This is a very narrow 
conception of the Court’s subject matter and jurisdiction. In the words of M. Cherif 
Bassiouni: “The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind."170
Conclusion
"Transnational crime" is a difficult concept to define, as is "international crime."
The two are related. The egregiousness of the act its prohibition by international 
legal instrument and the fact that the only persons capable of carrying out such 
crimes are necessarily high officials of public office (either de jure  or de facto), are 
important elements to international crime. The corruption of public officials, the 
emergence of the extra-judicial State, the presence of rebels, the status of 
terrorists and the role of mercenaries represent ways in which these high officials 
can become corruption -  frequently by transnational organized crime. Reflexive 
law and the withdrawal o f the State from certain regulatory involvement may 
exacerbate this cooption. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the Court is quite narrow.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Preface," in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) at XXI.
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The Court targets those individuals in high public office that carry out those 
international crimes, as specified in the Rome Statute.
This line of reasoning raises some serious issues. Perhaps the most intriguing is 
what happens when an agent of the State performs her duties well, but has been 
beguiled by those corrupt officials elsewhere in the system of government? 
Provided that her performance was solely in the bona fide aim of furthering the 
interests of the State and that she derived no personal benefit from the situation, 
might these pose some degree of mitigation? Could her acts really be considered 
as illicit acts to the same degree as those who attempted to further interests other 
than the State? A further complication arises in the instance of an entire 
population that has been mobilized by their political leaders to carry out 
international crimes -  for instance the hundreds of thousands of Rwandese that 
participated in the genocide in 1994. Surely by remaining silent or how ever 
remotely participating, they were complicit -  but not necessarily to the same 
degree as their leaders. A line could be drawn with regard to whether they 
achieved a personal gain or simply acted in the furtherance of the political 
objective in good faith (if that is possible for such crimes). It is here that the realm 
of the truth and reconciliation commission, limited amnesties and restorative justice 
might apply. This w ill be addressed in chapter five. Just exactly who can draw this 
difference is answered by considering where discretionary power to prosecute (or 
not) lies. How this power may be exercised in a jurisdiction ‘‘shared'' by domestic 
and international criminal courts is a major issue. Should an international court 
impose its will on a State? Does this not violate the principle of State sovereignty? 
Should another State impose its laws on the other, also violating State 
sovereignty? The answers to these questions lie in the next three chapters, which 
concern complementarity and the limitations on the exercise of discretionary 
powers by the international courts (and their judiciary), the international executive 
and the international legislature.
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C h a p t e r  3
Chapter Three: Complementarity: The Tension Between the ICC and the
Domestic Jurisdiction
Introduction
The Rome Statute is a constitution and therefore outlines how the International 
Criminal Court interacts with the international community (or at least the States 
Parties).171 One of the great achievements of the Statute is that it has created a 
vocabulary to describe this interaction. In the language of the Statute words such 
as “complementary,” “issue of admissibility” and “deferral” replace concepts that 
presuppose the traditional inter-State abstraction of the international legal order. 
Traditional labels include: “primacy,” “concurrent of jurisdiction,” “State consent” or 
“State obligation.’ The new labels represent a specific use of language with 
specific meaning. Immanent to them is the conception of a novel form of 
interaction between international courts and domestic legal systems. They 
represent the culmination of decades of legal drafting by diplomats, government 
functionaries and legal experts. This is why it is necessary to be aware of the 
traditional approaches to international criminal law, so that one can avoid potential 
traps cloaked in terminology. It is also why rather than adopt any one of those 
frameworks described in the first chapter a contextual approach is necessary to 
determine empirically what exactly the ICC is all about.
In this chapter an exploration o f the use of language within the context of the 
Rome Statute is carried out in the general context of international criminal law. 
The precise meaning of language is of great importance. The focus is the 
relationship between the International Criminal Court and the domestic legal
171 Philip Allot, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 
1990) at 133. Professor Allot considers that the constitution of a society represents the 
abstraction of how that society views itself.
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jurisdiction. A referential point is discemable through comparisons to the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR). To this end, the key terms used by the two ad hoc tribunals, is salient -  
‘primacy,’ ‘concurrent jurisdiction” and “ne bis in idem.” ‘Complementarity” is 
frequently used by academics to describe the relationship between the two 
jurisdictions (domestic criminal and international criminal). The meaning of this 
word is explored briefly but the focus w ill be on its root adjective, ‘complementary.’ 
Complementary is a function of ‘conjunction.” A mathematical metaphor is 
gradually employed to visualize complementarity as a general solution to the 
relationship between the two jurisdictions. The dynamic metaphor of a calculus 
equation is appropriate. Calculus is the study of change and therefore reflects the 
vibrant nature of complementarity.172 One must keep in mind that the approach is 
not intended to propose a theory, but rather to gain a unique perspective, amongst 
the multitude of possible visualizations.173 Once the complementary relationship
172 The use of metaphor is often helpful where words may not capture the essence of a 
concept; consider the facetious article: Philip Allot, ‘New International Law: The First 
Lecture of the Academic Year 20-,’ in Allot, Carty, Koskenniemi and Wart)rick, supra 
note 10 at 113. The goal is to capture the ‘poetry of law” and its changing mood. 
Sandra Bunn-Livingstone uses the metaphor of a cell and the analogy to stoichiometry 
in an effort to capture the reality of diverse interpretations of and reservations to treaty 
law in her book: Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 64-65. The use of 
metaphor is therefore one approach to trying to describe a system whose description 
may be constrained by the limits of our language.
173 In this respect this approach is more in line with imaginative post-modernism (William 
Twining, supra note 29 at 195) and the use of contextualization and plurality (Anthony 
Carty, “Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law* 
(1991) 2 E.J.I.L. 66 at 67 and Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument, supra note 10 at 132). The post-modernist 
would advance the theory that aK theory is impossible. Naturally there is a paradox in 
the previous proposition. The post-modernist would however advocate the use of 
differing views on a subject matter. One might contrast this approach to G.W. Leibniz's 
original intended use of differential calculus as a universal language for use in aH 
subjects -  a typical outlook of the 17*1 Century with regard to science and the search for 
universal laws of nature. For a description of this approach see: C. Henry Edwards and 
David E. Penney, Calculus with Analytic Geometry: Early Transcendentals, 5"* ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997) at 213. One might also consider 
Sir Isaac Newton (at 99) who independently developed integral calculus around the 
same time. Integration and differentiation are opposite functions, but together comprise 
the duality of calculus -  the study of change or dynamism. Liebniz and Newton (and 
others including Rene Descartes) reflect the general trend of their era to advance a 
universal natural law founded in reason.
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can be expressed, then it is but a small step to understanding the Rome Statute 
terms of “admissibility" and “deference.” Thus, first a literal approach to define 
complementarity is used, followed by a purposive approach, through the 
description of the procedures contained in the Rome Statute, designed to achieve 
complementarity. The provision of a comprehensive summary of how the 
relationship between the International Criminal Court (and ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals) and the domestic legal system is designed to operate, is the 
goal. If a procedure has been established for the operation of an international 
criminal court, then the framework for the implementation of the procedure 
comprises an international criminal legal system.174 Crucial to the procedure is the 
relationship with the domestic courts. Complementarity embodies this relationship.
Terminology of the International Criminal Legal System
Old Terms 
“Primacy0
“Primacy," in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes appears immediately after mention of 
the term “concurrent jurisdiction" and under the overall heading of “concurrent
1 Since the Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, it could be defined as conventional law 
and therefore is representative of a primary source of international law as described in 
the ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 38(1)(a). Contrast this fact with the statutes of 
the two ad hoc tribunals (infra note 167) where they are based upon the Chapter VII 
action of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Bruce Broomhall differentiates between the two approaches -  describing the “executive" 
approach of the tribunals and the “consensual” approach of the Rome Statute (Bruce 
Broomhall, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Article 51,' in Otto Triffterer, ed., supra 
note 171 at 686). Ultimately States are not as eager to allow the Security Council to 
have a wide discretionary power as to the interpretation of the extension of their consent 
from the Charter to the creation of international courts and tribunals. This is why they 
prefer the treaty approach encapsulated in the creation of the Rome Statute to that of 
the tribunals. This indudes the States that participated in the Rome Conference in July 
of 1998 -  a much larger set of States than those that would ratify the Statute. States 
want some degree of control over the discretionary exercise of power by the Security 
Council. The nature of the exercise of such power may be legislative in nature, in that it 
prescribes obligations upon States (rather than enforces them which is an executive 
action). What is important is that such power has been exercised and that States want 
more involvement. It is this increased involvement in the Rome Statute that Broomhall 
describes as a “higher degree of sophistication than achieved before.” (Broomhall, ibid.)
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jurisdiction.”175 The Rules o f Procedure and Evidence Of each tribunal uses the 
heading “Primacy of the Tribunal.”176 Neither term independently describes the 
jurisdiction accurately. Neither tribunal has the power to ‘assert jurisdiction” 
directly over natural persons of a State;177 otherwise a supranational court would 
exist.178 Yet there exists primacy in a sense, but not deriving from the tribunals per
175 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955 (1994), 1994, UN Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) (8 November 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute) at Articles 8. Statute 
of the International Tribunal, SC Res. 827 (1993), 1993, UN Doc. S/RES.827 (1993X25 
May 1993) last amended by UN Doc. S/RES 1411 (2002) (17 May 2002) [hereinafter 
ICTY Statute] at Article 9. For an up to date version see their respective websites: 
<http://www.ictr.org/> and <http://www.un.org/icty> Henceforth discussion will be limited 
to the ICTY, however the descriptions wiH equally apply to the ICTR unless otherwise 
noted. Also note that the ICTY is sometimes referred to as the “International Tribunal* 
because it was established before the ICTR (hence its case file numbers starting with 
the prefix “IT-").
176 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 11 February 1994, IT/32/REV.20 (entered into force 14 March 1994, last 
modified 12 April 2001) [hereinafter the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence] at 
Rules 7-13 inclusive. The provision is entitled ‘Part Two. Primacy of the Tribunal.” 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 29 June 
1995 (entered into force 29 June 1995, last modified 31 May 2001) [hereinafter the ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence] at Rules 8-13. Note that the ICTR Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence is identical to those for the Special Court in Sierra Leone. Both 
ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence share the same Appeals Chambers’ 
judges.
177 ICTY Statute, supra note 167 at Article 6 and Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 
25(1).
I7S This assertion is a major departure from much of the secondary writing, which asserts 
that the Tribunals do exert primacy over domestic courts. For example, consider the 
frequently referenced: Bartram S. Brown, “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the 
Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals” (1998) 23 Yale J. 
Inf IL. 383 at 387 in particular, but the theme runs throughout his article. Consider also: 
Leila Nadya Sadat, supra note 66 at 85 where she argues that the ICC will not operate 
at the same level as the tribunals as it lacks ‘primacyr in its jurisdiction; Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani, “Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger-Mechanism of the International 
Court,” in Herman A.M. von Hebei, Johan G. Lammers, and Jolien Schukking, eds., 
Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999)at 68; Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo,
“Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach," in Herman A.M. von Hebei, ibid. at 
130 where they describe the “reversal" of the “jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc 
Tribunals’ in comparison to the ICC; and even Otto Triffterer himself in “Part 1. 
Establishment of the Court,” in Otto Triffterer, supra note 171 at 64. Judge Claude 
Jorda, the President of the ICTY, clarified this confusion in his Press Release of 17 May 
2001: ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, “President Claude Jorda: The ICTY and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (17 May 2001), 
where he described the relationship between the ICTY and the domestic Bosnian legal 
system (and specifically a proposed TRC) as being complementary in nature. This is 
explored further in the following chapters (especially in chapter five of this thesis).
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se, but from the fact that the tribunals are subsidiary organs of the Security 
Council. Since States are bound to comply with Security Council decisions under 
Article 25 of the Charter, decisions of the tribunals may have a similar status since 
the tribunals were established under the authority of the Security Council. 179 
When a State does not comply with the request for deferral, the Trial Chamber 
may request the President to report the circumstances to the Security Council.180 
Direct invocation of the Security Council is a measure of last resort. Thus primacy 
may not actually be that of the tribunals, but rather primacy from the Security 
Council. The Tribunal has no other powers in the extreme case of non­
cooperation. Closely related to primacy are the terms “concurrent jurisdiction” and 
“ne bis in idem," both of which are contained in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
Contrast this with the response that the ICTR Registrar had with the Government of 
Rwanda when what had been proposed as a joint effort to investigate the maltreatment 
of witnesses. The initiative turned into a Rwandese proposal to stack the ICTR staff with 
Rwandese nationals, thereby compromising the independence and impartiality of the 
ICTR: ‘Statement by the Registrar on the Response of the Government of Rwanda to 
the Proposal to Establish a Joint Commission to Investigate the Allegations of 
Mistreatment of Witnesses Coming from Rwanda,” ICTR Statement No. ICTR/INFO-9-3- 
09.EN (28 March 2002), online: ICTR <http://Www.ictr.org/> (date accessed: 12 July 
2002).
179 This echoes Broomhall, supra note 175. The authors listed above (ibid.) may actually 
be describing the “executive” nature of the tribunals with the term “primacy” -  namely 
tracing the authority of the tribunals to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter and therefore to its binding authority on Member States of the United Nations 
under Article 25 of the Charter. It is the Security Council which has primacy over States 
and this is the so-called primacy that the tribunals are claimed to have.
IM ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note 177 at Rule 11. Morten Bergsmo 
makes this point suggesting: “primaiy responsibility for enforcing criminal liability for 
violations of the subject-jurisdiction of the Court rests on the States Parties.” (Morten 
Bergsmo, ‘Preamble in Otto Triffterer, ed., supra note 171 at 15) He suggests that in 
the case of a Security Council referral of a situation to the Court, “the matter stands in a 
different light.” (Ibid.) Surely primary responsibility still rests on the States Parties or for 
that matter on all States -  after all the subject matter represents a subset of international 
crimes. The only difference with the role of the Security Council referral is that the 
Security Council has the option of making use of the ICC as a Chapter VII tool for non- 
States Parties. This is an option not a requirement. Thus it may equally establish an 
international criminal tribunal along the lines of the ICTY or a “special court” along the 
lines of the one in Sierra Leone.
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*Concurrent Jurisdiction'’
In terms of "concurrent jurisdiction," the term is likely borrowed from the NATO 
Status o f Forces Agreements, where visiting forces come under the jurisdiction of 
both the sending State and the receiving State.181 The Status o f Forces 
Agreement mentions concurrent jurisdiction:182
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the 
following rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or o f 
a civilian component in relation to
(0 offences solely against the property or security o f that State, or 
offences solely against the person or property o f another member 
of the force or civilian component of that State or o f a dependent;
00 offences arising out of any act or omission done in the 
performance of official duty.
181 Mark R. Ruppert, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed 
Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No"” (1996) 40 A.F. L. Rev. 1 at 4 and 
5. Also consider the appearance of the term in the domestic federal context where the 
separation of powers may not be absolute: W. R. Lederman, “The Concurrent Operation 
of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada," (1963) 9 McGill L. J. 185, reprinted in 
Dianne Pothier and A. Wayne MacKay, Constitutional Law 2000-2001, vol.1 (Halifax: 
Dalhousie University, 2000) at 3-79. Lederman suggests the "double aspect doctrine" 
which is followed-up by examples provided by Professors Pothier and MacKay in the 
Canadian constitutional framework. It is interesting that their attention is drawn to 
sharing and conflict. In French, la competence concunente, implies a competition or 
rivalry between two bodies. One French author has described this situation as “ce 
probl6me de coexistence de iuridictions e d’6ventuels contentieux paralieies...” (see: 
MireHle Couston, “La multiplication des juricHctions intemationales: Sens et
dynamiques" (2002) 1 J.D.I. 5 at 32. Thus the sense is slightly different to the English in 
that under the NATO SOFAs, the rivalry has been resolved by an effective distribution of 
competencies of jurisdiction.
182 North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces, 19 June 1951, TIAS 2846 4 U.S.T. 1792; 1951 
U.S.T. LEXIS 301, at Article VII (3) (Date Signed August 23,1953) [hereinafter SOFAs; 
emphasis added] The importance of the NATO connection can be understood by the 
nature of the peacekeepers drawn initially from NATO countries. SFOR for instance 
(Stabalization Force in Bosnia) is actually a NATO force much like KFOR (in Kosovo) -  
both have UN approval. Later on, the connection is more significant through the 
intervention by NATO on behalf of the United Nations and NATO countries. Recall that 
this approach invokes the Representational Principle, described in chapter two.
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(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving 
State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise 
jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon 
as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right 
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the 
authorities of the other State fora waiver of its right in cases where 
that other State considers such waiver to be of particular 
importance.
The tribunals (like the sending States) have a ‘primary right to exercise jurisdiction* 
in cases of international crimes but, at their discretion, may defer the matter to the 
domestic courts. Thus an individual accused of the domestic crime of murder may 
also be accused of an international crime against humanity. The international 
criminal tribunals have the primary right to proceed with prosecution for 
international crimes over the State’s right to prosecute for domestic crimes. This is 
not primacy, in a supranational sense, but concurrent jurisdiction. In such a 
situation one might wonder if it is possible for an accused to be tried for two 
different crimes concerning the same act in two different jurisdictions. It is here 
that the principle of ne bis in idem may apply.
ICTY ‘Non-bis-in-idem”
The ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, govern how primacy is exercised.183 
It becomes evident in the ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence that primacy 
does not imply that the domestic courts are overridden. The Prosecutor may 
propose tha t the Trial Chamber make a formal request to the domestic court to 
defer its jurisdiction to the Tribunal, but only if any one of three conditions is 
satisfied:184
183 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) and ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 8(2). Also 
consider ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rules 7bis to 13 
and ICTR Statute, ibid. at Rules 8 to 13. Keep in mind that both sets of Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence have the status of a constitutional document for the tribunals at 
a par with the Statute.
184 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9; and ICTR Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ibid. at Rule 9. The ‘or” used in the provision is likely meant in
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(i) The act being investigated or which is the subject o f those
proceedings is characterized as an ordinary crime;
(ii) There is a lack o f impartiality or independence, or the
investigations or proceedings are designed to shield the 
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case 
is not diligently prosecuted; or
(iiij What is in issue is dosety related to, or otherwise involves,
significant factual or legal questions which may have 
implications for investigations or prosecutions before the 
Tribunal,
The first condition listed is reflective of the concurrent jurisdiction of the tribunals in 
that they may exercise a primary right to exercise jurisdiction if the crime has been 
mischaracterized as an ordinary crime by the domestic courts -  for example 
murder as opposed to murder committed as a crime against humanity.185 The 
second condition requires that there must be evidence that domestic courts are not 
carrying out a bona fide investigation or prosecution of the accused, before the 
Trial Chamber may request the deferral of the case to the ICTY.186 The third 
condition amounts to reinforcement of the discretionary right of the tribunal to
the ‘exclusive or" sense. The heading in both sets of documents is confusing, entitled 
‘Primacy of the Tribunal.” The Secretary-General’s Report (see Report of the Secretary- 
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (3 May 1993) at Paragraph 64, reproduced in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and 
Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, vol. 2 (The Hague, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 293) has the heading ‘Concurrent 
Jurisdiction and the Principle of Non-bis-in-idem.’ The Statute has headings 
‘Concurrent Jurisdiction’ (ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9; and ICTR Statute, 
supra note 176 at Article 8) and “Non-bis-in-idem’ (ICTY Statute, ibid. at Article 10; and 
ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 9). The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (supra note 
177) title is probably an artefact from what may have been at one time, development in a 
supranational direction.
185 It is this subtle difference that may be overlooked by Aaron Schwa bach when querying 
why the court martial of American Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi for raping an Albanian 
Kosovar in January 2000 was not turned over to the ICTY. See Aaron Schwabach, 
‘NATO’s War in Kosovo and the Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (2001) 9 Tul. J. of Int’l & Comp. L. 167 at 
183. The alleged act amounted to rape as ‘ordinary crime.*
116 Bona fide is not used in the tribunal basic documents or in those of the International 
Criminal Court. A more ‘correct” term is ‘unwillingness and inability to genuinely 
prosecute.” For a discussion on this see John T. Holmes, "The Principle of 
Complementarity” in Roy S. Lee, ed., supra note 66 at 75-76.
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assert its primary right to exercise jurisdiction. The label confusingly attached to 
this process is “ne bis in idem,' in the Statutes of the tribunals (and Rome 
Statute).187
The concept of ne bis in idem is common in international legal documents and 
generally well accepted as a legal principle.188 The European Convention on 
Human Rights describes the concept:189
187 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 10(2); ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 9(2); and 
Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(2).
188 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes use the term non-bis-in-idem rather than ne bis in idem. 
The difference is not considered to be important. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, G.A.Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996) [hereinafter ICCPR; also available online: UNHCR < 
http://Www.unhchr.ch/> (date accessed: 2 November 2001)] at Article 14(7) states:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of each country;m
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Liberties, 22 November 1984, E.T.S. No.117 at Article 4.1:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under 
the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that 
State;
European Convention on the International Validity o f Criminal Judgments The Hague, 
28.V.1970 online: Council of Europe < http://conventions.coe.int/ >(date accessed: 6 
May 2002) at Titre III - Section 1 - Ne bis in idem; Treaty on European Union at Article 
31:
Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: a)
facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and judicial 
or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings and the 
enforcement of decisions; (...) c) ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the 
Member States, as may be necessary to improve such cooperation; (...);"
and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, 19 June 1990 (Articles 54 to 
58 : Ne bis in idem). See also online: EU Parliament < http://Www.europart.eu.int/ 
>(date accessed: 6 May 2002). The last two provisions (from the European Union) are 
now integrated into the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community O.J.C. 340, 10.11.1997, pp. 145-172 at Article 249 [hereinafter The Treaty 
of Amsterdam].
189 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86 at Article 50; also see: Jaime 
de Lamo Rubio, "Non bis in idem’ y Prindpio de Buena Fe Procesal: efectos de la 
invocadbn tardia de la vulneraddn del Ne bis In Idem,” (September 2001) Articulos 
Doctrinales, online: Noticias Juridicas < http://Www.juridicas.com>(date accessed: 6 
May 2002). Abuse of process and a lack of good faith in international law are generally 
recognized as being unacceptable. Consider Judge Read’s Dissenting Opinion in
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No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with 
the law.
The actual procedure described in the tribunal Statutes, their Rules o f Procedure 
and Evidence (and even in the Rome Statute), is not exactly ne bis in idem as 
described by the European Convention on Human Rights. It is much broader than 
autrefois acquit or double jeopardy. Ne bis in idem incorporates the three-pronged 
test by which the Tribunal determines: 1) if the crime has been mischaracterized 
as an ordinary crime; 2) the domestic criminal prosecution (or lack thereof) is held 
to be valid/invalid by an international court or tribunal on the basis of good faith;190 
and 3) if there are other overriding reasons why the Tribunal should assert its 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction. Thus ne bis in idem is being used in the 
Statutes of the two tribunals in a particular sense with a specific meaning of its 
own. Confusion is inevitable in attempting to apply a pre-existing legal term to a 
rather different legal concept in differing legal contexts.
Their Origins: Legislative History o f the Tribunal Statutes
The history behind the drafting of the Statutes is revealing. The Statutes were 
adopted as emergency measures by the Security Council to deal with 
extraordinary events. China voted in favour of the Resolution adopting the ICTY 
Statute in 1993.191 It asserted that a stronger legal foundation might have been 
created, through a negotiated treaty.192 The Chinese were extremely uneasy
Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), I.C.J. Rep. 1955 4 at 37 cited in at J.F. O’Connor, 
Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot, Hants, England: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Ltd., 1991) at 86.
190 Consider European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, 
supra note 189 [contained in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, supra note 189].
191 Resolution 827 (1993), SC Res. 827 1993, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993).
192 In the case of the ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two 
Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 
May 1993, at 9 p.m., UN Doc. No. S/PV. 3217 (25 May 1993), reprinted in Virginia 
Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis, vol. 2 (Irvington-on-
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though, about the Statute empowering the Tribunal with ‘both preferential and 
exclusive jurisdiction [which] is not in compliance with the principle of State judicial 
sovereignty.”193 This is a curious comment because the Tribunal never had 
‘exclusive jurisdiction” nor did it have ‘preferential jurisdiction.” The Chinese may 
have thought that there was a supranational element to the Statute, in that it was 
being adopted without a representative from the former Yugoslavia present at the 
preceding debate.194
In the case of the Security Council Resolution adopting the ICTR Statute, Rwanda 
was represented at the Security Council debate.195 Rather than unanimous 
acceptance, Rwanda voted against the Statute and China abstained. The 
Rwandese vote is important but in the current context, the Chinese one is even 
more so.196 The Chinese maintained that the full cooperation from the Rwandese 
government was essential for the Tribunal to be able to carry out its mandate.197 
While Brazil voted in favour of the Resolution, it too echoed the Chinese concerns
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1995) at 179-208 (especially at 199) 
[hereinafter ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record o f the Security Council], and in the case 
of the ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, Forty-Ninth Year, 
3453d Meeting, Tuesday, 8 November 1994, 3:35 P.M., New York, UN Doc. No. S/PV. 
3453 (8 November 1994), reprinted in Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, vol. 2 (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at 298-310 [hereinafter ICTR: Provisional Verbatim 
Record of the Security Council].
193 ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, ibid.
m Ibid.
193 ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, supra note 193 at 298. The 
debate concerned the Resolution that adopted the ICTR Statute: ICTR Statute, supra 
note 176. For a comprehensive overview see: Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice and
Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda* 7 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 325.
196 ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, supra note 193 at 308. The 
Rwandese voted against acceptance for several reasons including: the desire to have 
the rabonae temporis earlier than 1 January 1994; the integration of the Appeals 
Chambers with that of the ICTY; the desire to have the ICTR focus exclusively on the 
crime of genocide; the likelihood of the participation of judges selected from States that 
took ‘a very active part in the civil war,” those condemned will be imprisoned outside of 
Rwanda; that the Tribunal win not invoke the death penalty whereas it exists in Rwanda; 
and finally that the seat of the Tribunal was not to be inside Rwanda.
197 Ibid. at 305. The Chinese however were swayed not to vote against it.
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that a more solid legal basis should have been sought, but that the urgency of the 
matter required immediate action.196 Brazil was concerned the Statute had not 
been reviewed by a panel of jurists, representative of the main world legal 
systems. Consequentially there were important lacunae concerning the 
relationship between the local courts and the Tribunal -  what it referred to as 
“concurrence of jurisdiction” between the Tribunal and the domestic courts.199 
Such a critique is sound, for as we have seen, the wording of the Statutes is 
confusing with regard to the relationships that exist between the tribunals and the 
domestic courts.
The intention of the Secretary-General, in drafting the Statutes, was not to override 
the domestic judicial systems but to encourage the “exercise of their jurisdiction in 
accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures.’’200 With regard to 
primacy, the Secretary-General stated:201
This concurrent jurisdiction, however, should be subject to the 
primacy of the International Tribunal. At any stage of the 
procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request the 
national courts to defer to the competence of the International 
Tribunal...
199 Ibid. at 304. It repeated its concerns voiced previously over the ICTY.
199 Ibid. Brazil therefore did not give an overall endorsement to the approach. It also had 
reservations about the Security Council carrying out activities not specifically prescribed 
in the Charter of the United Nations. Ambassador Sardenberg stated at 303-304:
The authority of the Security Council is not self constituted. It originates from the 
delegation of powers conferred upon it by the whole membership of the 
Organization under Article 24(1) of the Charter. For that very reason, the 
Council’s powers and responsibilities under the Charter should be strictly 
construed, and cannot be created, recreated or reinterpreted by decisions of the 
Council itself.
The Security Council is not a court or tribunal. It is an extension of the States that sit on 
its seats, with a permanent representation by those States that were victorious in 1945. 
It is not representative of the international community.
200 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), supra note 185 at Paragraph 
64.
201 Ibid. at Paragraph 65.
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The wording is substantially lower key than in the Statute,202 tempering primacy 
with concurrent jurisdiction and "requests for deferral.”
The New Conceptualizations 
A Regime o f Duality
While the usage of the terms ‘concurrent jurisdiction” and "primacy” are seemingly 
contradictory, one must remember that they are used together to describe one 
thing -  the relationship between the tribunals and the domestic courts. Echoing 
Professor Koskenniemi, one might assert that there is a false dialectic inherent in 
"primacy” and "concurrent jurisdiction.’203 Neither captures the essence of the 
relationship on its own and the Secretary-General’s subordination of one 
(concurrent jurisdiction) to the other (primacy) still maintains the dichotomy. Yet 
each represents aspects of the same abstraction, which together they are trying to 
describe. There is a duality. Had the Statutes undergone scrutiny by legal 
experts, these problems of expression might have been addressed.
The regime established for the tribunals is a novel one, but the statutes and the 
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence have failed to capture their description. The 
functionality has been fully expressed, but by resort to terms based upon a wholly 
different abstraction of international law - the exclusive jurisdiction by domestic 
courts. This became (and still is) a major source of confusion. New labels were 
needed urgently. The Rome Statute is outstanding in this regard, for it introduces 
a new vocabulary. The use of words such as "complementary,” "deferral* and 
"admissibility” represent dimensions of the relationship, which are labels attached 
to the functional aspects of ‘complementarity.'
202 The wording in the Statute may reflect the influence of certain interest groups other than 
States or organizations comprising States. For a list of those comments, which the 
Secretary-General received, see ibid. at Paragraph 14. It is suggested that their 
comments in particular may have resulted in a leaning of the Statute toward “primacy” 
which in turn has overtones of a tribunal that is supranational in character.
203 Martti Koskenniemi, “Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,” in Philip Allot and 
others, supra note 10 at 27.
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“Complementarity"
The word “complementarity’  (or in French, mcompl6mentarit6") appears nowhere in 
the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court or the Statutes of the 
Tribunals, 204 yet it refers to the fundamental principle of their essence of being.205 
It does appear in the Rome Statute travaux preparatoires, but remains devoid of 
any meaningful definition.206 The Oxford English Dictionary describes 
complementarity through the metaphor of the duality o f ligh t207
A complementary relationship or situation; spec, in Physics, the 
capacity o f the wave and particle theories o f light together to
204 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 1. A check of the entire text was carried out in 
succession, using the word-searching feature of Word, Adobe Reader and Internet 
Explorer.
205 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity," in Lee, supra note 66 at 75. Its 
importance is reflected by the fact that Holmes’ chapter appears right after the 
introduction. Hans-Peter Kaul has called the concept the ‘dominating principle’ of the 
relationship of the Court to the national jurisdiction (see: Hans-Peter Kaul, The
International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger Mechanism and Relationship to
National Jurisdictions,’  in Mauro Pditi and Giuseppe Nesi, eds.. The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited and Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001) at 59. Morten 
Bergsmo describes complementarity as ’an essential quality of the Court’s jurisdictional 
system.* (Bergsmo, ’Preface,* in Otto Triflterer, supra note 171 at 15) Other authors 
equate the concept as a ‘pillar” to the Court, trying to apply the three-pillar analogy of the 
legal regime of the European Union. Sir Franklin Berman (see: Sir Franklin Berman, 
‘The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council,” in 
Herman A.M. von Hebei, supra note 206 at 173-178) attempts to apply such an analogy 
suggesting that complementarity resides along with the idea of the most serious of 
crimes of international concern and (rather unconvincingly) crimes that fall under the 
subject matter of the Statute as being in the realm of customary law. This last category 
seems problematic, since the crimes that fall within the subject matter of the Rome 
Statute are generally conventional crimes defined in treaties already and redefined yet 
again in the Rome Statute -  which is also a treaty. They are conventional crimes 
regardless of whether they are customary. Perhaps the other two pillars might be 
territoriality/nationality bases of jurisdiction (Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12) 
and the referral mechanism of the Security Council (Rome Statute, ibid. note 2 at Article 
13(b)).
206 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Volume 1, (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During Marvh-April and 
August 1996), UN GAOR, 51”  Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996) at 36-41, 
reprinted in M.Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Documentary History (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at 408- 
412. The use of travaux preparatoires in English common law is well accepted: 
consider Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.).
207 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. ‘complementarity.”
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explain aH phenomena o f a certain type, although each separately 
accounts for only some of the phenomena.
To determine what the term connotes, one must look at the root word, 
“complementary.”
“Complementary- The Root Word
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “complementary” implies a conjunctive 
relationship, where the two objects under comparison are mutually dependent 
upon one another. If one were to consider the metaphor of geometry, the sum of 
the complementary angles of a right-angled triangle, by definition, must add up to 
90 degrees:208
x+y=90° x+y>90° x+y<90°
Figure 2 - Complementary Angles in a Right Triangle
The two angles (“x” and “y“) are mutually dependent or functions of one another. 
Their sum must be 90 degrees otherwise a triangle is impossible (see Figure 2).
208 Ibid.
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u
A ' = { x \ x e A D x e U  }
Figure 3 -  Venn Diagram and Corresponding Algebraic Equation of the 
Disjunctive Meaning for Complementary
In finite mathematics however, the complement of a set has a disjunctive meaning 
too. For example, the complement of all pennies in a pocket of change (A at 
Figure 3) would comprise the set of all other change, exclusive of all pennies (A’ at 
Figure 3).209 The complement of the set of all other change (exclusive of all 
pennies) is the set of all pennies. The function works both ways -  there is a bi­
directional aspect to it  Unlike the triangles’ example however, the two sets under 
comparison are mutually exclusive.210 The term “complementary" connotes two 
seemingly opposite, yet simultaneous meanings -  mutual exclusivity and mutual 
inclusivity (interdependence).
209 Curiously the disjunctive meaning is not present in the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of “complementary.’  For more on set theory, see at Margaret L. Lial, Raymond 
N. GreenweH and Charles D. Miller, Finite Mathematics and Calculus with Applications, 
5m Ed. (Reading, MA, United States: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1998) 
at 231 and 248.
210 In other words the intersection of A and A’ is the empty set (which is what the equation 
accompanying the Figure says) and their union is the universal set (U).
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Mapping these meanings onto the international legal jurisdiction equates to: a 
complete separation of powers (disjunctive) or some sort of overlapping jurisdiction 
or partnership (conjunctive). Disjunctive complementarity may entail the 
separation of powers (akin to federalism), mutual exclusivity of the international 
and domestic jurisdictions, opposition and hostility. Yet the validity of the other 
jurisdictions (including the national) is tolerated, provided that they remain limited 
to their “spheres'' of influence. The relationship with conjunctivity is neutral. The 
identification of “opposition” is typical of the parallelist approach,211 for example as 
expressed by the former President of the International Criminal Court, Stephen 
Schwebel:212
In so far as their jurisdiction does not duplicate that of pre-existing 
courts, the creation of specialized and regional international courts 
is to be welcomed. It reflects the vitality and complexity of 
international life. It evidences the understanding that the 
effectiveness of international law can be increased by equipping 
legal obligations with means of their determination and 
enforcement.
Disjunction presupposes divisions of power that are distinct, independent and 
mutually exclusive. Opposition and hostility arise when one jurisdiction 
“trespasses” into the other. The NATO SOFA agreements' provision of ‘primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction” by the receiving and sending States, also represents
2" Echoing Schabas, supra note 2 at 92 and Shane Spelliscy, ‘The Proliferation of 
International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor” (2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 143.
212 Stephen Schwebel, supra note 47. Contrast this outlook to that of Judge SchwebeTs 
successor to the American ICJ seat, Thomas Buergenthal (Thomas Buergenthal, 
“Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?" (2001) 14 LJIL 
268 at 274), who has a much more conjunctive (rather than disjunctive) vision of the 
interactions between proliferating international courts and tribunals:
...Here it is important for all international tribunals, the ICJ as well as the other 
specialized and regional courts, to recognize that they are all part of the same legal 
system and that this fact imposes certain obligations. Of these, the most basic one is 
the obligation to accept the methodological and doctrinal unity of the international 
legal system. This means, among other things, that each tribunal has an obligation to 
respect the general and special competence of the other judicial and quasi-judicial 
institutions which comprise the system, to recognize that H has an obligation, when 
rendering judgements, to take account of the case-law and, most importantly, to 
promote and be open to jurisprudential interaction or cross-fertilization.
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a separation of powers based on the type of offence committed, in what capacity 
and by whom.213 It too, is a form of disjunction.
Primacy suggests an extreme disjunction, in the ordinary meaning o f the term. It 
implies supremacy and therefore lacks conjunctivity. Primacy may however not be 
reflective of the Tribunals per se, but rather of the binding nature of Security 
Council decisions and its authority permeating through its subsidiary organs. In 
the case of the Tribunals, the provisions of the Statutes referring to "concurrent 
jurisdiction” appear to adopt the mostly conjunctive approach, but the provisions 
referring to mandatory "primacy” give a distinct disjunctive or even anti-conjunctive 
character.214 The ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence water down 
the disjunctive character in favour of a more conjunctive one. Cooperation with the 
domestic jurisdiction is important in the sharing of information,215 the execution of 
warrants of arrest and the implementation of transfer orders for a witness.216 
Nevertheless there remains a disjunctive element in that under the ne bis in idem 
principle, the Tribunal may assert its primary right to exercise jurisdiction when:
213 Namely the target of the offence (or victim) being the sending State or its agents, 
warranting the sending State to have primary right to exercise jurisdiction. NATO SOFA, 
supra note 183 at Article Vll(3)(a). There may be a graduated scale in existence 
between purely disjunctive and purely conjunctive, with examples falling somewhere 
between these two extremes.
214 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9. The term "concurrent” is also problematic. 
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. ”concurrent" defines this adjective in terms 
of the running of parallel lines in space -  a definite allusion to parallelism and the 
separation of powers, reinforced by giving it a conflicting jurisdictional quality (definitions 
A.1 and A.4). Yet at the same time it defines the term as ‘acting in conjunction; 
cooperating; contributing to the same effect.” Thus “concurrent” as a word has a similar 
double meaning, like "complementary” -  disjunctive and conjunctive. Hans Kelsen even 
had trouble with the description of the disjunctive and conjunctive and attempted to call 
the conjunctive relationship "supplementary.” (see Kelsen, supra 16 at 80 and 84). 
"Supplementary” is defined (The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v ‘supplementary  ̂
as being an addition (implying disjunction) or a completion (implying conjunction) -  thus 
it is also as problematic.
213 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 8 and Rule 11bis(B)(ii) 
-  the flow may be bi-directional. Also ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra 
note 177 at Rules 8 through 13.
216 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 56 and ICTY Statute, 
supra note 176 at Article 29.
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the act has been mischaracterized as an ordinary crime; there is evidence of a bad 
faith prosecution (or lack thereof); or there are overriding reasons for the Tribunal 
to deal with a case instead of the domestic courts.217
The conjunctive definition of complementarity is what is meant when one refers to 
the concept in the context o f the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
The concept is clearly stated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute: “[ejmphasizing 
that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions;"218 and in the first Article of the 
Statute:219
An International Criminal Court (the Court’) is hereby established.
It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to 
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
and functioning o f the Court shall be governed by the provisions of 
this Statute.
The Tribunal term of mandatory “primacy" has been dropped, in favour of a power 
to request the deferral of a case to the Tribunal. This is partly because the ICTY 
and ICTR have the authority of a Security Council resolution behind them, rather 
than an international convention (as in the case of the ICC). The tribunals are 
more disjunctive than the ICC.
217 Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 185. See discussion earlier in chapter three 
under heading of “Ne bis in idem.’
218 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Preamble. Contrast with ICTY Statute, supra note 176 
at Article 9.
2,9 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 1.
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4  Complementarity
A -E C J
Ideal Cooperation 1 
Slope approaches infinity 
(Contemporaneous Engagement)
B -EC H R
C -  ICTR Statute
D -IC T Y  Statute
E -  ICTR in Practice
F -IC T Y  in Practice
G -  ICC in Statute












Figure 4 -  Complementarity as a Function of Conjunction
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the general solution to what could be a 
continuum of complementarity with regard to international criminal law. One can 
visualize the variety of possible complementary relationships between the 
international and domestic jurisdictions. The relationship is a function of the 
degree of conjunction. In an ideally conjunctive situation, the relationship 
(represented by the curve) would approach an absolute limit of conjunction -  full 
cooperation, represented by the right-most asymptote. This is a particular solution
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to the curve. Similarly, where either the international or the domestic jurisdiction 
would deny the existence o f the other -  a form of primacy or exclusivity of 
jurisdiction -  an absolute lim it o f disjunction would be approached, as shown by 
the left-most asymptote. In the case of the middle-range, bounded on each side 
by the supra-nationalist or federal relationship, a milder form of disjunction may be 
present where the respective jurisdictions do not actively deny the other. An ideal 
balance between disjunction and conjunction occurs at the point of inflexion of the 
sigmoid (at the origin). A number of courts/tribunals have been plotted on the 
curve taking into account their relative complementary characters.220
“Deferral’
The system of “deferral’  represents how the ICC w ill implement complementarity 
procedurally. By contrasting the procedures of the ICTY and the ICC, it will 
become evident just how discretionary powers are limited and regulated in both. In 
the case of the ICC the regulation is more sophisticated and more comprehensive.
When it appears to the ICTY Prosecutor that any one of the conditions for the 
three-pronged ne bis in idem test is met,221 she may propose to the Trial Chamber 
that a formal request be made to the domestic court to defer a case to the 
Tribunal.222 If it decides such action is appropriate, the Trial Chamber may in turn 
formally request deferral from the State concerned.223 A state’s non-compliance
The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have similarly 
been plotted, but not actually on the curve. This is because they are not normally 
considered to be international criminal courts. Both incorporate primacy of law 
applicable to their respective member states. Consider Luzius Wlldhaber, supra note 13 
at 50 and Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, supra note 86. Primacy is actually contained as a 
stipulation within the relevant treaties and so interpreted by the respective courts.
221 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 185 and accompanying discussion.
222 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9.
223 Ibid. at Rule 10 but especially at Rule 10(A).
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after a period of 60 days from the formal request, may result in the Trial Chamber 
requesting the President to report the matter to the Security Council.224
There is a fair amount of judicial discretion permitted to the Prosecutor, Trial 
Chamber and President of the Tribunal. 225 Although there is no hierarchy of courts 
(they are equals), the ne bis in idem principle and associated tests represent a 
form of incentive on the part of the relevant domestic courts to ensure that crimes 
are property categorized as international when appropriate and that the 
prosecution of alleged offenders is carried out in good faith.
In the case of the Rome Statute, there is a stronger leaning toward the ideal 
conjunctive lim it Neither ‘‘primacy’' nor “concurrent jurisdiction* is mentioned at all 
in the document226 While the mechanism of the Court “asserting” its jurisdiction is 
similar to that of the Tribunals, it is nevertheless different due to the incorporation 
of “checks and balances* to the discretionary powers allocated to the organs of the 
Court.227 Relative to the tribunals, the level of conjunction in the regime of 
complementarity is much higher.226
224 Ibid. at Rule 11.
225 Recall that the Prosecutor is effectively a judge ^instruction -  and therefore has a 
judicial quality in the hybrid character between civil and common law. See William 
Schabas, supra note 32 at 287-307. The use of “Tribunal” refers to either the ICTY or 
ICTR or both in a general sense.
226 Verified through the use of a word search of the document.
227 Philippe Kirsch, supra note 45 at xvii.
226 This is probably the difference between the tribunals and the International Criminal 
Court that Philippe Kirsch alluded to in his recent publication in the McGill Law Journal 
(“which have priority jurisdiction over domestic systems'): Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., Valerie 
OostervekJ, ‘Negotiating an Institution for the Twenty-First Century: Multilateral 
Diplomacy and the International Criminal Court,” (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 1141 at 1159. 
Note that as mentioned in Chapter Two, the nationality and territorial principles are very 
well established in international law. Universality is not a basis of jurisdiction in the 
Rome Statute for the Court
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State consent to the Court’s jurisdiction exists in the act o f becoming a Party to the 
Rome Statute.239 Jurisdiction may be exercised in a case provided that there 
exists a link to a State Party based on the territoriality principle or the nationality 
principle.230 This is unlike the case of the ICTY and ICTR where consent derives 
from the United Nations Charter and the 'absolute' obligations to comply with 
Security Council Resolutions. The absolutist approach has its problems. Only in 
1995 did the former Yugoslavia formally accede to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
through the Dayton Accords.231 Rwanda voted against the establishment of the 
ICTR and there remain tensions between the two jurisdictions.232
229 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12(1) but also note Article 120 prohibiting 
reservations.
230 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 12(2). Consider. B. Brown supra note 179 at 392 and the 
discussion in Chapter 2 of the Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. Territoriality and 
nationality are the most accepted bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction by States. That 
said, some commentators have suggested that the delegation of territorial and 
nationality principles to an international court may not necessarily be in conformity with 
international law (see: Madeline Morris, supra note 43 at 44). Michael P. Sharf refutes 
this assertion from the standpoint of public international law (along with most of 
Professor Morris’ arguments) in Michael P. Sharf, supra note 43 at 99-114 especially. 
The roots of one of the major objections of the United States can be found in this issue -  
the possibility that American nationals (citizens of a non-State Party) could conceivably 
be brought before the Court. For American points of opposition, see: Marc Grossman, 
‘American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court: Remarks to the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 6 May 2002), online: United States Department of State 
<http://www.state.gov/>(date accessed: 6 May 2002).
231 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
14 December 1995, 351.L.M. 75 [hereinafter the Dayton Peace Agreement at Article IX. 
For an overview of the provisions see: Paola Gaeta, 'The Dayton Agreements and 
International Law” (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 147. The entire issue, of this particular journal, is 
devoted to a discussion on the Dayton Agreements by various other authors.
232 Consider ICTR, ‘Statement by the Registrar on the Response of the Government of 
Rwanda to the Proposal to Establish a Joint Commission to Investigate the Allegations 
of Mistreatment of Witnesses Coming from Rwanda,” supra note 179. There is a curious 
report that the ICTR will now allow the domestic courts to try accused individuals. There 
are suggestions that this too may have been a result of pressure applied on the ICTR by 
the Rwandese government. The ICTR web site does not reflect any such changes to 
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence as claimed (addition of an Article 10brs). If 
the report is true, then this could amount to a major shift of the complementary 
relationship established under the ICTR Statute in favour of a more conjunctive 
relationship in line with the Rome Statute. See: ‘Plenary Changes Allow National 
Jurisdictions to Try Suspects,” Hirondelle News Agency (8 July 2002), online: 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200207100442.html> (date accessed: 13 July 2002).
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■Admissibility”
The term "admissibility” refers to how the Court arrives at the decision as to 
whether a case should be considered, following either initiation by the Prosecutor 
or approval o f such initiation by the Pre-Trial Chambers. There are two tests that 
require application in the Rome Statute: one called "ne bis in idem” and one called 
‘unwillingness and inability.” Should these tests succeed then the case may be 
admissible.
IC C "Ne bis in idem”
The ne bis in idem test only applies in determining if a case is inadmissible 
where:233
The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is 
the subject o f the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not 
permitted under article 20, paragraph 3.
The wording o f Article 20 of the Rome Statute describes a slightly modified version 
of ne bis in idem over the previous variation in the ICTY Statute:23*
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried 
before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the 
basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or 
acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried before another court for a crime 
referred to in article 5 for which that person has already 
been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct 
also proscribed under articles 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the 
Court with respect to the same conduct unless the 
proceedings in the other court:
233 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1 )(c). Remembering that there is a 
presumption that the State is always considered having investigated/prosecuted 
properly, unless evidence to the contrary can be proven.
Ibid. at Article 20.
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a. Were for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
b. Otherwise were not conducted independently or 
impartially in accordance with the norms of due 
process recognized by international law and were 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.
The first paragraph establishes the prohibition of trying an accused, if previously 
convicted or acquitted by the ICC, for the same crime again by the ICC. The 
second paragraph establishes the prohibition of trying an accused by another 
court if previously convicted or acquitted by the ICC for the same crime. This 
second paragraph seems to include other international tribunals in addition to 
domestic courts.235 The third paragraph amounts to a test of abuse of process or a 
bad faith legal investigation/prosecution in the other court (domestic or 
international). If such evidence exists, then the double jeopardy rule may be 
overridden.
The wording of the rule and its placement in the Rome Statute is curious. It is 
placed under the section heading “Part 2 -  Jurisdiction, Admissibility and 
Applicable Law” rather than in “Part 3 General Principles of Criminal Law.” This 
suggests that rather than being a general principle o f criminal law upon which the 
accused may rely, it is a ground for challenging the admissibility of a case, 
primarily by a State.236 This seems to be supported by the explicit referral to Article
235 Could this amount to a restriction imposed on the ICTY Statute’s version of non-bis-in- 
idem, where only national courts and the International Tribunal are mentioned? (ICTY 
Statute, supra note 176 at Article 10) It is certainly wider than the corresponding 
provision in the ICTY Statute.
236 If one looks at Article 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, supra note 2, it becomes apparent 
that a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case can only be 
launched by the accused for whom a warrant of arrest or summons to appear has been 
issued under Article 58. If no such warrant or summons has been issued, she cannot 
challenge the admissibility of a case at all -  although the certain States may (Article 
19(1 )(b) and (c).
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20(3) in the provisions concerning issues of admissibility.237 Thus the context of 
the ne bis in idem rule is being changed yet again, to something entirely different 
to what it meant in the context of the ICTY. Confusingly it still has the same label 
as both double jeopardy as a general principle of criminal law and within the ICTY 
context. The ne bis in idem now refers to three different legal concepts in three 
different legal contexts.
Unwillingness and Inability Test
The ne bis in idem  test for admissibility of case coexists with a second test, 
“unwillingness and inability.” There are only two scenarios where it can be applied 
in an issue of admissibility:238
a. The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to cany out the investigation or 
prosecution;
b. The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to 
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute;
There exists the presumption that the State is carrying out its duties to investigate 
or prosecute (or not to prosecute) properly, unless evidence to the contrary exists. 
Unwillingness is determined by evidence of shielding an accused, unjustifiably 
delaying proceedings or carrying out proceedings that lack independence or 
impartiality.239 Thus evidence of a lack of good faith or an abuse of process is 
crucial in determining unwillingness. In the case o f inability, the condition of the
237 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at 17(1 )(c).
238 Ibid. at Article 17(1)(a) and Article 17(1)(b)
239 Ibid. at Article 17(2).
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domestic legal system is to be considered.240 Thus inability may be indicated by a 
“substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system."241
Both the ne bis in idem test and the unwillingness and inability test presume that 
the State is disposing of or has disposed of a situation in fu ll propriety. Both tests 
are used in the Rome Statute to establish how the Court determines if a case is 
admissible -  those exceptional cases where the State has not disposed of a 
situation in full propriety. While ne bis in idem still protects the individual from 
double jeopardy, it is also being used primarily as grounds for a State to raise an 
issue of admissibility. This is in stark contrast to the ICTY, where the it could 
request deferral even if the State prosecuted in propriety and if a crime had been 
mischaracterized as an ordinary crime or if significant factual or legal questions 
existed which required the case to be brought within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
While the State is not on trial in the jurisdiction of the ICC, there exists almost a 
presumption of innocence on its part This may be what Arbour and Bergsmo, 
mean (although they still use the word "primacy"):242
The jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals has been 
reversed: the ICC may only supplement national criminal justice 
systems when there is inadequate domestic will or inability to 
prosecute.
Through this "reversal,” the ICC takes on a substantially more conjunctive 
character than do the Iwo tribunals.
Regulation of Prosecutorial Discretion
The regulation of prosecutorial discretionary powers in the Rome Statute 
represents reinforcement to the underlying concept of complementarity. The
240 Ibid. at Article 17(3).
241 Ibid.
242 Arbour and Bergsmo, supra note 179 at 130.
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International Criminal Court may initiate proceedings concerning a "situation,” upon 
the actions of three different players -  a procedure, labelled as “referrals:”243
1. When an allegation is made by a State Party to the Prosecutor;
2. When an allegation is made by the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, to the Prosecutor; and
3. When the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation of her own accord 
(proprio motu).
The third condition may be indicative of an enormous discretionary power invested 
in the Prosecutor of the Court although to be fair there is also power vested in the 
States Parties and the Security Council. In the travaux preparatoires o f the Rome 
Statute, it was observed that the discretionary power of the Prosecutor was 
essential in order to ensure an independent and credible Court244 There were 
other negotiators however who considered that the discretionary powers of the 
Prosecutor had the potential to undermine the intended regime of 
complementarity.245 It was unrealistic to dismiss the pressure of States,
organizations and individuals seeking an investigation, prosecution, or the
refraining from any such process.246 There was the fear of an:247
...overzeatous or politically motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly 
or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations. Sometimes 
feared as a ‘tone ranger running wild’ around the world with
excessive powers, the independent Prosecutor was also
243 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 13.
244 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, "The Role of the International Prosecutor” in Roy S. 
Lee, supra note 66 at 177. Gurmendi refers to Report of the Preparatory Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I, reprinted in Bassiouni, 
supra note 45 at Paragraphs 149-151.
245 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, ibid. at Paragraph 156.
246 Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 181.
247 Ibid.
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sometimes depicted in the discussions as an overwhelmed man or 
woman, constrained by limited human and financial resources but 
overloaded with information provided daily to him or her by 
thousands of victims and organizations from all over the world.
Unable to deal with every complaint, he or she would have to 
decide on priorities, which would inevitably result in disappointment 
and challenges to his or her decisions...
A tension exists between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the 
conjunctive concept of complementarity.
The problem is not a unique one. The Prosecutor of the ICTY initiated an 
indictment of President S. Milosevic in 1999 at the height of the conflict between 
NATO and Serbia over Kosovo.24* The comments made by the British Foreign 
Secretary illustrate the unenthusiastic reaction to the indictment249
The International Tribunal is an independent court set up on the 
authority of the United Nations. Their decision to indict Milosevic as 
a war criminal must command respect because it is their 
independent judgement free o f any political interference.
Throughout this conflict I have repeatedly brought into the public 
arena the scale of the brutality and evil which we are fighting in 
Kosovo. I have highlighted the massacre of unarmed men, the rape 
of defenceless women, and the violent ethnic cleansing of a whole 
people. It is right that those who ordered these crimes should be 
brought to account...
But NATO must have channels to the authority in Belgrade that has 
the power to implement its objectives. So long as Milosevic retains 
that power in Belgrade it would be irresponsible of us not to talk to 
him about the implementation of our objectives in Kosovo.
248 Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic and others, IT-02-54, Indictment, 22 May 1999, online: ICTY 
web site <http://Www.un.org/icty/indictinent/english/miMi990524e.htm> (date accessed: 
30 December 2001).
249 ‘Cook’s Response to Indictment of President Milosevic,’ Statement by the Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook London 27 May 1999 Foreign and Commonwealth Office < 
http://Www.fco.gov.uk/ >(date accessed: 8 May 2002). The Secretary-General described 
the indictment as ‘complicating the peace process.’ See: ‘United Nations Daily 
Highlights, 99-05-28” online: Hellenic Resources Network < http://www.hri.org/news/ 
>(date accessed: 8 May 2002).
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At the time, NATO was on the verge of mobilizing its armed forces for a sustained 
ground-based intervention in the Province.250 The indictment of the President 
Milosevic could easily have sabotaged diplomatic efforts to end the war.
Louise Arbour, the Prosecutor at the time, has stood by her decision and considers 
it to have been one “driven purely by a juristic prima facie case and evidence” and 
not by political considerations.251 She considers her decision to have been 
supported by the Security Council; and if it had disapproved, it could have changed 
her mandate or revoked her appointment at any time.252 She has conceded 
however that there was a political aspect to her role as Prosecutor and that toward 
the end of her term, a new position for a political advisor was established.253
To accommodate the tension between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and 
the complementary relationship between the international and domestic 
jurisdictions, the Rome Statute incorporates various mechanisms. In the words of 
Philippe Kirsch, there exists a system of “checks and balances.”254 The phrase is
230 From the author’s own experience, the British Territorial Army (Royal Army Medical 
Corps) was within four days of receiving mobilization orders in May 1999.
231 Louise Arbour, supra note 34.
232 Ibid. Article 16(2) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 176 sets forth the Prosecutor as an 
independent organ of the Tribunal and that her office does not receive instructions from 
any source -  including the Security Council. The only “hold” that the Security Council 
has is through the Secretary-General on the reappointment of the Prosecutor (at Article 
16(4)). There are no provisions for her removal either in the Statute or the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. It is submitted that the only sanction available to the Security 
Council was in fact exercised against Judge Arbour. There is a hint of this in a recent 
report in The National Post, which suggests that her appointment as Prosecutor of the 
ICTY was “cut short”; Janice Tibbetts, ‘Arbour Resists War Court Bid: A Canadian Seat 
on the 18-Member International Criminal Court is Considered a Sure Bet -  Likes Busy 
Supreme Court” The National Post (5 July 2002), online: National Post < 
http://www.nationalpost.com/>(date accessed: 5 July 2002). Could Louise Arbour have 
been a ‘lone ranger running wild?”
233 Louise Arbour, supra note 34.
234 Kirsch, supra note 45. One might contrast this view with the official American 
opposition, Marc Grossman, supra note 231. Also contrast with: Alfred P. Rubin, ‘The 
International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse,” (2001) 64 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 153; and John Bolton, ‘The Risks and Weaknesses of the International 
Court from America’s Perspective,” (2001) 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167. It should be 
noted that John Bolton is the Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security
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problematic, for it evokes images of federalism. The phrase is probably an 
inappropriate description of a safeguard mechanism in a system that cannot be 
analogized exactly with a domestic legal system. Instead, terms such as 
“discretional diversity” and ‘controlled discretionary measures* might be preferred. 
“Discretional diversity” describes the manner in which discretionary power has 
been allocated to many different toe/, as a means of avoiding its concentration and 
hence it potential as a threat to the regime of complementarity -  namely the 
danger of centralization.255
Discretionary Diversity
Summary o f the Procedure for the Processing o f a Case (Post-Referral)
Following the referral, if the Prosecutor concludes that a prima facie case exists, 
she shall submit a request to authorize an investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
with supporting materials.256 She may consider the evidence provided by the Pre- 
Trial Chamber, including evidence provided by victims. Provided that there is a 
prima facie case within the Court’s jurisdiction, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
authorize the start of an investigation.257 The remaining roles of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber are administrative -  such as appointing counsel and the issuing of arrest 
warrants.258 Upon deciding that a prima facie case exists, the charges are 
confirmed and the President shall constitute a Trial Chamber.259 There exists a
and therefore voices the views of the Bush administration. Rubin has ties to the 
Heritage Foundation (see Casey and Rivkin, supra note 42), an “NGO” dosely aligned 
with the Bush administration. This raises a question of whether an NGO such as the 
Heritage Foundation really is an NGO or simply another manifestation of the government 
executive outside of the constraints of government -  bordering very dose to the 
‘shadow State.”
255 See the next Chapter for the concentration of discretionary powers and how it ultimately 
leads to a centralizing tendency.
236 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 15(3).
257 Ibid. at Article 15(4). This is without prejudice to a subsequent determination with 
regard to the ‘jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.*
258 Ibid. at Article 57.
259 Ibid. at Article 61 (10) and 61 (11).
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general obligation of cooperation by all States Parties.260 In the event of a State 
Paity failing to cooperate and thereby hindering the Court from performing its 
statutory functions, the Court has a discretionary power to refer the matter to the 
Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council (where a case had been 
referred by the Security Council to the Court).261
Internal Regulation o f Discretionary Powers o f the Prosecutor
Prosecutorial discretion is heavily regulated in the initial stages of a case.262 When 
a case has been referred to the Court and the Prosecutor believes that there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed or if the Prosecutor initiates an investigation of her 
own accord; she is obligated to notify all States Parties and those States, which 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes at issue.263 She has a 
discretionary power to limit the "scope* of information provided that she believes it 
is necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent the 
flight of persons.264 There exist sim ilar provisions in Rules o f Procedure and 
Evidence for the Tribunals, although rather than being a discretionary power of the 
Prosecutor, such non-disclosure is only permitted in exceptional circumstances 
and must be approved by a Judge or Trial Chamber in consultation with the 
Prosecutor.265 Such limitations on prosecutorial discretion, in the Rome Statute, 
constitute a reinforcement of complementarity, as they incorporate a role for the 
States Parties.
260 Ibid. at Article 86.
261 Ibid. at Article 87(7).
262 Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 180 notes the use of ‘situation* in place of 
"case” for Article 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute, supra note 2. She suggests that the 
drafters at he 1996 Preparatory Committee feared that if "case” were used this could 
lead to the politicization of the complaint procedure.
263 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 18(1). "Those States” might not necessarily be 
States Parties.
264 Ibid.
265 For example: ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note 177 at Rule 53.
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The Prosecutor has not been entirely stripped of discretionary powers. When 
deciding to initiate an investigation, she is required to consider whether a 
"reasonable belief may be established to suggest that a core crime has been 
committed.266 She must consider if the case is admissible under the Statute.267 
She is required to consider, in addition to the seriousness of the allegation and the 
interests of victims, whether "there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice."266 If her discretionary 
powers are exercised in this last manner to not proceed with an investigation, she 
is required to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.269 If she decides: that there is 
insufficient basis to issue a summons or warrant, that the case is inadmissible, or 
that a prosecution is not ‘ in the interests of justice;" she is obliged to inform both 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the referring party.270 The Pre-Trial Chamber has a 
power to review a prosecutorial decision not to proceed at the request of a 
referring party.271 The Pre-Trial Chamber also possesses a power to review a
266 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 53(1)(a)
267 Ibid. at Article 53(1 Kb) referring to Article 17 (Issues of Admissibility).
261 Ibid. at Article 53(1 )(c ). This point is addressed by Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, supra note 
179 at 75. She argues that "in the interests of justice’ stipulates sufficient discretionary 
power not to prosecute, to allow the toleration of truth and reconciliation commissions. 
This subject will be considered in greater detail in chapter five. Arsanjani considers the 
granting of an amnesty to be a political act, not a judicial one. Her argument is premised 
upon a court that performs only a judicial function. It will be argued that the ICC has 
been designed as a court that fulfils not only a judicial function but an executive role 
(through the States Parties, the Security council and the Prosecutor) but also a 
legislative role (through the Assembly of States Parties). The relationship between all of 
these different entities simultaneous seized of interests in the same domains of power 
(or discretion) represents a more sophisticated form of complementarity based on these 
three focal points (judiciary, legislature and executive). This may be the system of 
checks and balances that Philippe Kirsch alluded to earlier -  not between the ICC and 
domestic jurisdictions, but between all interested parties having concurrent interests in 
each of these focal points.
269 Ibid.
270 By referring party, one means the State or the Security Council as appropriate. See 
Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(2).
271 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(3Ka). The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the 
Prosecutor to reconsider a decision. Note that the Office of the Prosecutor remains 
independent from the Chambers.
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prosecutorial decision not to prosecute that is based "solely” on her discretionary 
power.272
Prosecutorial discretion, especially to drop a case, is subject to qualifications that 
do not exist for the two Tribunals. The Rome Statute ensures that the exercise of 
discretion is transparent subject to mandatory notification of the referring party 
and scrutinized to some degree by the Pre-Trial Chamber and States Parties. The 
consequence of such qualification is to shift the conjunctive character of the 
International Criminal Court far to the right of the complementarity curve described 
at Figure 4 (above at page 74).273 In a more practical way, the potential for abuse 
(intentional or innocent) either by the Prosecutor or the assertion of external 
pressure on her, is minimized.274 The entire system of checks, reflects the hybrid 
nature of the Court between: a civil law system, where prosecutorial discretion is 
generally limited and a duty to prosecute exists: and the common law system, 
where discretion is wide and a duty to prosecute is not nearly as absolute.275
272 Ibid. at Article 15(3)(b)
273 In all fairness, there is a limit to this view of the International Criminal Court. Without 
the presence of a domestic jurisdiction, one is only looking at "half of the picture.”
274 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 181-184.
273 Schabas, supra note 32. Also consider Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice in 
Europe and America (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1976) at 16-60, which 
provides an overview of the situation vis-a-vis the German prosecutor. While the ICC 
Prosecutor may be heavily controlled under the Rome Statute, there is still a certain 
degree of discretion possible with regard to prosecution on the part of the State -  
particularly for less serious crimes. Davis notes that this is the case in Germany too. 
One might also consider William T. Pizzi and Luca Marafioti, "The New Italian code of 
Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil 
Law Foundation” (1992) 17 Yale J. of Inf I. L. 1-40. Pizzi describes the origins of the lack 
of discretionary power vested in the Prosecutor due to the lessons of arbitrary 
prosecutions under the fascists. This rigidity is common to civil law systems where there 
exists a distrust of the judiciary -  probably a result of their suspected complicity with the 
ancien regime after the French Revolution. Thus plea-bargaining (marchandage in 
Rwanda) is normally considered to be abhorrent in the dvfl law system. Consider 
Damaska who sees the tension between common law and civil law as "centrifugal 
decision making” and ‘centripetal striving” -  the latter, which allows fix  a case by case 
approach (contextual?). Mirjan Damaska, “Structures of Authority and Comparative 
Criminal Procedure” (1975) 84 Yale L.J. 480. It may be interesting to note that while 
Schabas, supra note 32 argues that a civil law system and inquisitorial approach is best 
for an international criminal court due to the likelihood of intransigence by one of the
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Within one month after notification by the Court to the State concerned, that State 
may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the nationals with 
respect to the core crimes alleged.276 The State may request that the Prosecutor 
defer the case to the State, which she is compelled to do unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber (on application by her) authorizes an investigation.277 Deferral to the 
State can be reviewed by the Prosecutor six months later or at any time if there 
has been a significant change resulting in a State’s “unwillingness or inability 
genuinely to carry out the investigation.”278 The State or the Prosecutor may 
appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber.279 
Thus the system of discretionary negotiation built into the Tribunals has been 
removed from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and formalized 
into a system where: the State has primary right to exercise jurisdiction; with 
checks by the Prosecutor to ensure that the State is investigating/prosecuting in 
good faith; and counter-checks for the State to challenge an overly zealous 
Prosecutor -  eventually involving the Appeals Chamber (judges) in the event of 
irreconcilable conflict This is not concurrent jurisdiction as described in the NATO 
SOFAs. The regulation of prosecutorial discretion by the Pre-Trial and Appeal 
Chambers reinforces the complementarity between the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
the domestic courts. Ultimately what powers the Prosecutor can exercise are
parties and therefore the impossibility of a folly functional adversarial system. 
Notwithstanding that the tribunals and the ICC represent mixed systems (inquisitorial 
and adversarial), it is curious to note that the last effective war crimes court in the United 
Kingdom was also a dvit law jurisdiction - the Curia MarescaHi or High Court of Chivalry 
under James I. While largely a court of honour, its origins stem from the Court of the 
Lord High Constable and Earl Marshall of England (see: J.H. Baker, An Introduction to 
English Legal History (London: Butterworths, 1990) at 141-142; and especially Maurice 
Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 
1965)).
276 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 18(2). The Core Crimes are contained in Article 5 
of the Statute.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid. at Article 18(3).
279 Ibid. at Article 18(4).
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overseen by both the judiciary of the Court and by the States themselves, involved 
in the case.2”
External Regulation o f Discretionary Powers o f the Prosecutor 
State Challenge to Admissibility
The Court is required to satisfy itself of the admissibility o f a case in accordance 
with the Statute.281 The following entities may challenge the admissibility of a case 
or the jurisdiction of the Court:282
1. An accused or person for whom an arrest warrant or summons to appear 
has been issued;
2. A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the grounds that it is 
investigating or prosecuting the case or already has done so; and
3. A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required (i.e. a non-State 
Party to the Statute).
The right of the accused to challenge admissibility is only to when the Court, under 
Article 58 of the Statute, has issued a warrant for arrest or a summons to appear. 
This means that an individual cannot challenge an investigation, until it has been 
completed. The right of the accused always takes second place to the right of the 
State in issues of admissibility.
The right of a State to challenge admissibility is an extremely innovative step in the 
Rome Statute', there is nothing like it in the governing instruments of the tribunals.
280 In a struggle between the ICC and a State, the “winner* would depend on just how far 
either objected. Ultimately, the State could cany the issue all the way to the Assembly 
of States Parties or the Security Council (depending upon who referred the case to the 
ICC) for a decision. In this manner what is considered to be a legal issue could be 
deferred to the Security Council (or Assembly) for consideration as a political issue.
281 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 19(1). Admissibility criteria are at Article 17.
282 Ibid. at Article 19(2).
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It can be made only once283 and when made, requires the Prosecutor to suspend 
provisionally the investigation.284 The Prosecutor may however seek a Court order 
to continue the investigation, collect evidence and testimony, and prevent the flight 
of those for whom an arrest warrant has already been requested (in cooperation 
with the State(s) concerned).285 The challenge can only be made prior to or at the 
start of the trial.286 If the challenge is successful, the Prosecutor may submit a 
request for review of the decision, if convinced that new facts have arisen that 
have rendered the earlier decision per incuriam.2*7
The provisions governing issues of admissibility and State challenges, 
demonstrate both the disjunctive and conjunctive natures of the Court The 
provision for challenge to admissibility amounts to a provision for questioning 
whether the test for unwillingness and inability to investigate or prosecute has 
been satisfied. It also provides an opportunity for a State to challenge evidence of 
a bad faith prosecution or abuse of process under the ne bis in idem provisions 
contained at Article 20 of the Rome Statute. It allows a State to respond to the 
charges made against it by the Prosecutor or Pre-Trial Chambers. The challenge 
cannot be made before the regular Chambers, once the case is underway. In this 
way the regular Chambers are isolated from what might be a moral or political 
question, thus protecting the impartiality of Court’s judiciary. The Prosecutor and 
to some degree, the Pre-Trial Chambers are not so insulated.
Deferral Powers o f the Security Council
The Security Council may act through a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
283 Ibid. at Article 19(4).
284 Ibid. at Article 19(7).
285 Ibid. at Article 19(8).
286 Ibid. at Article 19(4).
287 Ibid. at Article 19(10).
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and Acts of Aggression”) to request that the Court “defer” an investigation or 
prosecution either impending or ongoing.288 The Court must comply. While the 
deferral may only last for a period of 12 months, the Security Council may request 
the Court to continue the deferral under another Resolution adopted in the same 
circumstances.289 This provision was severely criticized in the negotiations leading 
to the Rome Statute -  particularly by India, who thought that the power of the 
Security Council to block prosecutions was a blemish on the independence and 
impartiality of the C ourt290 The deferral power of the Security Council amounts to 
an additional check on the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor (and on the 
judges) -  not so much on her discontinuance of a case, but rather her prosecution 
of one. The provision would likely address a situation such as that described 
above, with the “apolitical” indictment by ICTY Prosecutor Judge Louise Arbour of 
President Milosevic, in the midst of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. There may be 
very good reasons not to prosecute immediately, even if there is sufficient 
evidence to initiate a case. The Rome Statute states that the reason would have 
to be a Chapter VII issue adopted by the Security Council with unanimity. The ICC 
and the Security Council could be said to exercise a form of concurrent jurisdiction, 
if that is possible between a judicial and non-judicial (legislative/executive) body. 
The Security Council does not exercise the ICC's jurisdiction, but rather exercises 
its own jurisdiction in matters of aggression and threats to the peace. This is why 
their respective jurisdictions remain distinct The Security Council only exercises 
jurisdiction when a State is prepared to maintain that a potential prosecution 
should not occur, because it may threaten both its and the community o f States’
2“  Ibid. at Article 16. Note the use of terminology to imply mutual admiration and equality 
pari passu of the two bodies.
289 Schabas, supra note 2 at 65. This is known as the ‘Singapore compromise.”
290 Ibid. at 66 citing Lionel Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: 
Articles 13(b) and 16’ in Lee The International Criminal Court, supra note 66 at 143-152; 
and Dilip Lahiri, supra note 42. Mr. Lahiri felt that the power amounted to the ability of 
certain members of the Security Council, who refused to ratify the Rome Statute, to be 
able to invoke it without having to be obligated by it. His remarks were probably directed 
at the United States and China in particular.
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peace and security. In such a case the jurisdiction of the ICC can be deferred to 
the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Thus the ICC has a form of primary right to 
exercise of jurisdiction. Another way of describing this concurrent jurisdiction 
would be to suggest that the rule of law has primary jurisdiction unless there are 
substantial reasons for a "political” pre-emption to apply.
Judiciary and Assembly o f States Parties
Generally the judiciary and Assembly of States Parties only become involved in 
instances of impropriety on the part of a judge, the Registrar, the Prosecutor or 
their subordinates. The Presidency of the Court w ill receive all complaints of 
"serious breaches of duty” and "misconduct of a less serious nature.”291 In the 
case of a judge, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar, removal from office must be 
put to a vote at a plenary session.292 In the case of the Deputy Prosecutor, the 
Prosecutor is charged to notify the President of the Bureau of the Assembly of 
States Parties in writing of any decision made by her.293 In the case of the 
Prosecutor, the complaint would be received by the President of the Court and 
transmitted to the President of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties; it 
would be up to the Bureau to decide any disciplinary measure in absolute 
majority.294
The Rome Statute does not allow the Assembly of States Parties to interfere in the 
operations of the Court. It can however establish subsidiary bodies including an 
oversights commission. These bodies are for enhancement of the efficiency and
291 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 24 for "serious breach of 
duty;’ Rule 25 for "misconduct of a less serious nature;” and Rule 26(2) for the Receipt 
of Complaints.
292 Ibid. at Rule 29(1) and (2). The plenary session is composed of the judges from the 
Chambers Division, chaired by the President of the Court. The plenary is an 
administrative body that has the power to propose amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (to the Assembly of States Parties) in absolute majority and 
also the power to amend the Regulations of Court (which do not yet exist). Rome 
Statute, supra note 2 at Articles 51 and 52.
293 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ibid., at Rule 29(3).
294 Ibid. at Rule 30(2).
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economy of the Court -  not to review the discretionary powers o f the Prosecutor or 
judges.295 The Assembly of States Parties also has the power to amend the Rules 
o f Procedure of Evidence and the Rome Statute itself.296 While not specifically 
targeting the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor, such powers allow the 
Assembly to react to any arbitrary decisions that may amount to financial 
irregularity. They also allow it to amend the governing documents of the Court to 
further curtail any excessive discretionary powers that undermine the 
complementary relationship between the Court and domestic jurisdiction. It must 
be remembered however that the Assembly w ill not actually possess this effective 
amending power until 2009 although it is now in its early stages of operation.297 
There exists a temporary legislative deficit
The Role o f NGOs
In chapter two the concept of reflexive law was discussed. While some groups 
have taken advantage of the concept to advocate a more participatory form of 
democratic interaction to counter the centralizing and undemocratic nature of the 
regulatory State, others have exploited it to reinforce their positions, enhance the 
efficiency of transnational organized crime, and undermine the authority of the 
State. It is possible to consider these groups as NGOs, but they are oriented 
toward undermining or even usurping the power of the State for their own criminal 
or non-criminal ends. One must distinguish these malevolent “NGOs’’ from benign 
NGOs that operate to reinforce the efficacy of the State in all o f its manifestations 
(judiciary, executive and legislature). Rather than usurping the State, they tend to
295 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 112(4).
296 Ibid. at Articles 51 and 121 respectively.
297 Ibid. at Articles 5(2), 121 and 123. By the same token the Assembly could alter the 
Court’s mandate or even the subject matter. Under Article 121 for instance, at the first 
Review Conference, it will decide upon a definition for aggression and whether nuclear 
weapons use is also a crime (see chapter six). The Assembly therefore could expand 
the Court’s jurisdiction and powers of the Prosecutor. Generally the Assembly is an 
institution that parallels the Security Council. It only becomes directly involved in an 
instance of non-compliance by a State or misbehaviour within the Court by a judge or 
the Prosecutor.
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work within its confines, to perform either a monitoring function or a 
representational function, on behalf of the population (or segments of it) and 
therefore in the best interests of the State. They tend to bring to light abuses of 
executive, legislative or judicial power to any or all of these bodies. They 
constitute a feedback loop to the system of the exercise of power by the State -  
including the judiciary. In a sense they represent a check on the exercise of such 
power. When feedback starts to break down, the conditions for the State to go 
awry are partially established.
The role of NGOs is enshrined in the Rome Statute, in that they are eligible to 
provide information to the Prosecutor in order for her to determine if an 
investigation should be made proprio motu.29# This is not the case for either the 
ICJ or the ICTY, although it may be in practice rather than in statute. Some critics 
have suggested that this may compromise the impartiality of NGOs.299 Some 
critics have suggested that the institutionalization of NGOs will inevitably mean that 
the Court w ill end up relying upon them -  a form of privatized provision of 
evidence.300 The Prosecutor may rely upon NGOs for some evidence, but it is 
doubtful the Court would rely exclusively upon them for all evidence. The critics’ 
arguments reflect those that one might have against reflexive law in operation on 
its own.301 Regardless, the ICC Prosecutor w ill have the role of filtering for
293 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(2). Information may be obtained from: “States, organs
of the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, or other 
reliable sources as he or she deems appropriate...” Also consider the role of the legal
academic community as evidenced by the division of the judiciary between criminal law
experts and international law experts (Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 36(3)). Note
that NGOs do not have the power to refer a case to the Court, although they can bring a 
situation to the attention of the Prosecutor (or even a State Party or the Security
Council).
299 Betina Kuzmarov, ‘An Uneasy Synergy: The Relationship Between Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the Criminal Court” (2001) 11 W.R.L.S.1.7 at 36.
300 Ibid.
301 This is discussed in much more detail in chapter six and concerns the question of the 
stability of a reflexive system -  namely that certain interests do not commandeer the 
feedback mechanism in order to obtain outputs as they desire. Obviously this cannot 
happen since there is a filtration going on here -  at the very least the rules of evidence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
reliability. There exist rules of evidence and procedural guidelines concerning how 
evidence is gathered and from where.302 Reflexive law is in operation alongside 
regulatory and formalistic law.303 Recourse to NGOs w ill not be as significant as 
some might suggest, otherwise it might actually violate some of the discretionary 
limitations on the judiciary and the system of complementarity -  namely accepted 
international and domestic standards for the continuity of evidence.
Apart from benign NGOs, such as Amnesty International, MGdecins sans frontiers 
or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one must not forget the 
role of the media. Freedom of the press is regarded as a fundamental guarantee 
to human rights.304 The free media would play a crucial role in exposing abuses of 
power (arbitrariness) to the executive, legislature or judiciary.305 Thus it too acts as 
a feedback system to the State. Like NGOs, it can be used or abused however.
Conclusion
In this Chapter, a comprehensive analysis has been undertaken of the abstraction 
that is used to describe the relationship between the jurisdictions of the 
International Criminal Court and the domestic courts - complementarity. Labels
302 Generally the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 104. But 
note that she is only to seek additional information sources from NGOs in analyzing the 
seriousness of information received, not to actually argue a case with it (Rule 104(2)). 
Also Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 69.
303 As suggested by Orts, supra note 52.
304 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms describes freedom of the press as a 
“fundamental right:' Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 at Article 2(b); 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86, being Schedule 1 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), supra note 86 at Article 10(1) [but note that unlike the Canadian 
Charter, this is not a fundamental freedom, but rather qualified by Article 10(2)]; and U.S. 
Const, amend I.
303 In Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, supra note 27, there 
was mention that the status of media (including television stations) was unique under 
customary international law. Regardless of whether a media installation was being used 
for propaganda, it still could not be considered a legitimate target for attack unless being 
used for other purposes (such as military communications in mis case). The enhanced 
status is consistent with the vital importance of the media as a bulwark to 
supplements rity.
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such as “primacy” and “concurrent jurisdiction’ do not capture the concept and 
their usage tends to confuse rather than clarify. The relationship is a function of 
conjunctivity -  the level of cooperation between the two jurisdictions. The 
procedures limiting prosecutorial discretion, described in the Rome Statute, 
represent bulwarks to ensuring the high degree of conjunction between the two 
jurisdictions. Discretionary powers are spread-out in order to avoid their 
concentration in an omnipotent prosecutor or even judge. By so doing, the drafters 
of the Rome Statute tried to skew the leaning of the Court away from any tendency 
to become a supranational or centralized court; and thereby reinforced the 
complementary relationship. The increased role of the State in challenging the 
ICC and the deferral process (effective veto of Article 16 of the Rome Statute) is 
salient in this regard. The two ad hoc tribunals represent prototypes of the 
approach; and while lacking the conjunctive safeguards contained in the Rome 
Statute, the functionality has some degree of similarity to that of the ICC. The 
Rome Statute itself represents a major evolutionary leap in terms of visualization of 
a new abstraction in international criminal law -  the deferential regime and 
complementarity. With it, there is a new vocabulary (“deferral,” “referral,” “request 
for deferral,” “complementary,” “State challenge to admissibility” and “issue of 
admissibility”). There are additional safeguards incorporated into the Statute to 
ensure that complementarity is achieved -  through controls on discretionary 
powers and the diffusion of such powers amongst many key players.
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C h a p t e r  4
Chapter Four Structural Constraints on the Exercise of Judicial Authority
within the ICC
Introduction
Complementarity represents the backbone of the Rome Statute. The concept 
incorporates a new vision of how international criminal courts (the ICC in 
particular) work in partnership with the domestic criminal courts to encourage 
prosecutions of international crime, yet to also act where the domestic courts are 
either unwilling or unable or in instances where their domestic judicial systems, like 
the State, have gone awry. The ICC is not a supranational court, asserting its 
jurisdiction over a State’s. A new vocabulary reflects this new idea, using such 
terms as “deferral,” “admissibility,” and “complementary.” The essence of 
complementarity is the diversification of discretionary powers amongst many of the 
players: the accused (to a limited extent), the States, the Assembly of States 
Parties, the Security Council and even NGOs. In this manner discretionary power 
is not centralized but decentralized. The “rule of law” becomes almost deliberative, 
characterized by negotiation and consensus rather than imposition and rigidity of 
control. Imposition and rigidity of control is the nature of the domestic criminal 
legal system, not the international criminal legal system. The Rome Statute 
incorporates a reflexive vision of complementarity.
Yet there is another focal point of control that must be considered in the context of 
the international criminal legal system. It is the judge. Within the hands of the 
judge there still remains a great deal of discretionary authority. This is because of 
the requirement for an independent judiciary. If unregulated discretionary power 
exists, it could conceivably thwart the deliberative approach that so characterizes 
complementarity. It could also result in the centralization of decision-making at
98
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one place, again undermining complementarity. The regulation of judicial power 
must originate from somewhere other than political decision-makers in order to 
preserve the integrity of judicial independence. In such a system, a self-regulation 
of the judiciary is necessary at the international level. Like complementarity such 
an approach is steeped in reflexive law, but unlike complementarity it is not 
described in any Statute. It is a form of inherent control.
This chapter explores how the judiciary of international courts regulates itself. 
Before any in-depth exploration, one first must understand the nature of the 
international legal environment. The nature of jurisdiction in the international 
sense differs from the domestic one. The State still figures prominently, even with 
the presence o f the ICC. The State remains the primary entity in international law. 
A decentralized legal order is the result There is a distinct aversion to 
centralization of international legal authority, which can be traced at least to 
Kelsen. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals represents a facet of 
the disparate nature of the international legal system. Inherent judicial regulation 
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY/ICTR) 
represent standards, against which one can compare those present in the Rome 
Statute.306 To whom are the judges responsible and how does that lim it their 
freedom of action? Are there indications of indirect accountability of judicial 
decisions through the appointment removal and renewal of tenure of judges? 
What sources o f law are permitted? What sources of law are used in practice? 
Answers to these questions could provide insight to the scope of the relevant 
court’s jurisdiction and the corresponding freedom the judges might have, or 
alternatively, think that they might have. The addition or removal of sources of law 
and/or judicial procedures within a court is normally accomplished through 
amendments to the courts’ statutes. The nature of the amendment process of the 
statutes of the courts could be another indicator of limitations to judicial power.
306 The comparison is limited since the ICC is not yet in operation.
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International courts must operate with constraints, because there is a limitation on 
the judicial decision-making, in favour of maintaining the decentralized nature of 
the international legal system. This is a form of internal regulation of international 
courts that supplements complementarity.
The International Legal Environment
The Concept o f Jurisdiction
In the domestic legal system, the concept of "jurisdiction” may delimit the State’s 
right to interfere with the individual, its subject.307 Limitations exist the sources of 
law; territoriality; the nature of the subject matter, including divisions of power the 
nature of the subjects (for example children or the insane); procedure through 
natural justice (such as a fair trial or autrefois acquit); and the issue o f remedies 
(right of appeal and administrative remedies).308 In the international criminal 
system, while the individual is the subject of the proceedings, so too is the State in 
a manner of speaking. The concept of ‘jurisdiction’ in international criminal law 
may delimit the right o f an international court to interfere with the individual, yet the 
individual still is a State’s subject This is not to mean that the State is being 
brought to account as the ICC, ICTY and ICTR do not have jurisdiction over 
States but over individuals.309 Rather, the State not only has a vested right in the 
individual, but also over its right to interfere with her rights instead of the 
international community.
307 Stuart James Whitley, "Preface,” The Concept of Jurisdiction in Canadian Criminal Law 
(LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie Law School, 1983) at vi. In an earlier draft of this thesis the 
author described this more diffuse form of complementarity as "supplementarity.” While 
an appropriate label, given that the vocabulary of the Rome Statute remains generally 
unused at this time, the last thing that this field requires is a new label for a new concept. 
For this reason it is labelled as complementarity, although its nature is quite distinct from 
the statutory regulation of discretionary powers described in the previous chapter.
308 Ibid. This is an overview of the Stuart Whitley's Table of Contents.
309 Contrast with Madeline Morris, supra note 43. The "primacy” described in the ICTY 
Statute over domestic courts or the ICC Statute’s "threat” to defer a case to the Security 
Council or Assembly of States Parties may amount to an indictment of the legal system 
within the subject State, however it is not an indictment with legal effect as such.
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This is a sensitive topic, for ultimately one is challenging the jurisdiction of the 
State as being either unwilling or incapable of prosecuting an individual. The 
credibility of a state’s sovereign prerogative may be at stake. The legal creeps 
close to the political. The delimitation has to exist in a decentralized legal system, 
where the international courts do not represent any one State and their application 
of the law must not be seen to be supranational. Decentralized though the 
international criminal legal system may be, there is a commonality and coherence 
in the judicial approach to international legal issues, including criminal. It is this 
commonality and coherence that imposes limitations on just how far a judge can 
act.
Decentralized Character o f International Law
The international legal system has been described as a primitive legal system.310 
Primitive law lacks the necessary division of labour to allow the centralization of 
legal legislative and legal coercive power to occur.311 Kelsen’s views on the 
international legal system rest precariously upon the idea of centralization. They 
reflect influence from Marx (the division of labour), Hegel (progress), Weber 
(bureaucracy) and even Darwin (evolution). They are also conspicuously oriented 
toward the exclusive consideration of the relationship between States and the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. This is understandable, considering that 
Kelsen may not have seen the proliferation of international courts and tribunals in
310 Hans Kelsen, supra note 16 at 40 and 60. ‘Primitive'' is a technical term and it is 
suggested that it is not an anthropological one for societies that lack the technology of 
the industrialized societies. It relates more to centralization. The term does evoke the 
Hegelian presumption of progress; for that reason ‘decentralized” is preferred. There is 
a common acceptance the Hegelian evolutionary approach -  namely that societies and 
legal systems develop in stages. Recall Teubner, supra note 52. Is it possible that 
rather than evolution, a legal system just is? The need for stages of evolution seems 
restrictive.
311 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 5.
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his day. He did not dismiss the possibility of ‘a diametrically opposite evolution of 
international relations.”312
Hans Kelsen believed in an eventual evolution to a world federalist State through 
the centralization of judicial and legislative authority.313 Kelsen was probably a 
supranationalist, however he saw such an international system as utopian idealism 
and its achievement not immediately realizable.314 Centralization of coercive 
power alone was not sufficient to advance from a primitive state of law to a more 
advanced form.315 Writing in 1942, in the shadow of the failure of the League of 
Nations, Kelsen saw the Permanent Court of International Justice (predecessor to 
the International Court o f Justice) as a potentially significant body in centralizing 
the international judiciary: “[ajccording to the patterns of evolution of natural law, 
centralization of the judiciary must precede centralization of legislative and 
executive power.” 316
Kelsen recognized that there were two key criteria in common to all international 
legal orders: coercion and voluntary obedience. He was critical of a legal order
312 Ibid. at 55. Kelsen also dismisses the liberal approach to international law. He does 
make allowance for the Soviet and fascist systems as legal systems that were valid and 
efficacious. He suggests that political ideals may influence how we define what is law. 
Liberals would apply a moral or political judgment on a system of social organization by 
arguing that only a democratic regime or a regime with a completely free-market 
economy is ‘legitimate.’  Such judgments do not follow from the “scientific character” of 
law; Kelsen would not make such judgments -  a view of cultural relativism and 
tolerance. The liberal approach is alive and well: see William W. Burke-White, supra 
note 30 and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ibid.
3,3 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 144.
314 In the long term this may be true. Kelsen also spoke of ‘spheres of interest” of States. 
If these spheres were interfered with, that could constitute a delict in international law 
(with the exception of the ‘just war”). See ibid. at 52. In the short term or present, he 
seems to accept the parallelist outlook.
315 Ibid. at 52.
316 Ibid. at 150. His conception of the role of the ICJ may reflect the school of dualism 
(Malcolm Shaw, supra note 25). It is submitted that dualism is simply a particular case 
of the more general concept of parallelism. Rather than a multiplicity of international 
judicial bodies, dualism simply holds that there are two -  the ICJ and the domestic 
courts.
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based upon coercion. Nevertheless, it may be this vision that he had of an 
international legal order dominated by a coercive United Nations, waging a war in 
1942, and perhaps of a reinvigorated Permanent Court of International Justice. 
Kelsen argued that a major evolutionary leap to centralization could be achieved 
through the old Roman law doctrine of betlum justum -  “the just war.”317 He 
believed the rendering of binding decisions upon states by the Court. He also 
believed in the ability of the Council of the League of Nations (forerunner of the 
Security Council) to impose binding majority decisions upon states.318 The task of 
deciding which was the just war could be delegated to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.
Kelsen also regarded voluntary obedience as a much sounder foundation on which 
to build a legal order. Reasons, explaining the "appropriateness’' of a rule and 
"respect or love” were all ways in which obedience could be achieved, but the 
most effective means of achieving compliance to legal rules was through the 
setting of an example.319 Kelsen illustrated his theory with the role of the teacher 
or saint.320
While Kelsen’s vision of the international legal order is not exactly what exists 
today. States have regulated themselves through international cooperation.321 A 
great many international organizations exist founded upon the consensus of 
States, negotiation and not upon coercion.322 Coercion exits, but it is restricted to 
matters involving the inherent right of self-defence of States and threats or
317 Kelsen, ibid. at 54. Writing in 1942 could it have been any different?
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid. at 6.
320 Ibid.
321 For example the Palermo Convention, supra note 70 mentioned in chapter two.
322 For example OSCE or even the UN. See: Organization on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, OSCE Final Act: 25, 1975-2000 Handbook (Vienna: OSCE, 2001), available 
online: <http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/handbook.pdf> (date accessed: 27 
August 2002) at 12-16.
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breaches to international peace and security.323 In this manner, the international 
legal system continues to be decentralized. Entities with legal personality are 
primarily States, but a multiplicity o f international organizations and NGOs also 
have standing. Some of these organizations are “regional arrangements,” 
recognized in the Charter,324 while others such as the Comit6 de la croix rouge 
represent NGOs with recognition by States and through conventional international 
law.325 If one adds to this the multiplication of States through post-war 
decolonisation, the international legal system has become even more 
decentralized than it was in 1945.
Proliferation o f International Courts and Tribunals
One of the features of the decentralized nature of the international legal system is 
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. The Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals (PiCT) ambitiously tried to identify all international courts and 
tribunals, including those concerned with international criminal law.326 PiCT 
suggests that327
323 This is Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26.
324 Ibid. at Chapter VIII.
325 The standing of the ICRC in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols is mentioned 
by Schabas, supra note 2 at 52 (citing Protocol II and also Article 8(e) of the Statute -  
namely the deliberate targeting of armed attack against humanitarian relief including that 
run by the ICRC or its associated Islamic analogue, the Red Crescent Society). Other 
organizations may have a lesser standing. One might also consider the extensive list of 
organizations and other entities represented at the Rome Conference with observer 
status at Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, PCNICC, Annex III reprinted 
in Bassiouni, The Statute of die International Criminal Court: A Documentary History, at 
106.
326 For a detailed on-line survey of the hundreds of international courts and tribunals one 
should visit the web site of the Project of International Courts and Tribunals (PiCT), 
being run jointly as a research project from New York University and the University of 
London. See: Cesare Romano, “The International Judiciary in Context: A Synoptic 
Chart” (Ver. 2.0, August 2001), online: The Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals (NYU) < http://www.pict-pcti.org/index2.html> (date accessed: 12 July 2002). 
“The matrix” is of great interest in this regard. Both Shane Spelliscy, supra note 212, 
and Cesare Romano, supra note 328 are of the opinion that the interactions between 
these courts are minimal and therefore consistency of decision-making is lacking. This 
argument amounts to a rejection of the conjunctive nature of complementarity -  either in 
favour of parallelism or alternatively in favour of a supranational court (Spelliscy
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...ft]he institutions and mechanisms listed...have very few legal or 
functional links among one another, either within or across each 
major grouping or cluster...
Other writers argue a lack of coherence through a lack of intercommunication:328
...the real proliferation problem is not derivative of the fact that 
many international tribunals exist, but rather of the fact that they 
have proliferated in an environment without any formal relations 
between them. The development of tribunals in the absence of 
structured relationships has led to the characterization of the 
international legal system as a disordered melody, though perhaps 
one not so optimistic might be more inclined to call it a cacophony 
rather than a melody.
Such an outlook preconceives that centralization (“formal relations’ or “structured 
relationships”) is essential to coherence. While these arguments may appear 
convincing at one level, the reality is that they amount to a projection of one’s legal 
expectations of the domestic system onto the international. A hierarchy of law is 
not necessarily needed at the international level. The international judiciary 
renders decisions in a consistent form and there are relations between the various 
courts and tribunals. Many of their sources of law are identical. They also tend to 
look at one another’s case law as persuasive authority. Judges often sit in other 
international tribunals.329 In a decentralized legal system, the nationalization of
concludes the need for primacy of judicial decisions by the ICJ -  it as a supranational 
court). Thomas Buergenthal's comments earlier seem to refute this idea (supra note 
213). Similarly see Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Relationship Between the International 
Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice,” in Herman A. M. von Hebei, supra 
note 66 at 166.
327 Romano, ibid. at obverse.
328 Spelliscy, supra note 212 at 155.
329 For example the biography of Judge Guillaume, the current serving ICJ President 
indicates him as haying been a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Member 
of the Court of Arbitration of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and designated arbitrator by the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (INTELSAT), the International Chamber of Commerce and the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Judge Buergenthal is a 
former judge and vice-president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Judge, 
Vice-President, President, Administrative Tribunal, Inter-American Development Bank; 
Member, United Nations Human Rights Committee; Member, United Nations Truth 
Commission for El Salvador Member, Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators,
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international law is avoided.330 Instead law becomes more communal, 
exponentially increasing the "sources of legal dialogue:"331
...Decisions are less conclusive, other sources may later prevail, 
and broader forms of agreement become possible, tolerant of 
differences now seen as minor and transient. The use of 
persuasive authority is thus essential to law itself and uniformity of 
law conies not through imposition but persuasion, in the daily world 
of legal practice...Law is so challeniged, however, only in those 
jurisdictions which have taken the risk of leading, and forming, the 
Western legal tradition. They have given law to the rest o f the 
world, and it is only fitting that the rest of the worid give law back to 
them, and that each give law back to the others.
Before considering the "sources of legal dialogue" in the Rome Statute, it might be 
fruitful to illustrate them in the context of two referent jurisdictions -  the ICJ and 
ICTY. The reason for this is to illustrate the significance of judicial limitation in the 
Rome Statute.
Referential Courts: The ICJ and ICTY
Judicial Limitation at the ICJ 
Inherent Conservativeness o f Decisions
While States are obliged to follow ICJ rulings by authority of the Charter,332 in the 
event of non-compliance by a State, there are two approaches possible. Because
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank; and Vice- 
Chairman, Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (1999- 
2000). See: Biographies of Members of the Court, ICJ website <http://Www.iq- 
dj.org\idwww\igeneralinformation.htm> (date accessed: 5 March 2002). Similarly
Louise Arbour was a Justice in the Ontario Court of Appeal prior to her appointment as 
Prosecutor of the ICTY and is now a justice at the Supreme Court of Canada. This 
represents only a small sampling of these three individuals’ backgrounds. It is dear that 
there is a very significant inter-relationship or "cross-fertilization" between the 
international courts and tribunals (including national ones) even without formalized 
structured relations. Therefore the argument to the contrary is contested.
330 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority," (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 261 at 298.
331 Ibid. This should evoke memories of Teubner, supra note 52 and Habermas, supra 
note 138. Thus the incoherence that Spelliscy identifies may in fed represent the 
misidentification of ‘broader forms of agreement.” Could this truly be the 
‘ internationalization of law?”
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the jurisdiction of the ICJ is predicated upon the consent of States, a State may 
render a case inadmissible simply by refusing to consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.333 In the event that the two States before the Court do consent but the 
ruling is unacceptable to one or both, the ruling could be ignored and the Court 
may forward the matter to the Security Council. The Security Council in turn, has 
full discretionary powers as to how to deal with the issue.334 In the event that the 
ICJ rendered a decision that was unacceptable to the Security Council too, the 
Security Council could simply let the non-compliance by the offending State 
continue. Such an act would seriously erode the prestige of the Court. This 
continuing threat may temper the Court’s approach in boldly exercising its powers 
-  and explain its general conservatism in dealing with controversial issues.
Limited Scrutiny o f the Security Council
Generally the judges of the ICJ have been reluctant to question legal decisions 
emanating from the Security Council.335 The Security Council possesses the 
power to simply ignore a decision by the Court with which it does not agree. If 
such a situation were to arise, the damage to the Court’s legitimacy and credibility 
would be extreme.
332 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94(1) -  provided that the State is 
itself a party to the case before the Court.
333 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Articles 34 and 35. For example, consider Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14.
334 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94(2). This regulatory effect is 
created by the balance, between the provisions of Article 93(1) and Article 93(2). (Ibid.)
335 Rosalyn Higgins describes this as the ICJ giving "consideration only to legal factors 
when exercising its jurisdiction, not withstanding the important political role of the 
Security Council." (Rosalyn Higgins, "The Relationship Between the International 
Criminal Court and the International court of Justice," in Herman A. M. von Hebei, supra 
note 66). As will be shown, international criminal courts cannot adopt this approach 
without adopting a supranational character. They must take into account political factors 
in addition to legal ones.
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There is really only one case where the ICJ might conceivably question a legal 
decision from the Security Council. Judge de Castro in Namibia summarized the 
scenario:336
The principle of ‘legal-ness’ -  the Court, as a legal organ, cannot 
co-operate with a resolution which is dearly void, contrary to the 
rules o f the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law.
There is an extremely high threshold to be m et Such a decision would 
undoubtedly launch a severe constitutional crisis within the United Nations and the 
international community, if one were not already in existence. The ICJ would be 
entangled in it  whether it acted or not The scenario is exceptional and most 
unlikely.337
Currently, before the International Court of Justice, is the Lockerbie case.338 At 
issue is whether the ICJ has the power to scrutinize the Security Council in a 
manner akin to a supreme court scrutinizing the executive for activities that may be 
ultra vires. The Court has been very cautious in approaching this question, but in 
its landmark decision of 28 February 1998, it probably ruled that it did could assert 
its competence to rule on the issue.339 This is certainly within its powers.340 The
336 Judge Castro in Namibia, ibid. cited in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 
"Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction," supra note 33 at Paragraph 30.
337 It probably applies to the ICTY and ICC. If faced with an outrageously illegal act by the 
Security Council or the Assembly of States Parties that threatened to compromise their 
judicial functions, they would probably act.
338 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamhiriya v. 
United Kingdom), ‘Preliminary Otwections" 28 February 1998, [1998] I.C.J. Reports 1, at 
Paragraphs 37 and 38, online: ICJ <http:/Awww.iq-cij.org/>(date accessed: 16 March 
2002).
339 Ibid. The Court was far from unanimous concerning its capability to review Security 
Council decisions. The judgement is also ambiguous. A broad interpretation of it 
suggests that the Court may review the legality of the acts of the Security Council, while 
a narrower one suggests that the ICJ jurisdiction may only apply to interpretation of the 
Montreal Convention and not to the Security Council. Guillaume (the current President) 
and Fleischhauer voiced such a narrow interpretration. Their outlook can be contrasted 
with those of Judges Bediaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma -  all of whom supported the idea of 
the ICJ being capable of reviewing the legality of actions by the Security Council in a
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decision is not without its opponents, including from within the judiciary of the 
ICJ.341 The actions of the Security Council in this case may have been 
questionable, but they hardly satisfy the stringent requirements outlined in the 
Namibia case. Lockerbie has yet to be resolved at this level.
Narrow Jurisdiction -  Preponderance o f Parallelism
In the Ndombasi case,342 there were significant differences of opinion, on the part 
of the judges, who generally felt that immunity of State could not be invoked under 
any circumstances in alleged cases of: genocide, crimes against humanity or 
serious war crimes. The International Court of Justice condemned Belgium for its 
issue of an arrest warrant for the Minister o f Foreign Affairs of the Congo, on the 
grounds that the Minister enjoyed immunity from criminal jurisdiction, inviolable 
under international law (it being a customary legal principle). To many observers 
this appeared as a legal retreat from the “campaign for universal justice* and a 
return to the use of immunity of office as a legal shield for commission of
manner akin to a domestic court. Judges Schwebel (President at the time), Oda and the 
ad hoc judge Robert Y. Jennings (also a former President of the ICJ) voted against the 
Court having jurisdiction. See Andreas L. Paulus, ‘Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice Lockerbie Cases: Preliminary Objections” (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 550.
340 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 36(6).
341 Judges Schwebel, Oda and Jennings (ad hoc judge for the UK) were the most vocal 
opponents. Consider Judge Rezek’s statement as representative of some of the 
dissenting opinions (arguing for the ultra vires review), supra note 340:
Ce serait bien une source dbtonnement si le Consei de s6curit6 des Nations Unies 
devait jouir dun pouvoir absoiu et incontestable d I'bgard de la r&gle de droit, 
privilege dork ne jouissent pas, en droit interne, les organes politiques de la plupart 
des fondateurs et des autres membres de Organisation, d commencer par les deux 
Etats dOfendeurs.
342 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), ‘Press 
Release 2002/04: The Court finds that the issue and international circulation by Belgium 
of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi failed to 
respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo enjoyed under international law; and that 
Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant,” (14 February 2002) online: ICJ < 
http://www.iq-cij.org/>(date accessed: 15 March 2002).
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international crimes and impunity.343 To some observers this would be an example 
of the lack o f coherence of the law, in a decentralized legal system.344
It must be remembered that the ICJ is a jurisdiction where States are the sole 
holders of legal personality. Immunity as a state function was at issue, not 
immunity as a matter of avoidance of individual criminal responsibility. As 
President Guillaume stated, “...immunity from jurisdiction and individual criminal 
responsibility are two separate concepts."345 Thus the ICJ decision did not amount
3 The Court ruled that Belgium had violated customary law that allows the Minister to 
enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction while occupying that office. To some this 
ruling appears to contradict the Statutes of the Tribunals (see ICTY Statute, supra note 
176 at Article 7(2) and ICTR Statute, supra note 176 at Article 6(2). For an account of 
the outrage see John Kamau, “Uproar as Foreign Ministers get Legal Immunity’ The 
East African Daily Nation (28 February 2002), online Daily Nation on the Web 
<http//www.nationaudio.com/ >(date accessed: 27 February 2002). This argument 
cannot be, for the jurisdictions are different. The subjects of legal personality in the ICJ 
are States whereas in the ICTY (or other international criminal courts and tribunals) they 
are individuals.
344 For example: Shane Spelliscy, supra note 212. This argument harks back to Kelsen, 
supra note 16 and the need for a centralized global judicial system (mentioned in A. 
Cassese, “Reflections on International Criminal Justice (1998) 61 M.L.R. 1 at 6). There 
is a presumption that multiple jurisdictions ignore the persuasive value of their fellow 
courts and may develop law in a different direction (Glenn, supra note 332). Spelliscy in 
particular assumes that there is inadequate lateral contact between judges (formal or 
informal) which is a theme also echoed by Professor Romano of PiCT (supra note 328). 
Respectfully this is not the case as most judges within these jurisdictions were judges 
either in their domestic jurisdiction or some other parallel court. Coherence in law does 
not require a centralized court. Most federal legal systems and that of the European 
Union are testimonials to coherence in a decentralized milieu. Spelliscy appears to 
forward an argument in favour of a centralized world court. The limitation on judicial 
discretionary powers being discussed in this chapter, represent the imposition of 
consistency and certainty in judicial decision-making. It is a complex system but it is 
operational.
343 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), “Press 
Statement of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International court of Justice,” 
online: ICJ < http://www.iq-cij.Ofg/>(date accessed: 15 March 2002). Many
commentators have suggested a retreat from the demise of immunity as a pretext for 
avoiding individual criminal accountability, including the President of the European Court 
of Human Rights (Kamu, supra note 345). With respect, they may foil to appreciate the 
uniqueness of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. That said there were many dissenting opinions 
regarding this case by the judges of the ICJ, arguing that immunity could not be upheld 
in cases of serious human rights abuses such as genocide or crimes against humanity 
and for that reason they felt that the arrest warrant should not have been annulled. See 
especially the joint separate opinions of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal or
the dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, at the ICJ website <http://www.icj-cji.org>(date 
accessed: 10 May 2002). See also: Rosalyn Higgins, “The Relationship Between the
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to a legal retreat from the rejection of the use immunity of State as a means of 
shielding one from individual criminal responsibility. However, immunity relating to 
a necessary function of State is (now) a recognized principle of customary law. 
This displays a prevalent view on the part of the judges, that the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ is extremely narrow. It is self-contained or insular, in that the majority of 
judges are not willing to import principles of law from other jurisdictions -  such as 
the general invalidity of State immunity over an individual as a shield from 
prosecution for international crimes. This is a manifestation of the parallelist 
outlook.346 Like Lockerbie, the judiciary was divided, with some judges of the view 
that the case law of the ICTY and the Rome Statute were sufficient indicators that 
such a customary law did not exist They were in the minority however.
Sources o f Law
The sources of law for the ICJ are outlined in its Statute:347
1. International conventions which establish rules explicitly recognized by the 
States brining the case before the Court
2. International customary law (“general practice as accepted by law”);
3. “The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;”
4. Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.”
While the ICJ applies these sources, there is a contradiction in its narrow 
jurisdiction and the application of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized
International Court and The International Court of Justice,” in Herman A.M. von Hebei, 
supra note 66 at 163.
346 For example the comments by Stephen Schwebel, supra note 47.
347 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 38-1.
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nations.” The Democratic Republic o f the Congo case illustrates the paradox. 
How can an individual’s immunity be questioned before a jurisdiction where States 
are the only entities that have legal personality? The nature of the ICJ requires 
that it have a narrow and parallelist conception of its own jurisdiction.348 
Furthermore the ICJ Statute explicitly denies the ICJ as a criminal jurisdiction.349
Case Precedents
According to the ICJ Statute, the ICJ’s own decisions have “no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”350 Therefore the 
ICJ is not even constrained by its own precedents. In practice the judges have 
skirted around this provision, rationalizing that the Court is bound by the legal 
principles rather than the particulars of any one case.351 Regardless of whether 
ICJ judges are bound by precedent or legal principles, they have opted to limit their 
discretionary power in favour of certainty and consistency of their decisions in 
practice.
Amendments
Amendments to the ICJ Statute may be proposed by the Court to the Secretary- 
General, however all proposals must be submitted to the General Assembly upon
348 Considering its history it may even have been the court envisioned in the development 
of the parallelist (or more appropriately dualist) school of thought.
349 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court and The 
International Court of Justice,’  in Herman A.M. von Hebei, supra note 66 at 163. Her 
views are reflections of Article 34(1), Of the ICJ Statute, supra note 26.
330 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 59.
351 In the domestic situation, it has been argued that precedent is necessary to ensure that 
law is certain. Persuasive authority on the other hand (which is probably how the ICJ 
views its prior decisions) allows more flexibility in application of the law (and the exercise 
of judicial discretion). In the case of the ICJ however, its refusal to incorporate any 
persuasive authority other than its own may further restrict judicial discretionary power, 
limiting it to its particular jurisdiction. See: H. Patrick Glenn, supra note 332 at 297. 
President Guillaume's statement regarding the Democratic Republic o f the Congo case 
may be important in this regard. The opposition from within the judiciary however may 
be an indicator of a desire to exercise more discretionary power.
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recommendation by the Security Council.352 In other words, the ICJ is first 
accountable to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly in matters 
where it decides to change its Statute. While this may not necessarily reflect 
judicial discretionary limitations over cases before the Court, it does reflect 
imposed limitations on the judicial authority to govern the Court.
Judicial Appointments
The judges of the ICJ are nominated by: parties to the Statute of the International 
Court o f Justice, members of the Permanent Court o f Arbitration or national groups 
(in the case of non-parties).353 There is a consultation requirement with domestic 
courts, faculties of law and national academies.354 The Secretary-General performs 
the role of coordinator.355 Both the General Assembly and the Security Council are 
furnished with separate lists of nominations and elect members of the Court (by 
majority of both organs) based on qualifications and the requirement of 
representation of the "main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems 
of the wortd."356 Judges are elected for nine-year terms and may be re-elected.357 
Dismissal of a judge may only occur on the unanimous opinion of the other 
members.358 There are prohibitions on employment but also the conferral of 
diplomatic privileges in order to avoid the compromise (apparent or real) of 
impartiality.359
352 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Articles 69 and 70; and also for UN Amendment 
procedure see Charter of the United Nations, ibid. at Articles 108 and 109.
353 ICJ Statute, ibid. at Article 5-1.
354 Ibid. at Artide 6.
355 Ibid. at Article 7.
356 Ibid. at Article 8 and 9.
357 Ibid. at Artide 13-1.
358 Ibid. at Article 18-1.
359 Ibid. at Articles 16 (prohibition on extraneous employment), 17 (prohibition of acting as 
counsel), 19 (diplomatic privileges) and 20 (pledge).
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While accountability of the judges rests mainly within the judiciary itself (through 
the provisions referring to dismissal), one might consider the incentive of re- 
election to amount to an inducement for a judge to lim it her discretionary power in 
favour of those who vote for her (representatives of the State). The sheer length of 
a term of nine-years, coupled with the fact that the Security Council and General 
Assembly independently carry out the vote, may obviate this influence.360
The ICJ, as a court with a close working relationship to the United Nations, is well 
established. There are constraints on the discretionary powers of its judiciary. An 
inherent conservativeness of decision rendering exists in order to protect the 
Court’s prestige and legitimacy (fear of decisions being ignored). The ICJ is 
reluctant to scrutinize the quasi-legislative/quasi-executive role of the Security 
Council, except perhaps in a case that is outrageously improper. This requires a 
very high threshold and as such, it is highly unlikely ever to happen, if ever. The 
Court has a narrow view of its jurisdiction - probably with good reason due to the 
restrictions on legal personality that constitute its jurisdiction. This may explain its 
reluctance to adhere to the “general principles of law of all civilized nations” source 
of law, at times -  whatever such laws and nations might be. The judiciary of the 
ICJ is largely independent of external influence, with the possible exception of the 
promise of a renewal of the term of office. This threat has been obviated by the 
mechanism of recruitment, which balances the legislative imperfections of the 
General Assembly and Security Council. It should be noted that despite the 
positivist and parallelist preoccupation of the ICJ, there are members of the 
judiciary that see the ICJ’s jurisdiction in a much broader light, “enmeshed” into the 
legal expectations of general international law and open to the persuasive authority 
of other international courts and tribunals. They remain however in the minority -  
for now.
360 Recall what was mentioned above: the General Assembly is representative but has 
little legal effect and the Security Council is not representative but has legal effect.
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Judicial Lim itation at the ICTY 
La competence de la competence
Originally, the ICTY perceived a broad judicial discretionary power {la competence 
de la competence).36' The President of the ICTY, Judge Cassese, described it:362
A narrow concept o f jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a 
national context but not in international law. International law, 
because it lacks a centralized structure, does not provide for an 
integrated judicial system operating an orderly division of labour 
among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or 
components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or 
vested in one of them but not the others. In international law, every 
tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided).
This is incompatible with a narrow conception of jurisdiction, which 
presupposes a certain division of labour. O f course, the 
constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can lim it some of 
its jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent to which such 
limitation does not jeopardize its ‘judicial character’, as shall be 
discussed later on. Such limitations cannot, however, be 
presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced form the 
concept o f jurisdiction itself.
Such a broad conception of judicial discretionary power (and jurisdiction) may find 
its domestic analogue in “inherent jurisdiction" of certain courts. There are 
problems with this reasoning. How far can the exercise of judicial discretionary 
power go? In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada 
indicated that it could counteract a decision made through a popular vote 
(referendum), on the grounds that it was contrary to international law and 
potentially, to the Canadian constitution.363 This is a rather undemocratic position.
361 Or alternatively Kompetenz-Kompetenz. See Tadic, supra note 33 at Paragraphs 11 
and 18.
362 Ibid. at Paragraph 11.
363 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. It should be noted that while 
this decision was within the jurisdiction of Canada, the decision has a significant 
international facet. Many of the experts who testified before the Supreme Court were 
international lawyers of standing, including Luzius Wikfhaber (currently the President of 
the European Court of Human Rights) and James Crawford. See: “Government of 
Canada Files Reply to Arguments in the Quebec Secession Reference," Canadian 
Department of Justice (15 January 1998), online: Canadian Department of Justice Web
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In the international context, could this freedom accorded to judges steer an 
international court into undermining the decentralized nature the jurisdiction of 
states and the promotion o f a supranational character? This is the very same 
problem facing the ICJ. The ICJ’s solution has been to adopt a narrow concept of 
jurisdiction. The ICTY too has been struggling, since its foundation, to narrow its 
concept of jurisdiction -  an extremely difficult task given the broad wording in its 
Statute and Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.3**
Sources o f Law
An examination of the sources of law for the ICTY reveals how it has overcome the 
problem of wide judicial discretionary power. In exercising its wide discretionary 
powers, the judiciary of the ICTY paradoxically has limited its powers by deciding 
to be bound by a plethora of sources of law.
The Secretary-General, in his 1993 Report, described its sources of law:365
...the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part o f customary 
law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to 
specific conventions does not arise...
The Secretary-General outlined an exhaustive list of conventional international 
humanitarian law instruments that he felt had become part of customary law in
Site < http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1998/repiy.html> (date accessed 14 April 
2002).
364 Consider ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) in particular -  “primacy over 
national courts.” Also consider the ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 8(2) which is even wider 
in that it accords ‘primacy over the national courts of all States.” In the case of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177, the provisions of Rule 9(i) and 
especially Rule 9(iii), endow an enormous discretionary power to the ICTY to request a 
deferral.
365 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 34 [emphasis 
added]. “Should” may imply that there exists some degree of discretion accorded to the 
judges in deciding upon sources of law.
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armed conflict.36* In addition, the Tribunal "should apply domestic law in so far as 
it incorporates customary international humanitarian law,” with the exception of the 
death penalty.367
In practice the Tribunal has invoked international legal instruments well beyond the 
exhaustive list suggested by the Secretary-General. In examining the Tadic 
Appeals Chamber decision one can find references to: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rightsi368 advisory and contentious case law of the 
International Court o f Justice; the United Nations Charter, previous decisions of the 
Tribunal;369 the European Convention on Human Rights,370 the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights;371 numerous General Assembly Resolutions;372 
case law of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;373 Israeli and
366 Specifically: Geneva Conventions and Protocols thereto, supra note 36; the Hague 
Rules supra note 162; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, 9 December 1948, U.N.T.S. 78:1021[hereinafter the Genocide 
ConventionJ; and The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of die European Axis, 8 August 1945, U.N.T.S. 82:251. Why the Secretary- 
General referred to customary law above conventional is curious. Surely conventional 
law represents a superior form of international law in that it is more certain than 
customary international law. Perhaps he was trying to use customary international law 
as a means of applying conventional law universally to states, which may not 
necessarily have ratified the appropriate conventions (i.e. the successor Yugoslavian 
republics). The ICTY was established through an executive action by the Security 
Council, rather than by treaty. Only after the Dayton Agreement were the legal 
foundations of the ICTY based upon state consent contained in a multilateral treaty. 
Therefore the reference to customary law may reflect the dubious legal foundations of 
the ICTY prior to its confirmation in the Dayton Agreement.
367 Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 36 and 111.
361 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 189.
369 Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 34
370 Ibid. at Paragraph 41
371 Ibid. at Paragraph 43.
372 Ibid. at Article 44. This suggests that the General Assembly may in fact have some 
legal authority, albeit persuasive rather than imperative.
373 Ibid. at Paragraph 45
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
American case law;374 French and Italian case law;375 the British Hansard,376 and 
numerous secondary sources.377 The list of actual sources of law is immense. 
The judges have significantly encompassed a greater variety of sources of law 
than what the Secretary-General envisioned. These sources however may 
represent interpretative aids to the judiciary in applying the formal sources 
enumerated by the Secretary-General.
The International Tribunal does not work in isolation.378 Its decisions occur within 
the context of the entire European and international judicial scenes. The former 
President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, filed an application through The 
Hague Regional Court alleging that his rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights had been violated.379 The Hague Regional Court, in consultation 
with the European Court o f Human Rights, declared the application to have been 
inadmissible on procedural grounds; Milosevic had failed to exhaust the available 
domestic remedies within The Netherlands. In a previous case that did reach the 
European Court of Human Rights, that Court found that the Tribunal offered 
sufficient procedural guarantees and had a solid legal foundation.380
374 Ibid. at Paragraph 55
373 Ibid. at Paragraphs 58 and 57 respectively.
376 Ibid. at Paragraph 100.
377 Ibid. at Paragraph 110 for example.
378 The ICTY is sometimes referred to by its original name, The International Tribunal." 
When it was established, there was only one international criminal tribunal. This is why 
its case file numbers are prefixed by "It-" whereas those for the ICTR are prefixed by 
“ICTR-."
379 Specifically he alleged contraventions of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
supra note 86: Artide 5 (right to liberty and security) in relation to his detention and 
abduction; Article 6 (right to fair trial); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 13 (right 
to an effedive remedy); and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). European Court of 
Human Rights, Press Release Issued by the Registrar, "European Court of Human 
Rights: Application by Slobodan Milosevic Declared Inadmissible (27 March 2002).
380 NaletHic v. Croatia (1999), decision. Application No. 51891/99, 4 May 2000, online 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>  (date accessed: 10 May 2002). This was a decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights.
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It could be argued that the ICTY judiciary has bound itself by accepting diverse 
sources of law. It could also be argued that the defendants themselves have 
bound the ICTY judiciary, through the insistence that these sources be considered 
and adhered to. The incorporation of these sources may even reflect the 
operation of the complementary relationship between the ICTY and the domestic 
legal jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia, where both jurisdictions are bound by 
the same sources o f law. Yet the domestic legal jurisdiction of former Yugoslavia, 
The Netherlands and all ties to other legal obligations (such as through the ICCPR, 
European Convention on Human Rights or even the Treaty of Amsterdam) are 
integral parts of the domestic legal order. Therefore complementarity cannot be 
restricted to the relations between the Tribunal and the domestic courts alone, but 
encompasses the entire domestic and international legal array of international, 
regional and national legal arrangements and associated courts. The ICTY is 
enmeshed into this “matrix” as is the ICTR, with appropriate adjustments to legal 
obligations listed. Regardless of how these limitations came about, they represent 
substantial limitations on judicial discretionary power. Judge Cassese’s remarks in 
1994 may not accurately depict the ICTY of 2002.
Amendments
Unfortunately the existing system of self-governance of the Tribunal has resulted in 
a counter to the attempts to narrow its wide discretionary powers. The internal 
governance of the ICTY consists of two bodies composed of the judges -  the 
Bureau and the Plenary. The Bureau consists of the President Vice-President 
and the Presiding Judges of the Trial Chambers.381 The Prosecutor (effectively an 
agent of the Secretary-General and Security Council) is excluded. Regular judges 
may draw to the attention of Bureau members; matters, which they feel, should be 
discussed by the Bureau and/or Plenary.382 Thus the President Vice-President
3,1 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 23. At this point focus 
will centre on the ICTY, however the same can be said for its cousin, the ICTR.
382 Ibid at Rule 23(C).
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and Presiding Judges of the Appeal/Trial Chambers perform a secondary role in 
governance.383 The Plenary meetings of the Tribunal provide an opportunity to 
accomplish the following tasks:384
/. Elect the President and Vice-President;
ii. Adopt and amend the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence;
Hi. Adopt the Annual Report provided for in Article 34 o f the Statute;
iv. Decide upon matters relating to the internal functioning of the
Chambers and Tribunal;
v. Determine or supervise the conditions o f detention; and
vi. Exercise any other function provided for in the Statute or in the
Rules.
Domestic courts exercise some of these functions, such as "matters relating to the 
internal functioning.” This might be considered to be an aspect of inherent 
jurisdiction in the domestic analogue. Yet the Plenary functions are significantly 
more substantial, incorporating functions that in the domestic model would 
normally be within the domain of the executive (for instance supervision of 
conditions of detention or adoption of an Annual Report to provide public 
transparency of activities).385
One might contest this last assertion, but the ICTY Rules o f Procedure and 
Evidence is a misleading document Its status is not subsidiary to the ICTY 
Statute. Considering it contains detailed "elaborations” of the relationship between 
the Tribunal and the domestic jurisdictions (mislabelled "primacy” but functionally,
383 This is reflected in their order of precedence. See ibid. at Rule 17(B) in particular.
3M Ibid. at Rule 24.
385 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 34 (for the Annual Report) and ICTY Rules 
Governing the Detention of those Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal before the Tribunal 
or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal, ICTY Document No. T-38- 
Rev8con (The Hague: ICTY, 29 November 1999).
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complementarity) and the specification of powers of the Plenary, the ICTY Rules o f 
Procedure and Evidence takes on the character of a constitutional document, in its 
own right388 For the ICTY, the amendment procedure is completely within the 
control of the judges.387 There is not even a notification requirement to the 
Security Council. In January 2002 a slight modification to this amendment 
procedure was implemented. There is now a consultative role in the preparation of 
amendments for the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: although possessing no 
voting power, the Registrar, Office of the Prosecutor and Defence Counsel are 
allowed to participate in an advisory role.388 Input from other players within the 
Tribunal may represent a slight easing of the tight grip that the judiciary maintains 
over the amendment procedure. The judiciary of the Tribunal still retains a 
significant legislative capability.
The Rules o f Procedure and Evidence has been amended 22 times, whereas the 
ICTY Statute only twice.389 Amendments to the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence 
are probably preferable to the Statute, since the Statute requires adoption of an 
amendment through a Security Council Resolution, as it is itself based upon a 
Security Council Resolution.390 The judiciary has in effect by-passed controls on
386 Consider the elaboration (or is it expansion?) of the discretionary powers from Article 
10 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 176 to Rule 9 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 177. . Note also that in the case of the ICC, the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence is explicitly subordinated to the Rome Statute, supra note 2 at 
Article 51(5)).
387 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 6.
388 ICTY Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Proposal, Consideration of and 
Publication of Amendments to The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal, Rev. 2 (24 January 2002), online: < http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm>(date 
accessed: 18 June 2002) at Paragraph 2. Contrast to the previous versions: Rev. 1 
dated 4 May 2001 and the original dated 18 December 1998.
389 "Basic Legal Documents," online: ICTY web site < http://Www.un.org/icty/ >(date 
accessed: 16 June 2002).
390 Originally based on Security Council Resolution 827(1993), UN Doc. No. S/RES/827 
(1993). The Statute was attached as an appendix to Report o f the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, 
supra note 185.
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the exercise of the discretion in directing the Tribunal. The reason for doing so 
may be in part, convenience. If this is so, rather than a flaw with the running of the 
Tribunal, there may be an indication o f a flaw with the Security Council - in that it is 
deficient in its ability as a legislative overseer, for amendments to the Statute are 
too cumbersome.
Judicial Appointments
While the Prosecutor is appointed by the Security Council, (and ultimately reports 
to the Secretary-General),391 the judges are elected by the General Assembly, from 
a list o f nominations submitted to the Secretary-General by States (with permanent 
representation before the United Nations and Members States), but only after 
being reviewed by the Security Council.392 The approach is generally the same as 
in the election of judges to the ICJ, despite minor modifications. There is a 
balance struck between the roles o f both quasi-legislative bodies (the General 
Assembly and the Security Council) - although the Security Council maintains a 
pre-eminent role.
There is no provision for the removal of a judge from the ICTY, however it would 
likely follow the ICJ pattern -  a unanimous decision by the Plenary.393 The term of 
office is for only four years and judges are eligible for re-election.394 The potential 
inducement by the promise of re-election may have a greater influence in the ICTY 
than in the ICJ because of the shorter term.
A quick reading of the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
suggests wide discretionary powers attributed to the judiciary. In practice 
however, the ICTY judiciary has tried to narrow its discretionary powers primarily
391 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 16. Consider the comments by Louise Arbour, 
supra note 34.
392 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 13b/s.
393 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 18.
394 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article Wbis(3).
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through its paradoxical expansive approach to the sources of law. While some 
success has been achieved through this route, the nature of the internal system of 
the ICTY’s system of governance, the nature of the ICTY Statute and the ICTY 
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence have limited the extent o f the narrowing of 
judicial discretionary powers. A disjunctive ICTY continues to exist.
Judicial Limitation in the Rome Statute of the ICC
The ICC will incorporate various methods of keeping judicial discretionary power 
narrow. It has to do this in order to maintain complementarity. Like the ICJ and 
ICTY before it  it uses many of the same means to accomplish this narrow vision of 
its powers. The manner in which it achieves this is however quite different at 
times.
Complementarity or Deferral
In the previous chapter the complementary aspect of the International Criminal 
Court (as defined in the Rome Statute) was examined in detail. The ICC judiciary 
is under an obligation to exercise its discretion in a manner compatible with the 
complementary relationship between the ICC and the domestic courts.395
There always exists the threat of a State not cooperating with the decisions 
rendered by the Court, just as in the case of the ICJ and ICTY. In such an event a 
matter is eventually deferred to the Security Council or the Assembly of States 
Parties (depending upon who referred it to the Court).396 This may represent a 
check on the powers of the judiciary, particularly as a system of appeal to the 
appropriate international organ by the recalcitrant State. Since the Security 
Council and Assembly of States Parties represent quasi-legislative/quasi-executive 
bodies, the rule of law is subordinated to them once procedure has been
395 This is a basic tenet of the Statute -  see Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Articles 1 and 
51(5).
396 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 87(7).
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exhausted.397 Thus while the Court itself may be seized of a matter firs t in the 
event of non-compliance, the matter is eventually deferred to political, non-judicial 
bodies.
Yet the Security Council also possesses a more immediate deferral power (Article 
16 of the Rome Statute). This may allow the Security Council, a political and non­
judicial body, to exercise some sort of pre-emptive exercise of prerogative power 
to stop an investigation/prosecution under a Chapter VII justification. Such a pre­
emption does not exist in either the ICJ or ICTY system. It is a restriction on 
judicial powers to authorize an investigation/prosecution.
Sources o f Law
Explicitly itemized, the sources of law available to the judiciary, in exercising its 
powers, constrain the discretionary powers of the ICC judges. Like the ICJ 
Statute, the Rome Statute enumerates the sources of applicable law that the ICC 
will apply:398
1. Foremost the Rome Statute, then the Elements o f Crimes and the ICC 
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence apply;
2. Second, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including international humanitarian law apply;
3. Failing the first two sources,399
.. .general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws 
of legal systems of the world fwould apply].. provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and 
standards.
397 As mentioned above in the discussion of the ICJ, there is an exception to this rule -  the 
case of outrageously illegal behaviour.
398 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 21(1).
399 Ibid.
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The Court may apply principles and rules as interpreted in its precedents.400 The 
Court is obliged to apply the ‘general principles o f criminal law.”401 The primacy of 
the Rome Statute is not really surprising as it is itself a multilateral convention 
(unlike the ICTY Statute but like the ICJ Statute, which is an integral part of the 
United Nations Charter).*02 The Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence are subsidiary legislation, interpreting the Statute.403 Thus from the 
outset, judicial discretionary power is significantly constrained in comparison to 
that of the ICTY, where the judiciary was able to modify the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
The third category is a source of last resort. While it may involve a certain amount 
of judicial discretionary power, it is only to be used in the absence of the first two 
sources. While some commentators have suggested that this source will 
engender an enhanced role for comparative criminal law,404 considering the status
400 Ibid. at Artide 21(2)
401 Ibid. at Articles 22 -  33. These principles are in application by the ICTY too, although 
not necessarily expressed formally in its basic documents. If they were not applied, the 
ICTY would not be considered to be operating in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86 at Article 6.
402 One might argue that the ICTY Statute is now accepted in all former Yugoslav republics 
through accession to the Dayton Agreement and various national implementing 
legislation. See: Ivo Josipovic, “Implementing Legislation for the Application of the Law 
on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Criteria for its 
Evaluation” (1998) Y.I.H.L. 35. This does not change the fact that its legal basis is 
founded in Security Council Resolution 827 and therefore has the force of a Security 
Council Resolution rather than a treaty.
403 For instance, see the explanatory note preceding the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 2; and also Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 51(5). There is 
no chance that this document could ever have the same status as its ICTY equivalent.
404 This issue was discussed in the course of the preparation of this thesis with the co­
supervisor Interview Professor H. Kindred and Ian Rennie (17 August 2002). Professor 
Kindred was of the view that this third option would be unlikely to ever be the basis of a 
criminal prosecution, although it might be useful in a contested case where the first two 
sources required greater interpretation. There is divergence in this view. Professor J. 
Verhoeven was of the opposite outlook, arguing that it was an important source of law 
for the ICC (mentioned in his lectures at I'Acadbmie de droit international de La Haye 
during the public international law course from 22 July 2002 to 9 August 2002 
[publication expected in 2003]. Professor Schabas seems to be much of the same view 
(Schabas, supra note 2 at 73). He dtes that this is already the practice before the ICTY 
and ICTR. He may not realize that the limitations on the exercise of discretionary power
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of this source, such a contention might be debatable. It is conceivable that this 
argument may also apply to the second source of law. The laborious elaboration of 
the particularities o f each core crime is described to the smallest detail in the 
documents under the first category (Rome Statute, Elements o f Crimes and Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence). The potential exercise of discretion is minimized.
Restrictions on Diversity o f Interpretation
Some academics suggest that there exists an absolute requirement that States 
prosecute serious offenders of human rights, especially if explicitly so required in 
treaties such as the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1984 Torture Convention, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.40* There may exist some doubt 
as to whether such obligations represent absolute international legal obligations.406 
While this may be true, the Rome Statute does not allow reservations.407 It also 
limits the scope fo r diversity of interpretation.408 Therefore the Member States
of the judiciary may vary between the ICTY and the ICC. It may be that this third source 
is simply foe informal source of law to be used only as persuasive authority where foe 
first two formal sources do not suffice. In this sense the sources may be clarified over 
those of the ICTY and foe possibility of the judiciary enlarging its scope of law actually 
curtailed by the Rome Statute.
405 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Amnesty and the International Criminal Court” in Dinah Shelton, 
ed. International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International 
Criminal Court (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000) at 77; also 
Garth Meintjes, ‘Domestic Amnesties and International Accountability,” ibid. For foe 
treaties: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
supra note 368; the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, supra note 36; the Hague 
Rules, supra note 162; and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Annex), 
U.N. GAOR 39*’ Sess., supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 
231.L.M. 1027 (1984).
406 John Dugard also makes this point: John Dugard, ‘Reconciliation and Justice: The 
South African Experience” (1998) 8 Transnafl L. and Contemp. Probs. 277 at 281. He 
feels that state practice is too unsettled to suggest that there exists a customary 
obligation to prosecute, and in the case of South Africa, it had not been party to the 
various conventions which may (or may not) indicate a requirement to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes (apartheid).
407 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Artide 120.
404 This is the point o f the detailed listings of the core crimes within the Rome Statute, ibid. 
at Articles 6 and 7 and 8; but also their elaboration in foe Elements of Crimes, supra 
note 2. Also consider Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 173-301 
(reservations) and 77-126 (diversity of interpretation).
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have consented to its description of offences and are under an obligation to apply 
the Statute.409 Some States Parties’ legislatures have already begun the process 
of harmonizing their laws to accommodate the Rome Statute410 The Rome 
Statute therefore represents the emergence of a universal interpretation of its 
provisions and a codification of some aspects of international criminal law.4,f This 
is quite a different approach to the ICTY, where its judges relied upon European 
and international legal instruments to which it was assumed that the successor 
States o f the former Yugoslavia had acceded.412 Rather than presuming that such
409 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12(1) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 23 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 at Article 18.
410 See: Constitutional Law No. 99-568 of 8 July 1999, France. Other countries have 
followed including Luxembourg and the Czech Republic. See: Venice Commission, 
Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Adopted by the Commission at Hs lSh Plenary Meeting, 
(Venice, 15-16 December 2000), Document No. CDL-INF (2001) 1 (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe,15 January 2001), online: <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL- 
INF(2001)001-e.html>(date accessed: 10 January 2002); also Rudolf Beate, 
“International Decisions: Statute of the International Criminal Court, Decision No. 98-408 
DC, 1999 J.O. 1317,“ (2000) 94 A.J.I.L. 391 [actual decision: Decision No. 98-408 DC, 
du 22 janvier 1999, J.O., 22 January 1999, 1317, online: <http://www.consert- 
constitutionnel.ff/decision/1998/98408/98408dc.htm> (date accessed: 14 November
2001). For a summary see: Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the 
International Criminal Court (2001) 11 Diuke J. Comp. & Infl L. 5 and M. Andfe Dulait, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangdres, de la defense et des 
forces armdes sur le projet de for adoptd par I’assembld nationale, autorisant la 
ratification de la convention portant statut de la Cour pdnale Internationale,(116me 
ldgisl.):2065, 2141 et T.A. 443 [French Senate No. 259 Session ordinare 1999-2000 
dated 8 March 2000 Annexe au procds verbal de la sdance du 8 mars 2000].
411 There is a provision in the Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 98, which holds that 
the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance that would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to a third State without that third State’s cooperation. This was the provision that 
the drafters of the American Servicemembers ’ Protection Act 2002 (supra note 6) were 
trying to rely upon -  through the planned re-negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements 
to ensure that extradition of American service personnel to the ICC would not happen in 
any host State. Regardless, this provision does not have an impact on the harmonizing 
effect that the Statute wiH have on the Member States and various international 
provisions concerning human rights and international humanitarian law.
412 European Union Council of Ministers, “Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”  (16 December 
1991) reprinted in Danilo TQrk, ‘Annex 1: Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’” (1993) 4 E.J.I.L. 
72 [also referred to as European Political Cooperation, Press Release, P. 128/91] and 
also ibid., Annex 2: ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia” at 73 [also referred to as European 
Political Cooperation, Press Release, P. 129/91]. In both of these documents respect
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international instruments are universal, the Rome Statute makes them so by 
prohibiting reservations by States Parties. Coupled with the reservations is the 
detailed description of offences both in the Rome Statute but also in the Elements 
o f Crimes. There is less room for diversity of interpretation at the domestic or the 
international level -  a significant limitation in discretionary power at both levels 
within their respective judiciaries and within their respective political bodies.
Relationship with the United Nations
The relationship between the ICC and the United Nations may represent a further 
form of constraint on judicial decision-making. The Court is required to recognize 
and respect the status and mandate of the United Nations.413 The relationship 
between the two is cooperative.414 Incorporated into the Rome Statute is a 
provision, which allows the Assembly of States Parties to request an advisory 
opinion from the ICJ through the General Assembly.415 This may represent 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ -  along the lines of a separation of powers. 
The relationship with the ICJ is therefore parallelist (or dualist) and not
for human rights, ethnic minorities and subscription to the commitments to the 
framework of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) -  and 
hence the European Court of Human Rights. These statements are reflected in the 
Secretary-General's report that introduced the ICTY Statute to the Security Council 
(supra note 185). Note that CSCE is referred to; its institutional title was changed to the 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994 after it had become a 
regional organization for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Charter, supra note 26. 
See: Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Final Act: 25, 1975- 
2000 Handbook (Vienna: OSCE, 2001), available online:
<http://www.osce.org/publications/handbookyhandbook.pdf> (date accessed: 27 August
2002) at 12-16.
413 Draft Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International 
Criminal Court: Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, Preparatory
commission for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. No. 
PCNICC/2001/L. 1 /Rev. 1 /Add. 1 (14 March 2001) at Articles 2(2) and 2(3). This 
document is online: ICC website < http://Www.un.org/law/icc/index.html> (date
accessed: 5 March 2002).
414 Ibid. at Articles 4,5 and 6.
415 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 119 and A Draft Relationship Agreement 
Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, supra note 415 at 
Article 13b.
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complementary. This may be indicative of a major delimitation between the two 
courts, further regulating the exercise of judicial discretionary power.
Qualifications
The required qualification for admission to the judiciary is revealing. While the 
required background is similar to that required for the ICJ and ICTY,416 the ICC 
judges are selected from persons who,417
.. .have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and 
the necessary relevant experience...
(as judge, prosecutor or advocate) and those who,418
...have established competence in relevant areas o f international 
law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human 
rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity 
which is of relevance to the judicial work o f the Court.
The proportion of judges qualified in criminal law to those qualified in international 
law has been fixed at nine to five.419 Unlike the ICTY this represents a major
416 For instance ‘persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess 
the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices.” (Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 36(3)(a))
417 Ibid. at Article 36(3)(b)(i).
418 Ibid. at Artide 36(3)(b)(ii). This raises a curious question about the recent efforts to 
establish an international criminal bar association for the ICC (see Stephanie Maupas, 
‘The Third Pillar Creation of the International Criminal Bar” (17 June 2002), online: 
dipiomatiejudiciaire.com <http:/Awww.dipkxnatiejudiciaire.com/UMCCUK9.htm>(date 
accessed: 6 July 2002)). Could this initiative be based upon an incorrect analogy of the 
ICC to a domestic criminal court? The idea of pillars comes from European Law (see 
Klaus-Oieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law, supra note 86). Presumably the 
pillars of the ICC are the judidaiy and the prosecution -  the third would be the 
international criminal bar. The initiative has been met with varying degrees of hostility 
from various groups, induding lawyers themselves. Yet on the other hand a control over 
those lawyers who appear pleading cases, might avoid some of the problems 
associated with counsel in the two tribunals - especially attempts to use it a (brum for 
political grand standing (for example ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 
177 at Rule 77 and Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (2000), Case No. IT-94-1, (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), ‘Judgement in 
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin,” online: ICTY 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealMjjin-e/index.htm >(date accessed: 6 July 2002). 
[Judgement dated 31 January 2000; Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Presiding].
419 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 36(5).
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expansion of the scope of judicial enlightenment from beyond criminal law. It may 
also represent a counterweight to the separation of powers between the ICJ and 
the ICC in that there will be judges with expertise in the subject matter of the ICJ -  
public international law. Rather than a relationship of absolute parallelism, the 
relationship may be capable of being complementary. Such an approach should 
seem logical, since international crime is both international and criminal. It must 
however be remembered that individuals have no standing before the ICJ, 
therefore the relationship between the two courts w ill always be independent and 
parallel. The ICC judiciary w ill however now possess sensitivity toward issues of 
public international law.
Judicial Appointments
The nomination of candidates for judicial office begins with their nomination in 
accordance with the procedure for appointment to high judicial office in their own 
States or alternatively by the nomination procedure similar to that of the ICJ.420 
The State Party w ill forward the nomination to the Assembly of States Parties.421 
The Assembly of States Parties elects the judges through a two-thirds majority of 
the States Parties present and voting.422 States Parties may take into account the 
need for equitable representation of global legal systems, geographical 
representation, gender and specific expertise (such as violence against women 
and children).423 The term of office lasts for nine years and is not renewable424 
Judges are not to engage in any activity likely to affect their independence (such 
as employment)425 A judge may be removed from office for serious misconduct
420 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 36(4)(a).
421 Ibid. at Artide 36(4)(b)
422 Ibid. at Article 36(6Xa).
423 Ibid. at Article 36(8). Unlike the ICJ or ICTY, gender and specific area of expertise 
considerations are novel.
424 Ibid. at Article 36<9)(a).
425 Ibid. at Article 40. Their immunities are similar to the ICJ under Article 48.
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only by a two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly of States Parties, after being so 
recommended by a two-thirds majority vote of the other judges.426 The President 
of the Court may take disciplinary measures against a judge (reprimand or fine).427 
Reprimands are forwarded and recorded by the President of the Bureau of the 
Assembly of States Parties.428
The nature of judicial appointments is therefore quite different to that o f the ICJ 
and the ICTY. While nomination may involve the Security Council (if the ICJ 
approach is adopted), it will more likely involve the States Parties themselves since 
those States that do not sit on the Security Council w ill be able to avoid the Council 
vetting their nominations for candidature. The role of the Assembly of States 
Parties gives the entire system a much greater “democratic” character in that there 
is no filtration possible by the Security Council and that the elections are based 
upon a two-thirds majority, rather than a majority of a college of states (of which 5 
States have a permanent vote). The duration of a nine-year term is reminiscent of 
the ICJ, but the prohibition of renewal undermines any residual influence, related 
to the incentive for re-election, that might exist from either the nominating State 
Party or the Assembly of States Parties. Removal from office is determined by the 
other judges (Plenary) but is subject to approval by the Assembly of States Parties. 
Thus the discretionary powers of the President are limited (in comparison to the 
ICTY) largely to the imposition of disciplinary measures against delinquent judges 
and to an advisory role to the Assembly o f States Parties. There is a substantial 
limitation of discretionary power. This may be expected, given the existence of the 
quasi-legislative Assembly of States Parties.
426 Ibid. at Article 46(2)(a).
427 Ibid. at Artide 47. Also ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 
30(1) and Rule 32.
426 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 30(4).
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Amendments
The power of amending the basic documents of the ICC also reveals severe 
limitations imposed upon the exercise of judicial discretion, although not 
immediately. For the first seven years of the Court’s operation, the Assembly of 
States Parties w ill possess no power to amend the Rome Statute.429 In the interim, 
the ICC will operate much as the ICTY did in its formative years with the judges 
exercising their discretionary powers to direct the decisions of the Court Their 
decisions will have to be in conformity with the limitations on their powers.
After the expiry of the seven years, any State Party may propose amendments to 
the Statute through the Secretary-General, who is obligated to pass these on to 
the States Parties.430 The role of the Secretary-General is restricted to simply 
disseminator, as she simply notifies the States Parties. The Assembly of States 
Parties only meets once a year.431 Three months later the Assembly of States 
Parties will consider any proposal and may adopt it on a two-thirds majority vote.432 
Alternatively the proposal may be handed over to a Review Conference and 
eventually adopted through a two-thirds majority vote433 The Secretary-General of 
the United Nations also acts as facilitator, for it is through her, on behalf of the 
Assembly of States Parties (after a majority approval), that the Review 
Conferences are convened.434
Amendments to the subsidiary legislative documents, like the Statute, downplay 
involvement by the judiciary in favour of the Assembly of States Parties.
429 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 121(1).
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid. at Article 112(6) although it may also meet as required in special session. The 
infrequent meetings may give the Assembly a quasi-legislative character from the start. 
This could change though if the special sessions are used frequently.
432 Ibid. at Artide 121(2) and 121(3).
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid. at Article 123.
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Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by any State Party, the 
judges acting in absolute majority or the Prosecutor.435 They must be adopted by a 
two-thirds majority o f the Assembly of States Parties.436 Amendments to the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence may similarly be proposed and require a two-thirds 
absolute majority for adoption by the Assembly of States Parties.437
The limitations imposed upon the judiciary are quite significant, in its powers to 
carry out amendments to the constitutional documents of the ICC. The judiciary 
does not have the power to suggest amendments to the Statute, although it can 
have input in changing the secondary instruments of the Court. It is probable that 
the judiciary may have an informal consultative role through the Bureau. The role 
of the Assembly of States Parties, coupled with a role by States Parties represent 
the sole means by which amendments to the Statute are accomplished. 
Amendments are adopted democratically through a majority vote. This process is 
quite different to that of the United Nations Charter- perhaps even streamlined.438 
There is no qualified voting procedure and no veto under any condition. Judicial 
discretionary power is not entirely eliminated in the secondary legislation, but the 
Assembly scrutinizes it
The Rome Statute therefore sets out some rather significant limitations on judicial 
discretionary power. Complementarity itself requires that the Court steer clear of 
any tendency toward supranationalism -  a limitation. The qualifications of the 
judges suggest a broadening of the scope of jurisdiction to include international
435 Ibid. at Article 9(2).
436 Ibid. at Artide 9(3).
437 Ibid. at Article 51(2). There is provision for urgent cases where the judges may, on a 
two-thirds majority, draw up provisional rules or amendments (or reject existing ones). 
There is however a requirement that these changes be proposed to the Assembly at its 
next ordinary or special meeting. See Article 51(3). The ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 3 deals with Amendments but simply refers to the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Rome Statute (an indication of the primacy of the Statute).
438 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Articles 108-109.
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law along with criminal law. This apparent increase in discretionary power is offset 
by the narrow selection of sources of law available and in particular, the primacy of 
the Rome Statute above all other legal sources, followed by its own detailed, 
subsidiary documents. It is also offset by the explicit recognition of the status of 
the UN and the jurisdiction of the ICJ. An examination o f the manner in which 
judges are appointed reveals the increasing importance of the Assembly of States 
Parties in electing them through a majority vote. This can be contrasted to the 
manner in which both ICJ and ICTY judges are elected. The accountability of 
judges for serious misbehaviour rests with the Assembly o f States Parties rather 
than with the judiciary itself. Only in cases of disciplinary action will the President 
act, although with the supervision of the Assembly of States Parties. Amendments 
to the Rome Statute rely primarily upon the Assembly of States Parties. The role 
of the judiciary has been reduced in governing the Court. In the case of the ICTY 
this power to amend the quasi-constitutional Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, 
amounted to a legislative power being exercised by the judiciary. This power has 
passed to the Assembly of States Parties in the framework of the Rome Statute. 
Overall, the Rome Statute limits the exercise of judicial discretionary power and 
vests it with the Assembly of States Parties.
Conclusion
In describing further limitations on judicial power uniquely at the level of 
international courts, insight has been gleamed regarding the interaction of 
complementarity on the international courts themselves. The international legal 
environment is adverse to the concept of centralization or supranationalism. In 
exercising judicial discretionary power within such a framework, the ICJ has opted 
for a very narrow conception of its jurisdiction but one that is also very 
conservative. By so doing the centralization that Kelsen envisioned has never 
been realized. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals, the rising 
influence o f NGOs and an increase in the number of States in the wake of 
decolonisation has increased the decentralization of the international legal order.
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In such an environment, international courts have regulated themselves in order to 
preserve this decentralized character. This was evident in the extremely narrow 
concept of jurisdiction within the ICJ. There are however judges who want to 
adopt a much broader concept In the case of the ICTY, initially a wide concept of 
jurisdiction was adopted with broad discretionary powers. The result of such an 
approach has been the acquisition of a supranational character on the part of the 
ICTY. This character flows from the ICTY being a subsidiary organ of the Security 
Council, established under a Chapter VII Security Council Resolution. The 
judiciary has tried to narrow the ICTY’s wide discretionary powers by expanding 
the available sources of law, but the narrowing is incomplete due to the nature of 
the ICTY Statute and the way in which it governs itself. It still retains a 
supranational character in the way in which it asserts its jurisdiction and therefore 
is disjunctive.
The Rome Statute sets up a somewhat different structure of judicial limitation. It 
describes its jurisdiction as both criminal and international. The judicial limitations 
are in place through complementarity, the primacy of the Statute as a source of 
law, and its statutory comity to the United Nations. By submitting requests for 
advisory opinions through the General Assembly to the ICJ, the ICC will have to 
recognize and respect the jurisdiction of the ICJ -  what might be a parallelist 
approach in recognizing other international jurisdictions. The accountability of 
judges rests primarily with the Assembly of States Parties rather than with the 
judges themselves (except in less serious disciplinary matters). The appointment 
of judges is mostly in the hands of the Assembly of States Parties. After seven 
years, the Amendment procedure for the Statute w ill be in the hands of the 
Assembly. In the initial “formative’' seven years, the judiciary w ill have some 
degree of freedom in rendering the precedents, but only in conformity with the 
restrictions imposed upon its discretionary power. Amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence are also entirely subject to the approval o f the Assembly
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of States Parties. Thus governance of the ICC by the judiciary is far more 
restrictive than in the situation o f the ICTY.
The Rome Statute entails a fully participative approach, investing roles for 
numerous domestic and international entities in helping to direct the Court’s 
decision-making. Complementarity ensures that such a deliberative approach is 
possible. Yet in addition to complementarity as described in the Rome Statute, a 
secondary mechanism is operative. It is a subtle mechanism but relates to 
inherent restrictions on judicial power at the international level. Whether the 
sources of such limitation comes from the nature of the decentralized international 
legal system, the sources of law or the nuances of the internal organization of the 
various international courts, in the case of the ICC the result is a supplemental 
means of regulation, reinforcing complementarity. In the next chapter an 
illustration of both complementarity and its interstitial analogue will be 
accomplished by considering the truth and reconciliation commission.
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Chapter Five: A Case Study of Complementarity -  Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions and Amnesties
introduction
While it is difficult forecast how the ICC will operate in the near future, the image of 
the Court portrayed in the last three chapters makes such predictions feasible at 
least in terms of how it ought to function. There are many examples where its 
restricted subject matter, the complementary relationship between it and the 
domestic courts (limits on the Prosecutor and judiciary as stipulated in the Rome 
Statute) and the limits inherent upon the ICC judiciary outside of the Rome Statute 
could be considered. One might consider these areas as potential sources of 
‘‘conflict.’’ “Conflict” may not be the appropriate word to describe the interaction. 
They are ‘‘challenges,” which confront this emerging and complex legal interaction. 
Examples of such challenges could include: the relationship between the
ICC/Assembly of States Parties and the United Nations;439 access to information 
that might be considered classified by a subject State;440 the provision of classified 
information from one State to the ICC, but without permission from the subject 
State;441 extradition;442 competing requests;443 conflicts of international legal
439 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, 
supra note 415.
440 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 72
441 Ibid. at Article 73.
442 This is ultimately the Pinochet problem. Consider Roman Boed, “The Effect of a 
Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of 
Serious Human Rights Violations,” (2000) 33 Cornell Infl L.J. 297; and Christine Chinkin, 
M., “International Decision: United Kingdom House of Lords, (Spanish request for 
extradition). Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (no. 
3). [1999J 2 Wlr 827’  (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 703.
443 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 90.
137
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obligations;444 what happens when the Security Council refers a case to the ICC, 
where an individual/State is not a State Party;445 whether the ICC could have 
jurisdiction over individuals who may have committed international crimes under its 
jurisdiction while occupying a position of responsibility for an international 
organization (such as the United Nations Security Council) instead of a State; the 
relationship with international organizations;446 and the truth and reconciliation 
commission (TRC) coupled with amnesties. TRCs and amnesties have become a 
rather popular means of redirecting States gone awry, onto the path toward 
normalcy. It is for this reason that their study presents a useful opportunity to 
study the mechanism of complementarity in action alongside how judicial 
discretionary power to prosecute is regulated. If the ICC were to deny amnesties 
outright, or the validity of TRCs, would it be interfering with this process?447 How 
should it decide?
The aim of this chapter is to answer these questions. This chapter is divided into 
two parts. In Part I, a brief examination of the validity of amnesties at international 
law prior to the introduction of the Rome Statute is considered. All possible 
variants of TRCs are considered, however it becomes evident quickly that one 
cannot dismiss any one of these variants as invalid and along with them any 
associated amnesty. A more sophisticated assessment of the use of discretionary 
power by a jurisdiction is necessary. John Dugard's assessment of the South 
African TRC and associated amnesties is useful in this respect although it is only
444 In particular Ibid. at Article 98. This is the provision that ASPA tends to rely upon in 
making States renegotiate their SOFAs in order to bring it into effect.
445 Madeline Morris, supra note 43. This was the basis of Mr. Lahiri’s objection for India. 
Can the Security Council refer a case to the ICC under Chapter VII of the Charter -  and 
if so does that mean that the jurisdiction of the ICC is backed-up by the Security Council 
Resolution and therefore applicable even to non-State Parties? Consider Mr. Lahiri’s 
comments, supra note 42.
446 This is the subject of the next chapter.
447 Consider Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 27(2). The Article is restricted to 
immunities of persons in official capacity -  what about all persons?
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the informed opinion of one academic. The United Nations’ position is then 
examined initially with respect to Sierra Leone and the Lom6 Peace Agreement.4** 
Latest developments appear to have harmonized its position with that of the two 
ad hoc tribunals -  namely that amnesty is not forbidden per se. It is a matter for 
the domestic jurisdiction, with the exception of those most egregious of 
international crimes committed by those most responsible acting as agents of the 
State. In such exceptional cases, both the fiduciary nature of the individual’s 
position and the nature of the crime necessitate international prosecution by the 
international community.
In Part II, just how the ICC determines the validity of an amnesty is considered. 
There exist two tests: 1) the test to determine if the domestic courts are unwilling 
or incapable of dealing with a situation; and 2) the ne bis in idem test, primarily 
aimed at instances of determining if a domestic investigation, prosecution or 
acquittal was carried out in bad faith, an abuse of process or simply a “sham’’ to 
shield the accused. The justification for asking for a deferral to the ICC from the 
domestic courts (or the “issue of admissibility’’ in the words of the Rome Statute) is 
significantly more restrained than was the case in the ICTY. The State is 
presumed to be acting in propriety, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
Furthermore through the system of discretionary diversity contained in the Rome 
Statute, there are many more entities that can either promote or challenge the 
application of both tests. These entities include the States themselves, NGOs and 
the Security Council. They are non-judicial bodies. Thus a role for political 
decision-makers is built into the Rome Statute. The section closes with a 
discussion of the potential for TRCs of a very different nature to those tolerable 
under the system of ad hoc tribunals. There is a wider scope for TRCs of a quasi­
judicial character under the Rome Statute thanks to its increased conjunctivity than
448 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone and The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
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in the case of the ICTY. Thus the South African TRC and amnesties would likely 
be tolerated under the Rome Statute, but not under the ICTY Statute. Thus the 
Rome Statute may indicate a greater potential for the toleration of amnesties and a 
wide variety of TRC variants by the ICC.
The Validity of Amnesty at International Law Prior to the Rome Statute
Possible Variants o f TRCs
Table -  Discretionary Combinatorial Matrix of Domestic Variants of TRCs
Description/Example
A 1 1 1 Balanced TRC -  foil involvement by all branches of 
State (ideal)
B 1 1 0 Undemocratic TRC - Chile
C 1 0 1 Extra-Judicial TRC -  Sierra Leone
D 0 1 1 Extra-Executive TRC -  South Africa
E 1 0 0 Exclusively Executive TRC -  Rwanda or Uganda
F 0 1 0 Exclusively Judicial TRC -  ‘pure rule of law” (ideal)
G 0 0 1 Exclusively Legislative TRC - ‘ rule of mob”
H 0 0 0 Non-State TRC -  rejection of formal TRC
The table above might come to mind if one thinks of all possible variants of
involvement by the three branches of the domestic jurisdiction. Any one of these 
variants may be suitable for a given context. The table represents a “truth” table 
based upon the presence of influences from the three branches of the State: the 
executive, judiciary and legislature.449 A folly balanced TRC is probably
Leone (RUF/SL), 18 May 1999 (entry into force 25 May 1999) [hereinafter Lom6 Peace 
Agreement], online: < http://www.sierra-leone.gov.sl/ncddrr/kxne_pea.htiTi >.
449 The truth table is based upon the logical construct of the executive and judiciary and 
legislature. Thus since any one of these variables may be adequate or not, a total of 23 
or eight possibilities exist. William Burke-White, supra note 30 at 479 for example 
considers only two variables in his categorization of TRCs: legitimacy and scope. His 
approach is heavily steeped in the relationship of the individual to the State to determine 
legitimacy and the legislated protection (through conventional and customary law) of 
individual rights authorized by individuals to the State to determine scope (a test of 
proportionality). This approach presupposes the primacy of international human rights 
and the rise of the individual in international criminal law. It may also presuppose a
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unrealizable, since the conditions which give rise to a need for the TRC, occur 
when the apparatus of the State goes awry -  or one of the branches fails to 
exercise effective control. Perhaps a fully balanced TRC is represented by a 
properly functioning domestic judicial system. Those situations where only one 
branch is effective represent cases of the State gone awry: the exclusively 
executive, exclusively judicial and exclusively legislative variants. The option to 
have no official TRC may amount to a collective denial of a past too difficult to 
confront450 Some advocates of universal human rights might insist that any TRC 
that is judicial in nature is acceptable,451 although they might equally argue that it 
must be non-judicial, in order to allow prosecution by international courts of 
international crimes.452 Advocates of legal realism might argue that the State 
(executive and/or legislature) has full discretion in overriding the judicial 
prosecution of such cases.453 There might be compelling reasons not to prosecute 
all instances of violations.454 Thus the decision to establish a specific variant of
universal form of human rights law. The existence of such a legal order has been 
questioned throughout this thesis and the Rome Statute does not necessarily create 
such an order. By William Burke-White’s liberal approach, the option of no TRC at all 
seems to be excluded as viable. It may be that his approach is too restrictive.
450 Confronting the truth is not necessarily a guarantee of restoring harmony (Johnathan 
Allen, ‘Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” (1999) 49 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 315 at 317).
451 Lousie Arbour, supra note 34 or A. Cassese, supra note 346 both hold that primacy of 
the rule of law as sacrosanct in the operation of the ICTY in this context.
452 This will be explored shortly, but consider President Jorda’s views expressed in ICTY, 
Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179.
453 Marc Grossman, supra note 231 for example.
454 Alex Boraine was of this opinion in assessing the South African approach to the 
granting of amnesties. Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 384-5. He 
also recommended caution in applying the South African approach to all situations. 
Thus blindly applying any one to aH circumstances is inappropriate. Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
suggests that collective denial was an appropriate choice for Japan in dealing with its 
painful legacy in World War II (“Overview” in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 407 at 
226). Also consider Tomochika Okamoto, The Distortion and the Revision of History in 
Postwar Japanese Textbooks, 1945-1998 (M.A. Thesis, Sociology Department of 
Queen’s College, City University of New York, 1998) [unpublished], online: 
<http://member.nifty.ne.jp/romochika/> (date accessed: 2 July 2002) at Conclusion.
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TRC is very much context specific and is generally an assessment of how the 
domestic discretionary powers are exercised.
The Exercise of No Discretionary Powers to Stay Prosecution
The failure to exercise discretionary power to not prosecute equally raises 
problems. Those who often are alleged to have committed atrocities are 
frequently the only individuals that are competent to enter into negotiation for 
peaceful resolutions to conflict Thus the indictment of Milosevic by Louise Arbour 
in 1999 was hardly beneficial to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict.455 
This situation represents at least one practical reason why discretion should be 
exercised in prosecuting individuals for international crimes. There may be 
pressing reasons of a non-judicial nature for an amnesty, regardless o f whether it 
amounts to impunity.
The example of Rwanda provides another vivid illustration of what happens when 
little or no discretionary power is exercised. In genocide of national scale, there 
were vast numbers of individuals who were complicit in some form. Nearly 
150,000 persons remain in detention since the RPF assumed power in 1994. The 
Rwandese executive is of the position that all persons against whom an 
accusation was made, should be held individually criminally accountable. The 
Rwandese justice system has become overwhelmed. Crowded prisons put an 
enormous drain on the resources of the government and the nation, not to mention 
a judiciary still recovering from being one of the first casualties of the genocide. 
Many of those detained and still awaiting trial suffer deplorable conditions, which 
are in contravention to their basic human rights under the ICCPR.456 Despite 
efforts to diffuse the problem through the introduction of plea bargaining
455 Arbour, supra, note 34 and for the Indictment itself see supra note 250.
456 ICCPR, supra note 189 at Article 9. ‘Rwanda: Elections May Speed Genocide Trials 
But New System Lacks Guarantee of Rights,” Human Rights Watch News (4 October 
2001), online: Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/rwanda1004.htm> (date accessed: 4 October
2001).
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(marchandage),457 restoration of the judicial system and the introduction of a 
regional tribal court system (Gacaca),458 the RPF remains in a vindictive mood to 
all those whom it deems even remotely connected to the genocide.459 While there 
is a National Unity and Reconciliation Committee, this TRC remains dominated by 
the executive, with the President at its head. It is simply an instrument for 
denunciation of persons or entities that are suspected of complicity with the 
genocide. Thus in the case of Rwanda, its TRC is essentially of the exclusively 
executive variant
Discretionary Power to Grant Amnesties
Ultimately the exercise of a discretionary power by officials in one or more 
branches of State is necessary in order to decide whether there are compelling 
reasons not to prosecute. Whether the decision explicitly grants an amnesty, 
defers prosecution to a later date or confers immunity, does not matter in this
For a comprehensive overview see: Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda:
A Lawyers Committee report on the ICTR and National Trials (New York: Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, July 1997) at VIII(C) [unpaginated]. Plea-bargaining is 
objectionable to the civil law system as it represents a deviation from the truth and the 
exercise of discretionary powers by the judiciary inconsistent with the limitations on such 
discretion imposed by the legislature through statute.
458 Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30,1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed 
since October 1, 1990 (Rwanda), 30 August 1996, Article 2 online: Prevent Genocide 
International Homepage <http://Www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm 
>(date accessed 18 October 2001). This is a translation into English. Also note that on 
19 June 2002, the first Gacaca trials were held: Emmanuel Mutabazi, Ladislas 
Niyongira, and Ephrem Rugiririza, The Gacaca Ballet Comes on Stage’ Judicial 
Diplomacy (19 June 2002), online: Judicial Diplomacy <
http://Www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/RwandaUK11.htm> (date accessed: 4 July
2002). It should be noted that the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 
462, has suggested that the Gacaca courts likely violate the ICCPR, supra note 189 at: 
Article 14(1) and Article 26 (right to equality before the law -  not in the case of RPF 
personnel); and Article 14(3)(b) (right to defence counsel -  denied under Gacaca); and 
Article 14(5) (right to appeal -  denied under Gacaca). The popularity of the Gacaca 
system amongst legal academics is probably a result of wanting to see reflexive law in 
operation, outside of the parameters of the State -  and therefore an endorsement of 
modem liberal theory. Also consider Sadat, supra note 66 at 57.
459 RPF personnel are not subject to the normal judicial system but rattier to the military 
system of courts.
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discussion. The decision not to prosecute may represent a major step forward on 
the path to reconciliation within a divided society:460
Reconciliation in South Africa is a process which started not only 
when enemies sat on opposing sides of a table but also when 
victims told their stories and perpetrators confessed their atrocities.
It is a process which must continue long alter the Commission has 
completed its task.
Yet it may also be representative of a situation where the branches o f State have 
been co-opted by criminal groups to shield themselves or frustrate efforts at 
making them individually accountable for their acts. The international community 
is therefore faced with a dilemma. Are there compelling reasons to accept the 
decision or is it simply subterfuge aimed at preventing a prosecution and further 
pushing the State toward the commission of international crime and going awry?
The Confused Situation Prior to the Rome Statute 
South Africa
John Dugard tried to carry out an assessment of whether the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was compatible under international law.461 
Although there were numerous international conventional instruments regarding 
apartheid and related crimes alleged to have occurred, South Africa was not a 
party to any at the time in question. Yet Professor Dugard considered that in the 
case of international crimes, “states do not enjoy absolute freedom of choice in 
deciding upon the measures to be taken* after a regime change.462 Despite 
attempts to determine whether the South African amnesty was legally valid under 
customary international law,463 the South African courts failed to address such a
460 Boraine, supra note 459 at 377.
461 John Dugard, supra note 408.
462 Ibid. at 280.
463 Ibid. at 299, citing Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v. President o f the Republic 
of South Africa 4 SALR, 683-5 (CC).
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question.464 Professor Dugard nevertheless concluded that it was, taking into 
account the following factors:465
1. The amnesty was the result of a "political compact included in a liberal 
Constitution that was given form by a statute enacted by a democratically 
elected Parliament;” [legitimate]
2. The TRC and related committees were independent of the government and 
broadly representative of the people; [independent and democratic]
3. The TRC was sufficiently funded and resourced to investigate fully and 
thoroughly; [effective]
4. Safeguards were in place to protect the procedural rights of the "accused;” 
[lawfully respectful o f human rights]
5. The TRC had the power to award compensation to victims in accordance 
with the ICCPR; [lawfully respectful of human rights]
6. The TRC was obliged to submit a report o f its findings in a reasonable time 
(3 years); [effective] and
464 Ibid. at 307.
465 Ibid. at 307. In the square brackets an adjective summarizing the factors has been 
added. This analysis is preferred over the Joinet Report (Annex II: Set of Principles for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, 
Appendix B: United Nations: Economic and Social Council: Distribution: General: 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, 26 June 1997: English: Original: French: Commission on Human 
Rights: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 
Forty-ninth Session: Item 9 of the Provisional Agenda: The Administration of Justice and 
the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human 
Rights Violations (CtvH and Political) ' Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to 
Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, in 59 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249. at 264 
[hereinafter the Joinet Report] at 262, online: LEXIS (Secondary Legal, Law Reviews 
Combined) < http://www.lexis.com/researchytawschooJ>). This report is lengthy and 
incorporates some 50 guidelines to what makes a TRC-related amnesty invalid. This 
may be an attempt to curtail the exercise of discretionary power. It does not have any 
legal force however (and neither do John Dugard’s factors for that matter).
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7. The Amnesty was not unconditional, [not disproportional]
For Dugard a TRC has to be legitimate, independent, democratic, effective and 
legally respectful of human rights -  only then is an amnesty valid if conferred 
through such a TRC, where the amnesty is not unconditional.
The United Nations’ Position
The United Nations considers unconditional or blanket amnesties for international 
crimes to be invalid at international law, no matter how pragmatic or popular their 
use might be domestically.466 The United Nations Security Council’s 
unenthusiastic support for the blanket amnesty of the Lom6 Peace Agreement of 
May 1999,467 demonstrates how blanket amnesties may not be entirely valid under 
international law, where international crimes are involved.466 This is despite the 
fact that the Agreement was a precondition to the establishment of peace in Sierra 
Leone. The Government of Sierra Leone eventually ignored the blanket amnesty
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, U N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 915th mtg., U.N. Doc., S/2000/915, (2000) at Article III. 
Paragraphs 22 and 23. Charles Villa-Vicencio also raises this point: Charles Villa- 
Vicencio, “Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International 
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet,” (2000) 49 Emory L.J. 205 at 214. See 
also Sadat, supra note 66 at 67, although she suggests that if blanket amnesties for 
international crimes are not already prohibited at international law, they should be as 
They undermine the rule of law and are, for the most part, simply self-serving 
declarations by government officials exempting themselves from the reach of 
law... "(/bid. at 68) This is an oversimplification of a much more difficult issue. Sadat's 
outlook may be steeped in the primacy of rule of law and as such may be unrealistic.
467 Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 453 at Article IX (the amnesty).
466 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, supra note 471. The RUF was also given control of the diamond mines and 
cabinet positions in the government. Its position as an effective "shadow State" was
entrenched by the Agreement, yet by giving it cabinet positions it was re-integrated into 
the State. See: Karen Gallagher, ‘No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities 
of Amnesty in Sierra Leone" (2000) 23 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 149. Gallagher provides a 
general synopsis of events leading to the repeal of the amnesty. See also: INS 
Resource Information Center, supra note 117); Situation of Human Rights in Somalia: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolutfon 1997/47, ECOSOC 44* Sess., UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/96 (16 January 1998); and David Pratt, ‘Sierra Leone: Danger and
Opportunity in Regional Conflict” Report to Canada's Minister o f External Affairs, The 
Honourable John Manley, PC, MP (Ottawa, 27 July 2001).
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provisions of the Accord, after the rebel leader, Foday Saybana Sankoh, 
demonstrated bad faith by reattempting to usurp the State, through the capture of 
thousands of UN peacekeepers and a failure to disarm his rebel forces in May 
2000.469 He was subsequently arrested in violation of the Peace Agreement 
Other aspects of the Agreement remained in force, including the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and a form of amnesty/rehabilitation for the abducted 
child soldiers that constituted the majority of the rebel forces.470 Thus the treaty 
was not entirely abrogated nor was the blanket amnesty entirely rejected. This 
modified approach does recognize that in certain instances foil individual criminal 
accountability may not be appropriate. In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security 
Council recognized that unravelling the Agreement might not be the best route to 
dealing with a Chapter VII crisis, opting instead for a Special Court to try only those 
most responsible such as Sankoh. The role of the Security Council is important in 
that it is a non-judicial body, along with the non-judicial elements of the 
Government of Sierra Leone, exercising a discretionary prerogative not to 
prosecute all instances of war crimes.
The situation with the ICTY is slightly different It must be remembered that the 
ICTY is a judicial organ and therefore it possesses limited discretionary powers not 
to prosecute. Such discretionary powers, at least according to the ICTY Statute, 
reside in the final deferral of a matter to the Security Council in the case of an 
uncooperative State.471 The indictment of Milosevic by Louise Arbour illustrates
469 For a description of the events that led to the failure of the Agreement see: Sixth 
Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 2000, 
UN Doc. S/2000/832 (2000) at 1. This was probably in the aftermath of the 
embarrassing situation that the UN peacekeepers found themselves in -  namely the 
taking hostage of thousands of Indian army peacekeepers. Sankoh has remained in 
solitary confinement for the last year awaiting trial.
470 Security Council, Sixth Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission 
in Sierra Leone, ibid. at 1.
471 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 7bis.
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that at least in 1999, the ICTY was narrowly focused solely on its judicial role.472 
Given the danger posed by the indictment to international peace and security and 
the subsequent appointment of a political advisor to the Prosecutor afterwards, 
one might wonder if there was a realization that a purely judicial ICTY Prosecutor 
was undesirable. One might also find that where the Prosecutor failed to exercise 
such discretionary power not to prosecute, “on the ground” United Nations 
peacekeepers and NATO intervention forces did exercise such discretion by not 
always pursuing the indicted.473 Is it desirable to have such discretionary power so 
informally delegated without oversight?
ICTY President Claude Jorda tried to deal with this issue when considering draft 
legislation for a TRC in Bosnia.474 Although amnesties are not explicitly mentioned 
in the ICTY Statute, there is a provision dealing with domestic pardons and 
commutation of sentences:475
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted 
person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or 
commutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the
472 Sadat, supra note 66 at 70-71 suggests that Milosevic did in fact receive a de facto 
immunity through the Dayton Peace Agreement. Professor Sadat’s sources in support 
of this statement are not conclusive. In addition while her report of the United States 
offering immunity to Milosevic, provided he relinquished power in Serbia in 2000, does 
not necessarily reflect the views of the international community, notwithstanding the 
reliability of Sadat’s source (she cites Steven Ertanger, “U.S. Seeks Way Out for 
Milosevic,” International Herald Tribune (19 June 2000) at 1 and certain utterances by 
one Professor Williams and Bernard Kouchner at footnotes 111 to 113).
473 For example consider ‘Carla Del Ponte critique Taction de la Force de stabilisation en 
Bosnie-Herz6govine” Le Monde (23 August 2002), online < 
http://www.lemonde.fr/artide/0,5987,3214-288108-l00.htinl> (date accessed: 24 
August 2002). She is the current ICTY Prosecutor. She has called for a more 
aggressive effort on the part of NATO forces in Bosnia to seek out and arrest Radovan 
Karadzic, the political leader attributed for many of the atrocities in the Bosnian-Croatian 
conflict in the early 1990s. In an interview with Agence France Presse, M"“  Del Ponte 
spoke rather harshly of SFOR’s inability to capture Karadzic. This has resulted in some 
tension between her and NATO. NATO denies that it has been ‘dragging its feet.”
474 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.SV591-e, supra note 179. Remember that the judiciary of 
the ICTY is completely independent of the Prosecutor (who answers to the Security 
Council directly).
475 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 28.
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International Tribunal accordingly. The President of the 
International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide 
the matter on the basis of the interests of justice and the general 
principles of law.
Thus a discretionary authority is vested in the judiciary and the President in terms 
of sentencing but there is still none with regard to whether to prosecute.
The President acknowledged that the Tribunal could not try all perpetrators of 
serious violations of humanitarian law in its jurisdiction;476 it could not alone carry 
out the process of ‘‘peace-making;’’ and its priority lay in trying the:477
...highest ranking military and political leaders...those who through 
the great responsibilities which were theirs and the seriousness o f 
the crimes ascribed to them...truly endangered international public 
order.”
For the Commission, President Jorda was of the opinion that the TRC had a 
necessary secondary role in: determining the fate of “lower ranking executioners;*
476 As of 13 May 2002,108 individuals have been publicly indicted by the ICTY (see online: 
ICTY < http://www.un.org/icty/>(date accessed: 13 May 2002). This is a far cry from all 
instances of serious offences against international humanitarian law that have been 
committed in the former Yugoslavia. The “Rules of the Road’  project and was intended 
to expedite decision making of the Tribunal by filtering the most serious of allegations. 
In 1996 40 such cases were examined and only 11 allegations followed-up with 
indictment. In the spring of 1996, Bosnia and Herzegovina had submitted 1,500 alleged 
instances of international crimes while Croatia had submitted 100. It is a pragmatic 
approach. In a way the program reinforces complementarity in that it acknowledges the 
potential of the domestic courts to prosecute the “small fry,* eventually. See 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Third Annual Report o f the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution o f Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991 (The Hague: ICTY, 19%). online: ICTY web site: <
http://www.un.org/icty/rappoftan/third-96.htm > (date accessed: 19 September 2001), 
paragraphs 80-83. A similar mechanism exists in the case of the ICTR. As of 13 May 
2002 there were 52 detainees in Arusha, Tanzania (see online: ICTR <
http://www.ictr.org/>(date accessed: 13 May 2002). This is a far cry from the estimated 
120,000+ persons detained domestically in Rwanda, for alleged offences relating to the 
1994 genocide (see: M. Kimani, “News Analysis/ Rwanda’s Dilemma: Striking a
Balance Between Justice and Reconciliation,” in Kimani, M., ed., Four Reports on the 
Film Screenings, Reconciliation, and The Gacaca Process (Arusha, Tanzania: Intemews 
Arusha Office, 30 May 2001), online: <
http://Www.intemews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ICTR_reports_may2001.htm > (date 
accessed: 3 October 2001).
477 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
reparations for victims; carrying out the “pedagogical work” of analyzing the root 
causes of the conflict; and providing a forum for the fashioning of a collective 
“undiluted memory” for history.478 Amnesty, for those less serious of crimes, 
committed by those lower ranking persons, is a matter for the domestic courts with 
some advice by the Tribunal. Factors in determining seriousness of crimes include 
the capacity of the accused as an agent of the State and the nature of the crime -  
especially if an international crime. Those more serious of crimes, alleged to have 
been committed by the highest-ranking officials of State, where the endangered 
international public order -  they are the subjects of the Tribunal. It is quite evident 
that amnesty is not viable for them, although pardons and commuted sentences 
maybe. They have to be prosecuted.
President Jorda’s position challenges the wording of the ICTY Statute, which 
established a tribunal with “the power to prosecute person responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law” in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 as 
prescribed.479 The ICTY is not tasked to deal with “the most serious violations.” 
Yet this is the redefined task envisioned by President Jorda. Through a continuing 
oversight of domestic prosecution of those “lesser fish,” it may be President 
Jorda’s view that the statutory task of the ICTY can be met.
There is a growing view, that the domestic jurisdiction runs extra-judicial TRCs 
while the international runs international criminal courts or international tribunals. 
This is a separation of powers, disjunctive and parallelist -  in tension with the 
concept of complementarity. The international community often overlooks the 
relationship:480
"'Ib id .
479 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 1. [underlining added]
480 This assertion may be controversial. Also consider the views of the Prosecutor, as 
expressed by Louise Arbour, supra note 34. and Judge Cassese, supra note 346. 
Respectfully, it is submitted that Judge Cassese’s article missed the principle of 
complementarity as he described the absolute requirement of bringing individuals to trial
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The international community and the institutions tor accountability 
that it creates too often forget this point concerning complementary 
roles and adopt a somewhat condescending and dismissive 
attitude toward national efforts at achieving justice.
The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
echoed the view that a complementary relationship must exist between the 
Tribunal and a proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina:481
.. .1 consider it my duty to ensure that this national initiative not run 
counter to the mission o f the Tribunal and that it be consonant with 
the powers conferred on the Tribunal by the Security Council. I 
also believe it appropriate to reflect on a system for reconciliation 
which complements the work of the International Tribunal and 
which allows for a more effective contribution to the reconstruction 
of national unity without which democracy and deep-rooted lasting 
peace are impossible...
President Jorda could only envisage a commission functioning successfully, given 
two overriding conditions:482
1. Its work must be complementary to that of the Tribunal; and
2. The mandate of the Commission must not be similar to that of the Tribunal.
and that there was no room for an amnesty of any sort. This may be understandable 
given the confusion over terminology and the rapidly evolving nature of complementarity 
as a doctrine.
481 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.SV591-e, supra note 179 [underlining added]. Contrast this 
with the Prosecutor’s suggestion that such a Commission would be "counter-productive 
to the work of the tribunal” as described in: Jennifer Llewellyn and Sandra Raponi, 
"Interview: The Protection of Human Rights Through International Criminal Law: A 
Conversation with Madam Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (1999) 57 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 
83 at 94. The Prosecutor does not have a say in the governance of the Tribunal since 
that is left to the Plenary, composed of judges (ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 177 at Rule 24) and she is not invited. Louise Arbour’s comments were 
therefore likely personal observations, but of little value in describing the Tribunal. 
President Joraa’s comments are significantly more authoritative (and recent).
482 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
While President Jorda was generally supportive of the draft legislation, he was 
critical of the Commission being imbued with judicial powers including investigative 
ones. Such powers would undermine the complementary relationship with the 
Tribunal and as such should be amended accordingly.483 President Jorda 
effectively established the framework in which a truth and reconciliation 
commission would operate within the jurisdiction of the two ad hoc tribunals -  but 
only extra-judicially. The complementary relationship remains distinctly disjunctive. 
President Jorda’s laudable effort to reconcile the disjunctive character of the 
ICTY484 with the conjunctive character of the ICC, elaborated in the Rome Statute, 
may be problematic, for they are irreconciiiable:485
The jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals has been 
reversed: the ICC may only supplement national criminal justice 
systems when there is inadequate domestic will or inability to 
prosecute.
Thus the current trend in international law, is that any TRC under the United 
Nations system, must be of the type described by President Jorda -  disjunctive 
and non-judicial whether in Bosnia or in Sierra Leone.486
483 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179. Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, 1995 (South Africa), supra note 91, would likely be considered a 
significant violation of the complementarity principle in that it allocates the Commission 
significant quasi-judicial and investigative powers. This does not necessarily mean that 
had it been implemented after 1 July 2002 or a similar Act adopted in the former 
Yugoslavia, that it would be invalid to the ICC. The ICC has allowed for a much less 
positivist approach to the prosecution of international crimes through the system of 
complementarity as described in the Rome Statute. This will now be examined in the 
text.
484 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9 (especially Rules 9(i) 
and 9(iii)) but also ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) -  the provisions relating 
to "primacy over national courts.”
485 Arbour and Bergson, in von Hebei, supra note 66 at 130.
486 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, supra note 471 at Paragraph 39.
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An Assessment of the Validity of Amnesty under the Rome Statute
Under the Rome Statute, amnesty for international crimes is significantly more 
viable than under the ICTY Statute. This is largely due to the greater conjunctive 
character of the Rome Statute.m  There exist two tests available to determine if an 
amnesty (or decision not to prosecute) is sufficiently legitimate to render a case 
inadmissible to the ICC: 1) the test for unwillingness or inability to prosecute on 
the part of a State; and 2) the test for ne bis in idem.
Admissibility
Unwillingness and Inability Test
There exists a presumption that the State is carrying out its duties to investigate or 
prosecute (or not to prosecute) properly, unless evidence to the contrary exists.488 
The unwillingness and inability test is used to determine if such evidence exists 
and only is applied in two instances, where: the case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it; or the case has been 
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not 
to prosecute the person concerned.489 Unwillingness is determined by evidence of 
shielding an accused, unjustifiably delaying proceedings or carrying out 
proceedings that lack independence or impartiality.490 Thus evidence of a lack of
487 Recall the earlier discussion comparing these two tests to the circumstances under 
which the ICTY Prosecutor could request a deferral from a State under ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9. Specifically it appears as though 
the Rome Statute drops the conditions of Rules 9(i) and 9(iii). These two provisions 
gave the Tribunal its disjunctive character, making it capable of asserting its primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction over the domestic courts largely at its own unchecked 
discretion.
488 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17 generally. The force of such a presumption 
renders a case inadmissible automatically. Contrast this with Rule 9(0 and (ii) of the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177, where the ICTY could request 
deferral even if the State prosecuted in propriety.
489 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1) and 17(2) respectively.
490 Ibid. at Article 17(2).
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good faith or an abuse of process is crucial in determining unwillingness. In the 
case of inability, the condition of the domestic legal system is examined.491
If confronted with assessing whether an amnesty accorded by a domestic (State- 
run) TRC is legitimate, the ICC would have to presume that it was in the absence 
of evidence of unwillingness or inability to genuinely investigate or prosecute. 
Thus the presumption is that such an amnesty is legitimate. In determining if the 
State is unwilling, lack of good faith and abuse of process are crucial elements. In 
determining the inability o f a State to carry out the investigation/prosecution, the 
state of the legal system is a crucial element. If such evidence is not present, the 
question of legitimacy of the TRC is inadmissible to the ICC, and therefore a 
matter for the domestic courts to decide. Does inadmissibility o f a case indicate an 
endorsement of legitimacy of the domestic investigation/prosecution? To answer 
this question is to establish a hierarchy of law and hence violates the principle of 
complementarity. It is the wrong approach. What matters is that inadmissibility 
precludes the case from going before the ICC as the domestic jurisdiction is 
presumed to be operating properly if no evidence suggests otherwise. This is 
complementarity.
Ne bis in idem Test
The second test available in scrutinizing a domestic amnesty to the ICC is that of 
ne bis in idem. The test is only applied in one instance where the Court considers 
an issue of admissibility: where the person concerned has already been tried for 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint and trial is precluded under the 
provisions relating to ne bis in idem contained at Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute. 
This test applies primarily in instances of sham prosecutions where the purpose of 
the domestic trial was to shield the accused from the jurisdiction of the ICC (by
491 Ibid. at Article 17(3).
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double jeopardy) or if the trial was neither independent nor impartial and never 
intended to bring the accused to justice.492
In the case of questioning a TRC granted amnesty, the first issue is whether the 
TRC represents another court before which the accused was tried. In the previous 
test, there was no reference to any court, just “a State, which has jurisdiction.' It 
would appear that a domestic TRC must have at the very least a quasi-judicial 
character in order to grant an effective amnesty. Only after such conditions have 
been met can the test in Article 20(3) be applied.
Professor Schabas raises an interesting point in this regard. While the means of 
determining the illegitimacy of TRC granted amnesty are focused on prosecution 
or exemption from prosecution, he raises the issue of where an accused has been 
prosecuted and found guilty but then her sentence is reduced or she is 
pardoned.493 Citing the example of Lieutenant William Calley whom the United 
States convicted of war crimes, Richard Nixon nullified a life sentence by granting 
him a pardon after a brief period of incarceration.494 The argument is that ne bis in 
idem could be used as a shield not to prevent prosecution, but as a shield to 
prevent an appropriate punishment Efforts by the States Parties to harmonize 
their domestic laws so that they are in conformity with the Rome Statute may 
represent a partial solution to this loophole.495 One might wonder whether this 
really is a loophole though. If a State were to systematically grant pardons to 
persons who were prosecuted for international crimes domestically, effectively 
defeating the prosecution, perhaps this might be evidence of exactly those 
conditions in Article 20(3) which render the claim of ne bis in idem void -  
proceedings in the domestic court pursued to shield the person from criminal
492 Ibid. at Article 20(3) but cross-referenced by Article 17(1)(c).
493 Schabas, supra note 2 at 70.
494 Ibid.
495 Dulait, supra note 412.
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responsibility and a compromise of the independence or impartiality of the norms 
of due process recognized by international law, inconsistent to bring the person to 
justice. If such claims are void, then the presumption of inadmissibility could be 
set aside and the ICC become seized of the matter.496
Discretionary Diversity
The Prosecutor possesses a qualified discretionary power not to initiate an 
investigation, where:497
Taking into account the gravity o f the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that 
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
The judiciary oversees the exercise of this power. If the Prosecutor decides not to 
prosecute for whatever reason, such a decision may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and to some degree the referring party (the Security Council or a 
State).498 It does not matter what these ‘‘interests'' are, just that a discretionary 
power not to prosecute does exist. Thus the domestic, quasi-judicial TRCs 
according amnesties may represent one instance of the exercise of discretionary 
power but so may "deals,” where accused provide evidence on those more 
responsible and serious offenders. This is not too distant from marchandage or 
"plea bargaining” in Rwanda -  except that the price is immunity from prosecution. 
It should also be noted that the Rome Statute is oriented toward "the exercise of 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern,”499 
and as such, has accords both the Prosecutor and the judiciary discretionary 
power to not pursue cases where "sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
496 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1 He).
497 Ibid. at Article 53(1)(c). This power is under the supervision of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
however (Article 53(3Kb» [underlining added). Arsanjani, supra not 179 at 75 also 
regards this provision as allowing domestic TRCs to coexist with the ICC under the 
framework of the Rome Statute -  naturally in good faith and not as an abuse of process 
to shield accused from prosecution.
498 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 53.
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Court” is lacking.500 This allows the ICC to possess the narrow jurisdiction so 
envied by the ICTY and so necessary to avoid any drift toward a supranational 
character which would detract from its complementary character to the domestic 
courts.
While the judiciary supervises the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers, the 
judiciary’s powers are supervised from outside of the Court, through external 
checks -  a diversification of discretionary powers amongst various international 
personalities. Challenges to the admissibility of a case represent such a check. 
The accused, a State having jurisdiction over the case (and believes it is 
investigating or prosecuting or already has done so in propriety) and a State from 
which acceptance of jurisdiction is required (a non-State Party),501 all have the right 
to challenge admissibility and thereby meet allegations made of unwillingness and 
inability on the part o f a State or the inapplicability of the ne bis in idem test.
The deferral powers of the Security Council, represent yet another check o f the 
ICC Prosecutor’s discretionary powers. Through a Security Council Resolution 
under Chapter VII o f the Charter, adopted unanimously, the Security Council may 
request that the Court “defer” an investigation or prosecution.502 Despite the 
language of cordiality, this is probably as good as an order. The Rome Statute 
therefore reserves an unfettered discretionary power for the Security Council -  a 
prerogative to stay proceedings should they constitute a threat to the peace.
In the worst-case scenario, the intransigence of a State may result in the Court 
deferring the matter to the Security Council or Assembly of States Parties, as
499 Ibid. at Article 1.
500 Ibid. at Article 17(1 )(d).
501 Ibid. at Article 19(2). Remember that there is a presumption that the State carrying out 
the investigation/prosecution has done so in good faith, unless it can be proven 
otherwise.
502 Ibid at Article 16.
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appropriate.503 An additional pre-emption is possible by the Security Council, in 
the event that it decides a prosecution should not be initiated (under a Chapter VII 
action).504 The Security Council is permitted to override prosecution in the event 
that it would help ensure international peace and security.
Conclusion
Just how TRC granted amnesties are received under the Rome Statute is a 
complex issue. The international community (through the United Nations) 
generally regards amnesties granted for international crimes as being invalid, 
especially where the beneficiaries are the ringleaders, the most flagrant offenders 
and those who have shirked their fiduciary duty to uphold the compliance of the 
State in suppressing such crimes. To this end, it has become increasingly the 
practice to allow the domestic jurisdiction to deal with the "lesser fish," so long as 
an international court or tribunal prosecuted "the bigger fish". This is the situation 
with the ICTY, ICTR and in Sierra Leone. Domestic TRCs therefore are sapped of 
any judicial character, in order to avoid any conflict of jurisdiction between the 
international tribunals and the domestic courts. This is a disjunctive approach and 
reflects the disjunctive character of the Security Council, operating through its 
subsidiary organs (the ICTY, ICTR or Sierra Leonean Special Court).
The Rome Statute enshrines the concept of complementarity and therefore the 
presumption that a domestic investigation/prosecution is valid unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. Such evidence is furnished by the unwillingness or 
inadmissibility test (in the case of a State with jurisdiction either 
investigating/prosecuting or having investigated and decided to not prosecute) or 
by the ne bis in idem test at Article 20(3) where evidence of a bad faith prosecution 
or abuse of process exists. The existence of such evidence can negate the 
presumption that any case is inadmissible to the ICC. A TRC is therefore
503 Ibid. at Article 87(7).
504 Ibid. at Article 16.
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acceptable to the ICC provided that the State running it is both willing and capable 
of genuinely carrying out investigation and prosecution. This implies a TRC that is 
necessarily quasi-judicial in character. What State would avoid an extra basis to 
assert inadmissibility o f a case by running a non-judicial TRC? The preference for 
quasi-judicial TRCs represents a major departure from the disjunctive approach 
adopted by the ICTY, ICTR and Sierra Leonean Special Court The ICC approach 
respects complementarity by presuming that the State is fully capable of dealing 
with international crimes on its own. Only in those exceptional cases where 
evidence to the contrary exists, may an issue of admissibility be raised. Yet this 
issue may be challenged by the subject State or by other international entities. 
This is how discretionary power is supervised in a decentralized legal order. It is a 
reflexive approach to the international community exercising its decision-making. 
The "big fish” are still targeted, but in a manner that respects and reinforces the 
decentralized nature of the international legal order.
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C h a p t e r  6
Chapter Six: International Complementarity 
Introduction
Complementarity is the structural foundation of the International Criminal Court It 
is a concept that is complex and sophisticated. It is a concept that challenges our 
understanding of what law is. In the domestic legal system one views law as 
hierarchical, structured and centralized, complete with a means of enforcement. 
All three branches o f State are active in all of its facets. Individual modular units, 
the States, carry out the daily business of ensuring compliance with legal norms, 
including the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. International 
crimes are after all crimes within the State’s jurisdiction. Yet it is when the 
apparatus of State enforcement goes awry that the State fails in its duty to deal 
with such crimes. The international community steps in where the State is 
unwilling or unable to act How it does this without asserting a supranational 
character is crucial to understanding how complementarity works. The Rome 
Statute sets up just such a system. The previous chapter showed it in action, 
through the case study of how the Statute deals with TRCs. In that chapter the 
issue was not whether a TRC or TRC-granted amnesty was legitimate, but rather 
whether the presumption of inadmissibility of a case could be property countered to 
permit the ICC to exert its jurisdiction. This may be more than simply a matter of 
semantics, considering the presuppositions contained in the immanent meaning of 
words, discussed in chapter three.
The aim of this chapter is to show the subtle, yet sophisticated, nature of 
complementarity by discussing how the ICC is intended to operate within the 
international legal system. This is the relationship between the ICC and other 
international entities, not uniquely States. Thus the chapter w ill focus a much
160
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broader vision of complementarity -  ‘ international complementarity." Part I o f this 
chapter summarizes the manner in which the ICC ‘asserts its jurisdiction," while at 
the same time respecting complementarity and reinforcing the decentralized 
nature of the international (criminal) legal system. Naturally States are the primary 
international personality, but they are not the only one. While it may be true that 
individuals and NGOs as having an increasing importance, this chapter draws 
attention to regional organizations of States -  an entity recognized under Chapter 
VIII of the Charter. Consensus, negotiation and communicative deliberation are 
not particularly unique in international law, for they are commonplace in such 
regional arrangements. The ICC represents just another type of regional 
arrangement established by the international community. The proliferation of such 
organizations maintains decentralization within the international legal order. 
Coherence is achieved through a high level of reflexivity. While this gives the 
international legal order its sui generis character, at the same time many legal 
thinkers and decision-makers are unable to visualize law as having any form other 
than that in their domestic legal system. To them, law must be centralized, 
hierarchical and imposed. This is the common denominator of the traditional legal 
schools discussed at chapter one. In Part II those problems that arise, from this 
limited perspective, are examined with respect to the opposition to the Rome 
Statute from India and the United States. Both positions are revealing, for they 
reject a decentralized international legal system in favour of a hierarchical system 
of law -  a projection of municipal law into the legal arena. This chapter therefore 
brings to light a problem in perception of the nature o f contemporary international 
law generally and the corresponding lack of imagination in the reading of the 
Rome Statute.
A New Legal Proceduralism -  International Complementarity
The ICC and Admissibility
Throughout the Rome Statute, the central doctrine of complementarity establishes 
a working partnership between the ICC and domestic courts. There exists a
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presumption that the domestic approach to dealing with international crimes is 
proper -  almost a ‘ presumption of innocence” accorded to States in matters of 
jurisdiction. Only if there is evidence to suggest that a case is no longer 
inadmissible, can the presumption be countered and the ICC become seized of the 
case. In instances where the State is investigating or prosecuting or has 
investigated but decided not to prosecute, only then may the unwillingness and 
inability test apply.505 This test would make a case admissible if there was 
evidence o f an attempt to shield an accused from responsibility for international 
crimes; an unjustified delay in proceedings inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person to justice; and a lack of independence or impartiality also inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the accused to justice.506 Inability to prosecute is an alternative 
test that may also be applied.507 It is determined by the state of the domestic 
judicial system.
In the event that a court has already tried the person, for conduct that is the 
subject of a complaint before the ICC, the principle of ne bis in idem is assumed to 
apply automatically, rendering the case inadmissible.508 If however there is 
evidence of the abuse of the principle to shield the accused from criminal 
responsibility or evidence that the proceedings in the other court were neither 
independent nor impartial, then the principle may be suspended, rendering the 
case admissible.509 A final form of inadmissibility exists, where the ICC considers 
that a case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action.510
505 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b).
506 Ibid. at A/tide 17(2).
507 Ibid. at Article 17(1Xa) and 17(1)(b). Both use the term ‘unless the State is willing or 
unable genuinely” to carry out the investigation/prosecution. Each test is then identified 
in Articles 17(2) and 17(3) respectively. Therefore they are construed as being 
independent of one another. If they were not, this would seriously hamper the ability of 
the ICC to function.
508 Ibid. at Article 17(1 Xc).
509 Ibid. at Article 20 -  especially Article 20(3).
510 Ibid. at Article 17(1 Xd).
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In a domestic legal system the determination of these tests for admissibility would 
rest in the hands of the Prosecutor or judge. In the Rome Statute these two 
individuals still make these decisions. Their discretionary power however is 
overseen by a number of international legal personalities. States, the Assembly of 
States Parties, the Security Council, the accused (to a limited extent) and NGOs 
(through indirect representation before the Prosecutor) are all allocated a role. 
Whether through powers of referral, deferral, staying an investigation/prosecution, 
challenging admissibility, or simply refusing to cooperate with the Court -  there are 
numerous mechanisms and tactics available to invoke oversight This 
diversification of discretionary power is also reflected in the manner in which the 
Court governs itself -  for instance in how amendments to its documents are 
achieved. The Rome Statute establishes a decentralization of discretionary power 
throughout the international legal system.
The Rome Statute, Complementarity and Reflexive International Law
The Rome Statute sets up a legal system that is not immediately recognizable 
when compared against a domestic model or even that of the ICTY. 
Complementarity not only respects the integrity of the States to domestically 
prosecute international crimes by according them a presumption of capability, but it 
also respects the disparate nature of the international legal system keeping it 
decentralized. The centralization of judicial authority that Kelsen expected 
continues to be absent511 International legislative and executive authorities 
remain vaguely defined, if defined at all. Instead a legal order is founded upon 
negotiation, consensus and communication. This is reminiscent of Kelsen’s 
voluntary character of law -  what he might have identified as an extremely
511 In the case of the ad hoc tribunals (and to some degree Sierra Leone), under authority 
of the Security Council, they were endowed with a broad discretionary power to 
“override" the jurisdiction of a domestic court. This approach is highly disjunctive in 
character and undermines the concept of complementarity. It represents the operation 
of the Security Council's supranational character filtering through to the tribunals. Recall 
ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Articles 9 and 10 and more importantly ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9.
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advanced form of law. It is reminiscent of Habermas’ "deliberative democracy” and 
communicative action theory.512 It is Teubner’s final evolutionary reflexive law 
stage.513
The Rome Statute is a mirror, reflecting the international legal system, since the 
international criminal legal system operates within its confines. The ICC is just one 
of many international organizations and regional arrangements established to 
represent the collective interests of "like-minded states.”514 These organizations 
are reflexive in their own right and frequently incorporate some sort o f deliberative 
assembly or even a court or arbitral body. They are founded upon consensus, 
negotiation and communication between the member States. Thus for example, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) makes decisions 
on the basis of consensus of all participating States, each of which has an equal 
status.515 The OSCE possesses a Parliamentary Assembly (based in 
Copenhagen) and a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (based in Geneva).516 
The drafters of the Rome Statute adopted the same approach, through the
512 Discussed in chapter one. See Rehg, supra note 52 at xii. Note the three idealizing 
assumptions in conflict resolution described at xv -  and in particular the need for 
consensus and the presumption of rationality.
513 Teubner, supra note 125.
514 Authors such as Romano, supra note 328; Couston, supra note 182; and Buergenthal, 
supra note 213; tend to be preoccupied by the ‘proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals.” Rather than their proliferation perse it might be more appropriate to consider 
the proliferation of international organizations. If one is preoccupied by the proliferation 
of international courts, it is easy to reach a conclusion of a legal system dominated by 
the supranational aspects of "rule of law." Proliferation would amount to a form of 
centralization, albeit in a parallelist or federal conception. It is argued here that this is 
not a fair reflection of the disparate nature of the international legal system. Rather, with 
the rise of international organizations, the disparate nature is reinforced. The ICC is an 
international organization which happens to have a court. Yet its character is 
significantly different to the ICTY. In a similar vein the ICJ is a court that belongs to the 
United Nations (its primary judicial organ).
515 Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 324 at 1. Other 
organizations might include the Organization of American States or the Organization of 
African Unity. These regional arrangements are generally independent of the United 
Nations, although recognized by it under Chapter VIII of the Charter, supra note 26.
516 Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 324 at 38 [shown in 
Figure 3 ‘Structures and Institutions'!.
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creation of an Assembly of States Parties (the ICC “legislature’).517 An active role 
for the Security Council also is enshrined, through the attribution of referral and 
deferral powers. This is not a separation of powers however. There is nothing to 
prevent the ICC from investigating or prosecuting a case which has a Chapter VII 
aspect (for instance an international crime of aggression would probably stem from 
an act of aggression). Thus the ICC and the Security Council could be dealing 
with related issues (although not identical issues) at the same time.518
The United Nations could be considered such a reflexive entity, where the 
decisions of the General Assembly and Security Council are adopted on the basis 
of consensus, negotiation and deliberation. Although both the General Assembly 
and Security Council are reflexive, the Charter confers upon the Council the 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.’519 
The Security Council consists only of 15 States, five of which maintain their seats 
permanently and possess a qualified voting power.520 This is a far cry from the 189 
States, which comprise the United Nations. While Security Council decisions are 
presumed to have a legal binding quality on States under the Charter,521 the
Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 112. States are equal (Article 112(1)) and voting 
is preferred to be on the basis of consensus (Article 112(7)) and failing that through a 
majority vote by the States Parties present. There is no qualified majority voting as in 
the case of the Security Council.
518 Ibid. at Article 16 allows the Security Council to delay an ICC investigation provided that 
it has voted unanimously to do so under a Chapter VII justification.
519 Ibid. at Article 24(1).
520 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 23.
521 Ibid. at Article 2(5), 25 and 48. In the case of the recent controversy over Iraq’s non- 
compliance with various Security Council Resolutions concerning the admission of 
weapons inspectors, it seems that Iraq holds the view that even these Resolutions are 
negotiable. This view seems to be reinforced by a willingness to negotiate both from 
within the Security Council and from the international community in general. There are 
States that do not subscribe to this approach and insist that the Resolutions be complied 
with, or else Iraq could face a renewed intervention since the admission of weapons 
inspectors was a condition to the ending of hostilities in 1991. On the other hand, Iraq’s 
position may be justified to some degree in that to simply attack a State or carry out an 
embargo or even to expel it from the UN, seems a potentially disproportionate act that 
may be self-defeating to the desired end goal -  compliance by the delinquent State.
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Security Council is not a representative body of the community of states. The 
Charter entrenched the global power distribution at the end of World War II, 
through the granting of permanent seats on the Security Council and a permanent 
veto power over certain resolutions that might be considered, to the five victorious 
States.522 This seems to undermine the Charter’s own recognition of the equality 
of all States,523 imbuing it with what might be perceived as a certain hegemonic 
quality. This may detract from its ability to fully deliberate, negotiate and 
communicate before reaching a decision. This is probably reflected in the 
ambiguity contained within the ICTY Statute -  to be contrasted by the way in which 
the Rome Statute excels in defining a new vocabulary, it having been drafted in a 
comparatively more deliberated and reflexive manner. On the other hand there is 
a trade-off, for by not being fully deliberative, the Security Council is capable of 
acting in a relatively short time.524
The Municipal Analogue and its Inappropriateness
International law is applied through negotiation, deliberation and consensus rather 
than through imposition, positivism and the application of universal norms. The
Whether Security Council Resolutions really are binding is not as straight-forward as one 
might suspect.
522 Ibid. at Article 23 (members) and Article 27 (voting). The voting arrangement is often 
called the “Yalta voting formula,” although it is also known as qualified majority voting -  a 
distinct improvement over the League of Nations Council required unanimity on 
substantive matters. Consider Statement o f the Delegations to the San Francisco 
Conference of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, and the 
Republic o f China, with which the Delegation of France Associated Itself, San Francisco, 
7 June 1945, UNCIO Doc. 852, 111/1/37(1); 11 UNCIO Documents at Articles 1-7, in 
Louis B. Sohn, ed. , Basic Documents of the United Nations, 2nd ed. (Brooklyn: The 
Foundation Press, Inc., 1968) at 70-71.
523 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 2(1).
524 Soci6t6 des Nations, Convention pour la creation d'une cour p6nale intemationale 
(Gen6ve : Soctete des Nations, 1937) [Getteve, le 16 novembre 1937; S6rie de 
publications de la Soci6t6 des Nations; 1937.V.11.; 5.Questk>ns iuridiques]. It could be 
argued that negotiations toward some sort of international criminal tribunal go back even 
further to World War I (Schabas, supra note 2 at 1 for example makes this point). 
Schabas suggests that it really started to be drafted in earnest from about 1989 on. It 
may even gofurther back to the medieval period (see supra note 277). The point here is 
that it has taken a long time for the Rome Statute to be drafted.
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four traditional schools of law (legal realism, legal positivism, universalism and 
parallelism) falter, for they presuppose the existence of a hierarchical and 
centralized legal system. The reflexive approach provides a means of overcoming 
their inherent limitations and capturing the essence o f complementarity. Yet it 
must be used with caution, for even its original proponents defined the concept in 
the domestic context, not the international one. Nevertheless the Rome Statute 
mirrors the reflexive nature of international law in its procedures. By so doing 
complementarity is used to establish an international criminal court in a 
decentralized legal order without a hierarchy of law.
The Rome Statute: Roots of Opposition
Expectations o f the Domestic Model Internationally 
A Crisis o f Legitimacy for Some
Unfortunately the fallacious projection of the domestic model into the international 
legal system is engrained in these traditional schools of dominant legal thought It 
is here that one may uncover the roots of opposition to the Rome Statute by the 
two largest democratic States within the international system. Their opposition to 
the Statute is not founded in any one school o f thought but rather in an 
expectation of an international legal order that reflects some degree of hierarchy, 
structure and centralization. Both positions deny the concept of complementarity 
in the Rome Statute but also the decentralized nature of international law. 
Ironically they recognize the ICC as having a character that the other claims it 
lacks.
India -  Security Council Invested With Too Much Discretionary Power
India’s objections revolved around three issues: the Security Council referral 
power, the Security Council deferral power and the failure of the Rome Statute to 
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. .
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Under the Rome Statute, the Security Council may request the initiation of an 
investigation by the Court through a referral.525 The Indian government felt that the 
conferral of such a power to the Security Council was ultra vims and exceeded 
those powers explicitly stated in the Charter. Mr. Lahiri, the Indian representative 
at the Rome Conference in 1998, suggested that by according powers of referral 
to the Security Council, that would either make a Security Council referral of 
greater importance than other referrals; or establish a mechanism whereby sitting 
members of the Security Council who were not States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
could still make use of the International Criminal Court.526 Mr. Lahiri’s position 
reveals distrust of the Security Council and o f those sitting members who are not 
States Parties to the Rome Statute. Such distrust is probably warranted since the 
Security Council by its very nature incorporates a centralization of coercive 
authority -  potentially the first step to a centralization of judicial or political 
authority.
In terms of the power of blocking cases before the Court under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute (the second objection), India fe lt that this was a political interference 
with the Court’s independence by the Security Council:527
...it is argued that the maintenance of international peace and 
security might require that those who have committed these crimes 
should be permitted to escape justice, if  the Council so decrees.
The moment this argument is conceded, the Conference accepts 
the proposition that justice could undermine international peace 
and security.
Latent in Mr. Lahiri’s argument is an underlying presumption of the primacy of the 
‘ rule of law.” Yet such a ‘primacy” represents a hierarchy of law to which the 
Security Council would have to submit. Thus Mr. Lahiri’s position, projects the 
domestic legal model onto the international scene.
525 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 13(2).
526 Dilip Lahiri, supra note 42.
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India’s third objection to the Rome Statute was that the Statute did not classify the 
use of nuclear weapons as an international crime.52* The Rome Statute contains 
an incomplete inventory of international crimes. An argument does exist that the 
Rome Statute does in fact prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in that they 
represent a form of indiscriminate attack (a war crime) and may even represent a 
crime against humanity (through their effects and even more so through the 
intention of the decision-makers who would authorize their use). Notwithstanding 
this argument the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is a political topic that just 
does not fit into the nature of international crimes covered by the Rome Statute. In 
this respect it is like terrorism or drug trafficking. The issue is not purely legal. 
There is a political dimension, which if ignored, could amount to the Court 
undermining the concept of complementarity. This is not to say that the Indian 
position is wrong, but that it is too simplistic. The approach is consistent with a 
positivist “rule of law* view of international law.
United States -  Security Council Invested with Not Enough Discretionary Power
American opposition to the Rome Statute is complicated and at times incoherent. 
This is partly due to a change in government from the Clinton to Bush 
administration. President Clinton initially signed the Rome Statute on 31 
December 2000. Yet President Clinton advised that there were still “concerns 
about the significant flaws in the treaty* and that he would therefore recommend 
that Congress not ratify it 529
527 Ibid.
528 William Schabas (Schabas, supra note 2 at 49) suggests that India may have been 
simply grandstanding for political reasons in order to upstage Pakistan’s development of 
nuclear weapons in 1998. While this context may be true and perhaps even his 
argument, presuming that States negotiate in bad faith is not a productive route in trying 
to assess international legal development. It must be presumed that they are 
negotiating in good faith unless there is evidence to the contrary. If anything, it shows 
the reasons why deliberative communication takes so long and also illustrates the 
“asymmetry” of a reflexive system -  as States pursue their own interests in the course of 
negotiation.
529 Marc Grossman, supra note 231.
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Provisions o f the Rome Statute did not sit well with some American politicians,530 
especially when it became apparent that under certain conditions, it was possible 
for American members of the armed forces and civilian leaders to come under the 
jurisdiction o f the Court Such concern was amplified by claims of the denial of 
procedural protections guaranteed under the Bill of Rights and American 
Constitution (such as the right to trial by jury).531 There is a certain inconsistency in 
this approach noted from within the American legal community, in that there are 
numerous treaties that do deny such procedural protections and surrender some 
of the sovereignty belonging to Congress.532 The potential for exposure to 
prosecution for senior elected and appointed officials in the American government, 
for "decisions involving such matters as: responding to acts of terrorism, 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deterring 
aggression,” was just too much.533 This is a curious statement since all three 
matters are excluded from the Rome Statute.
The unsigning o f the Rome Statute by the Bush administration marks a significant 
clarification of the American government’s stand. By "unsigning,” the Bush 
administration cleared the path for a much more hostile approach to the Statute 
(and the introduction of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act o f 2002), 
without fear o f violating the law on treaties.534 The "unsigning” was in effect a
530 Specifically: Jesse Helms, Thomas Delay, Benjamin Gilman, Henry Hyde, John Murtha 
and Chris Smith; they were the sponsors and co-sponsors of the Bill. In particular refer 
to: Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12.
531ASPA, supra note 6.
532 Congressional sovereignty is equivalent to parliamentary sovereignty in this sense. 
Consider Audrey I. Benison, ‘ International Criminal Tribunals: Is there a Limitation on 
the Treaty Power?” (2001) 37 Stan. J Inti L. 75 at 112 (in particular). There are a 
number of treaties in existence to which the United States has "surrendered sovereignty” 
from Congress to an international tribunal. She considers extradition treaties. Status of 
Forces Agreements, extradition to other international criminal tribunals (such as 
Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999)), prisoner exchange, the Charter of 
the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.
533 Ibid. at § 3002(9).
534 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 411 at Art. 18.
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denunciation. Reasons for the “unsigning" were prepared in set of remarks 
delivered by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman on 6 May 
2002 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.535 Mr. Grossman’s 
remarks were largely derived (verbatim) from what would eventually become the 
preamble to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act o f 2002.53e While there 
was much said in Mr. Grossman’s remarks, he outlined some premises, which 
formed the basis for the American decision to “unsign" the Statute.
Mr. Grossman indicated the principles of international law, which the United States 
believed in:537
We believe in justice and the promotion of the rule of law.
We believe those who commit the most serious of crimes of 
concern to the international community should be punished.
We believe that states, not international institutions are primarily 
responsible for ensuring justice in the international system.
We believe that the best way to combat these serious offenses is 
to build domestic judicial systems, strengthen political will and 
promote human freedom
The remarks are important for they represent the full policy statement of the Bush 
administration. They are echoed in summary by other members of the Bush cabinet: 
United States Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC 
Treaty,” News Release, No. 233-0 (6 May 2002), online: Defenselink
<http7/www.defenselink.mil>(date accessed: 16 May 2002).
536 ASPA, supra note 6 at § 2002 “Findings."
537 The third principle does not seem accurate. It should probably read: “We believe that 
States, not international institutions (with the possible exception of the Security Council) 
are primarily responsible for ensuring justice in the international system." Such a 
revision seems more consistent with the second last paragraph before the subheading 
“We Will Continue to Lead:’
In situations where violations are so grave as to amount to a breach of international 
peace and security, and the political will to address these violations is non-existent, 
the international community may, and if  necessary should, intercede through the UN 
Security Council as we did in Bosnia and Rwanda.
This is an endorsement of the two ad hoc tribunals and the peacekeeping missions.
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Yet Mr. Grossman outlined four reasons why the Government of the United States 
felt that the Rome Statute did not advance these principles:538
We believe the ICC undermines the role of the United Nations 
Security Council in maintaining peace and security.
We believe in checks and balances. The Rome Statute creates a 
prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power.
We believe that in order to be bound by a treaty, a state must be 
party to that treaty. The ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of 
states that have not ratified the treaty. This threatens US 
sovereignty.
We believe that the ICC is buHt on a flawed foundation. These 
flaws leave it open for exploitation and politically motivated 
prosecutions.
The only explanation as to why his government felt that the entire system of 
complementarity was inadequate was because American proposals to set in place 
a system of ‘proper checks and balances on the Court were rejected."539 
American proposals both before and after the Rome Conference in July 1998 
were:540
1. To permit a Security Council referral outside of a Chapter VII authorization;
2. That if a State Party referred a situation to the Court that was already under 
deliberation by the Security Council, the authorization from the Security 
Council would be required before the ICC could consider it  This was hotly 
contested and eventually the ‘Singapore Compromise* resulted and the
538 Although later in the same text he claims that the Rome Statute threatens these 
principles, (see last sentence before subheading "We Will Continue to Lead)
539 Grossman, supra note 231.
540 United States Department of State, David Scheffer, ‘Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward 
the International Criminal Court,” Address at American University, Washington, DC (14 
September 2000), online: United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov> 
(date accessed: 15 May 2002).
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drafting of what would become the Security Council deferral power under 
Article 16;
3. An “opt out" provision was proposed where a State Party could opt out of 
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, but not genocide. If a State so 
opted, it would forfeit its right to refer matters to the Court. The Security 
Council could override the "opt out" with a Chapter VII referral;
4. A 10-year transitional period was proposed, during which time a State Party 
could opt out of crimes against humanity and/or war crimes with a possibility 
for renewal under certain conditions. A modified version materialized as 
Article 124 of the Treaty, with a reduction to 7 years and concerning Article 
8 (war crimes only); and
5. A final proposal was that Article 12 be drafted: to require express approval 
of both the territorial state of the alleged crime and the state of nationality of 
the accused in the event either was not a State Party; or to exempt the 
court’s jurisdiction in conduct arising from the official actions of a non-State 
Party and acknowledged as such by the non-State Party. Article 12 actually 
sets forth a precondition where acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is 
required from: the territorial state of the alleged crime (or State of 
registration in the case of a vessel or aircraft) or the State of nationality; or 
in the case of a non-State Party, a declaration accepting the exercise of 
jurisdiction.
The nature of the proposals made at the Rome Conference clearly indicate that 
the American government wanted to establish the ICC as an international 
institution in a subordinate relationship to another international institution -  the 
Security Council. The idea of endowing the Security Council with a referral power 
outside of Chapter VII represents a significant expansion of powers beyond what 
was explicitly allocated in the Charter. The proposal to allow the Security Council
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a primary right to exercise jurisdiction (through "deliberation”) over a State Party 
referring a situation to the Court is a reincarnation of the wide discretionary powers 
found in the ICTY Statute and Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. It allows the 
Security Council to assert some form of primacy over States Party -  and not even 
restricted to Chapter VII issues. The proposal for an "opt out” clause and the 
ability o f the Security Council to override it under a Chapter VII referral represents 
yet another method of the Security Council using the ICC system at its discretion.
The last proposal represents one that is truly different. The first part of the 
proposal represents a significant limitation to how the ICC would assert its 
jurisdiction. Consent from both territorial state and state of nationality is required. 
Ambassador Scheffer describes this as remedying the "dangerous drift toward 
universal jurisdiction over non-party states.”541 This may not be entirely accurate, 
since it appears more as a means of ensuring that the two primary States involved 
have given their consent Consent and universal jurisdiction are two different 
things. The approach Scheffer describes seems to be more comparable to the ICJ 
requirement for consent to the Court’s jurisdiction as a precondition to even 
considering a case as admissible.
The second part of the proposal, as Scheffer describes it, was to distinguish acts, 
which might be incorrectly classified as crimes of aggression, when they were in 
fact official actions. Scheffer suggested: humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping 
actions, or pre-emptive defensive actions to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction. This is essentially the same argument in the first part -  that one of the 
preconditions to the exercise o f jurisdiction by the ICC is the consent of the State 
in whose name the international crimes may have been committed.
The American position therefore can be summarized as resting on two grounds for 
objection. In the first, the Security Council is regarded as being the primary
541 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
international organization in the international legal system. American proposals for 
its supervisory status over the ICC and to some degree the States Parties 
amounted to a desire to establish it as a focal point for international criminal judicial 
power. This is a hierarchical system with a certain degree of centralization. It is 
the domestic model being applied to the international legal system.
The second grounds for objection is mired in the idea of State consent to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. State “consent" is one of those old terms from traditional 
international law identified in chapter one. The legal system described in the 
Rome Statute truly is reflexive as described in this thesis, based upon voluntary 
compliance, consensus, negotiation, deliberation and communication. The 
reflexive mode, including consensus, represents an evolutionary leap in the idea of 
State consent; all of the active elements of reflexion contribute to general 
agreement not merely on the part o f the State, but by all States and all 
international personalities. Article 17, concerning how the presumption that a 
case is inadmissible is countered, represents the ultimate in how the reflexive 
mode operates. Consent is diversified not centralized. The last American 
proposal may therefore be in itself a residual element of drafters still thinking along 
the lines of a municipal model -  the idea of consent from one personality only. 
Unfortunately American legislators continue to perceive the ICC as a municipal 
type of court projected internationally, where discretionary powers are centralized 
within its judiciary and prosecutor. This would explain the foundations of the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act o f 2002 s42 Thus it is the American
542 Consider United States Department of State, David J. Scheffer, Statement Before the 
House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC (26 July 2000), online: 
United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov> (date accessed: 15 May 
2002) where Scheffer outlines why he and the Clinton Administration opposed the 
American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000 (which was a bill at the time, hence 
the year). Similarly refer to: United States Department of State, David Scheffer, 
“Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal Court,' Address at American 
University, Washington, DC” (14 September 2000), online: United States Department of 
State <http://www.state.gov/> (date accessed: 15 May 2002) where he states To argue 
that our position on personal jurisdiction reflected an underlying opposition to the whole 
concept of a permanent International Criminal Court or the Rome Treaty itself is a
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legislators that have projected their expectations o f a domestic legal system onto 
the international criminal legal system and in so doing, distorted their perception of 
how the Rome Statute sets up the ICC to operate in a decentralized system 
without a hierarchy of law. There is a relation to the Security Council arguments, 
in that if prosecution for international crimes is to occur, then legal authority should 
be subordinated to a centralized political authority which represents the interests of 
States -  the Security Council.
Conclusion
It is possible that the emergence of the ICC is symptomatic of a general trend in 
the context of the contemporary international law. Although Hans Kelsen saw the 
international legal system evolving through centralization of international judicial 
power and then international political power, he did not dismiss evolution in an 
altogether different direction.543 International law has been developing in this 
different direction for some time, as shown by the proliferation of regional 
arrangements. The Rome Statute establishes the ICC based on a similar 
approach steeped in reflexive law -  consensus, equality and decentralization. Its 
respect for complementarity is central. The presumption of a State being capable 
of dealing with international crimes domestically represents a major advance from 
the approach of the ad hoc tribunals. Centralization of legal power is averted 
through a system of diversified discretionary oversight by all those international 
legal personalities with an interest in the investigation/prosecution (or lack thereof)
deeply flawed argument.” This may an attempt by him to undo the damage that his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accomplished on 23 July 
1998. His original words may have been inappropriately chosen, in that they may have 
spawned the false image of a supranational ICC and the vulnerability of American 
service personnel and civilian leaders to groundless allegations. See: United States 
Department of State, David Scheffer, ‘Developments at Rome Treaty Conference,” 
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC (23 July 
1998), online: United States Department of State <http://Www.state.gov/> (date
accessed: 15 May 2002). Scheffer actually supports the ICC in principle and despite 
the objections that he and the Clinton administration originally had.
543 Kelsen, supra note 16.
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of accused individuals of international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Thus 
decentralization of the international legal system is also respected. There is no 
hierarchy o f law. There are just issues of admissibility. The rule of law is achieved 
through negotiation, consensus and communication. It is a very different model to 
the municipal approach where the “rule of law” is achieved through imposition, 
“arbitrariness* and unilateral action.
Here lies the difficulty with the acceptance of the ICC by some of its most 
vociferous opponents. India’s opposition is rooted in the failure of the Statute to 
operate without interference from the Security Council. It specifically criticizes 
those members of the Security Council, who are not States Parties, yet who 
possess some oversight in the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers 
(especially with respect to admissibility and challenges to it). In this respect India 
expects a hierarchy of law to exist, subordinating the prerogative powers of the 
Security Council and States to the discretionary powers of the Court. It expects 
centralization of judicial discretionary authority within the Court These are 
expectations of a domestic legal system projected into the international.
The Indian objection to the failure to classify the use of nuclear weapons as an 
international crime, further illustrates the lack of appreciation for the concept of 
complementarity through the simplistic classification of an act having both legal 
and political character, as uniquely legal.
The American position is extremely confused. There is a total dismissal of the 
reflexive mechanisms incorporated throughout the Rome Statute, but without 
justification. The Americans argue that the Security Council should have full 
oversight o f the Court. Yet they do more than that -  they argue for a hierarchical 
system of international law where the Security Council is invested with broad 
discretionary powers well beyond those stipulated in the Charter under Chapter 
VII; where the ICC and States Parties (to some extent) are subordinated to its
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powers. The American position may therefore express a desired centralizing role 
for the Security Council in the international legal system through an expansion of 
its power. If this is a correct analysis of the American position, it is a significant 
rejection of the decentralized nature of the international criminal system and the 
limited manner in which the Security Council operates within i t 544
544 It may be consistent with the contemporary upsurge in unilateralist views toward 
international law present amongst the members of the Administration in the United 
States. See: Peter Beaumont and Ed Heimore, "Will Bush Go to War Against
Saddam?” The Guardian (1 September 2002), online: The Guardian
<http7/www.observer.co.uk/iraq/Story/0,12239,784319,00.html> (date accessed: 1
September 2002).
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Chapter Seven: General Concluding Remarks
Chapter six represents something of a dimax in this thesis. International law as a 
reflexive system, founded upon consensus, negotiation and equality, represents a 
challenge to our preconceived view of law, rooted in the domestic model. A 
reflexive approach is evident in the international legal system through regional 
arrangements like OSCE and the UN (and the multitude of other regional 
arrangements). It is mirrored throughout the legal regime that the Rome Statute 
establishes for the ICC. Unfortunately this is not the same basis normally 
understood for the domestic legal system. There exists a relational problem.
Yet the flaw is more significant in that one presupposes the existence of a 
centralized, hierarchical and even authoritative approach to how courts exercise 
their jurisdiction. This is the antithesis of the fundamental bases of the 
contemporary international legal system. International law is sui generis. Yet one 
cannot change the expectations of academics or decision-makers overnight. 
They expect to see domestic patterns in the international legal system. 
Regardless of which school one adopts, all seem to view the ICC as a 
supranational court in the manner in which it exercises its jurisdiction over States -  
good or bad.
The traditional approach of States in dealing with international crimes, through 
cooperation and aut dedere aut judtcaire (prosecute or extradite), is undoubtedly 
the predominant mode. It remains unaffected. Only in those very rare cases 
where the apparatus of the State becomes co-opted by criminal elements (the 
State gone awry) does this mode fail. In such cases the ICC may be capable of 
exercising its jurisdiction, provided certain conditions exist. The subject matter of 
the ICC does not cover all instances of international crime or even all potential
179
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
perpetrators. In this sense it is incomplete. The subject matter is extremely 
restrictive as are the subjects. Only those high public officials who are directly 
responsible for a few categories o f international crime (genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes) are targeted. Even those categories of international 
crime are restricted further, to occurrence within a specific context in accordance 
with the ICC’s governing documents.
The concept of complementarity is intricately linked to the meaning of language. 
The new vocabulary of the Rome Statute captures concepts that are original yet 
difficult to comprehend, unless we cast off the usual terms associated with 
international (criminal) law and their accompanying immanent presumptions. A 
high degree of conjunctivity is established in the Rome Statute, where the ICC and 
the domestic courts coexist and cooperate.
The Statute regulates the exercise of discretion through a series of mechanisms, 
effectively diversifying checks amongst the key players in the international 
community (States, Security Council, Assembly of States Parties, Judiciary, NGOs 
and other lesser players). Discretionary power is monitored through deliberation 
and communication. While regulation of the discretionary powers of the 
Prosecutor is significant within the Rome Statute, a subtler but equally effective 
form of regulation exists, checking the discretionary powers of the judiciary. These 
structural constraints on the exercise of judicial authority exist in all international 
courts, but they are particularly strong in the ICC as evidenced by a closer reading 
of the Rome Statute and in the context of international criminal law. The Statute 
does not centralize legal authority in one location.
The emerging picture of the ICC is one of a very tempered court, only "asserting its 
jurisdiction” in those most exceptional of cases. When so doing, it is under the 
utmost of control. The case study of the TRCs and associated amnesties reveals 
how restrictive it is, including the presumption that, in any given situation, the
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domestic courts are deemed to be best suited to investigate or prosecute. This 
presumption is only countered when: there is evidence that domestic courts are 
unwilling and incapable (due to a collapse in whole or in part of the judicial 
system), or that they have acted in bad faith or through an abuse of process. This 
is a somewhat different stand to how the ICTY (and ultimately the Security Council 
operating through it) regards amnesties -  generally viable for those lesser 
individuals accused but not viable for those who have abused their fiduciary 
responsibilities both to the State and to the international community to prevent and 
repress international crimes. The ICTY approach does not presume that a case is 
inadmissible automatically. A great deal of discretion is invested within the 
Tribunal. This is not the case with the ICC, where the presumption that a case is 
inadmissible exists and where oversight of the ICC's discretionary power is 
diversified throughout the international legal system.
This divergence in approach is representative of a much broader facet of how 
contemporary international law, not just international criminal law, operates. The 
contemporary international legal system is decentralized and disparate yet based 
upon equality, consensus, negotiation, deliberation and communication. A 
domestic legal system is based upon centralization (of judicial and political power), 
a hierarchical system of laws (and possibly even institutions), separation of 
powers, command and coercion. This is exactly what Kelsen describes. While 
coercion does exist in international law, it is very restricted and generally allocated 
to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Because legal, coercive 
power is partially centralized (although limited) in the hands of the Security 
Council, it might be identified as the primary threat to the decentralized order. 
International organizations and particularly regional arrangements reinforce the 
decentralized nature of the international legal system by ensuring that the doctrine 
of “implied powers” does not result in the United Nations’ (and in particular the 
Security Council) accretion of residual powers. The accretion of power in one 
location would lead to the evolution of a primary international legal and/or political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
organization. This is how trends toward centralization and hierarchy are diffused. 
Thus the reflexive international legal system is self-perpetuating.
Ironically it is the reflexive nature of the Rome Statute and the international legal 
order, which creates controversy. In both the Indian and American cases, there is 
an inability o f legal thinkers to accept an effective international legal system as 
being disparate and decentralized. Academic criticisms, such as the lack of 
coherence in a decentralized international legal order, presuppose a centralized 
legal order and even a hierarchical relationship between courts. This is a 
projection of one’s expectations of the domestic legal model onto the international 
legal system. It is a denial of the sui generis character of international law. India 
considers that the ICC must itself be a hierarchical court capable of making 
decisions without the need for oversight o f its discretionary power, let alone for its 
being diversified throughout the international legal system. Its objections to the 
failure to classify the use of nuclear weapons as an international crime, further 
illustrates its lack of understanding or recognition of complementarity in the Rome 
Statute, through a lack of understanding of its subject matter restrictions.
The American position is rooted in the argument that States should have primary 
responsibility for ensuring justice in the international system. Since the Security 
Council is the main body that regulates the actions of States in the international 
system, it should have exclusive control over how the ICC would assert its 
jurisdiction. Thus the ICC should be subordinated to the Security Council primarily 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, but not necessarily exclusively so. Again 
expectations of centralized legal and political authority resurface but this time 
instead of the ICC being at the top of the hierarchy, the Security Council is. 
American opposition further reflects the inability to get past Article 12 of the Rome 
Statute, seeing it as the only check on the way in which preconditions are 
established for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction -  and inadequate at that 
Provisions concerning admissibility, the real manner in which the Court* exercises
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jurisdiction over States, are glossed over. Without admissibility, how can 
complementarity be achieved? It cannot
The Rome Statute is an exceptional document It outlines an extremely complex 
yet sophisticated approach to prosecuting international criminals where States are 
unwilling or incapable of doing so. Simultaneously, it maintains the decentralized 
international legal order, without creating a court that asserts its jurisdiction in a 
supranational manner. It defines concepts and uses a new vocabulary to do so. It 
departs from the constraints of traditional views of international law. 
Complementarity is achieved through its procedures. The international 
diversification of oversight o f its discretionary powers gives it a unique reflexive 
character in the Habermasian sense. In many respects there is a reflection of the 
existing structure of the contemporary international legal system. Unfortunately 
the Rome Statute may be too avante garde. Most legal thinkers and political 
decision makers remain steeped in their domestic preconceptions of international 
law. The task confronting the ICC and the Assembly of States Parties is 
enormous. They will have to prove that the ICC can function as intended. 
Whether the officials of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties themselves 
folly understand the context of how the Court is supposed to operate will be crucial 
to its survival. In an environment where confusion abounds, the success of these 
tasks is by no means assured.
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